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ABSTRACT 
 
This dissertation consists of three empirical studies in finance and innovation. I study 
various financial factors affecting innovation such as stock market manipulation and public to 
private transaction. I also investigate the effect of ownership structure on these public to private 
transactions.  
The first study finds that the End-of-day price manipulation is associated with short-
termism of the firm’s orientation, long-term harm to a firm’s equity values, and commensurate 
with reduced incentives for employees to innovate. Insider trading, by contrast, enables innovators 
to achieve exacerbated profits from innovation. Using a sample of suspected manipulation events 
for all stocks from nine countries over the years 2003-2010, I find evidence consistent with these 
real impacts of market manipulation on innovation. These findings are not attributable to “bad” 
firms innovating less and manipulating more, since the average firm subjected to manipulation in 
the sample is more innovative during the pre-manipulation period. 
The second study investigates the effect of going private buyout transactions on the 
investments in innovation using an international sample of buyout transactions from 36 countries 
over 1997 to 2011. Patent counts and citations are used to proxy for quantity, quality and economic 
importance of innovation. The data indicate that the effect of buyouts on innovation is quite sizable 
in terms of quantity and quality, as both patent counts and citations drop following a buyout. I also 
find that the number of radical patents (i.e. more scientific) drop as well. When we split the sample 
into institutional and management buyouts the negative association is only confirmed for 
institutional buyouts. We find that the negative effect of buyouts on innovation is aggravated in 
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post-2006 period, suggesting that the nature of deals has worsened for innovation over time. The 
data also show that buyouts have a negative effect on innovation efficiency. 
The third study considers ownership structure of target firms that are subject to going 
private buyout transactions, which are often highly leveraged and give rise to potential agency 
conflicts among existing shareholders. In this study, I examine ownership structure prior to going 
private transactions in 33 countries around the world from 2002 to 2014.The data indicate strong 
and consistent evidence that pre-going private ownership is characterized by higher institutional 
and corporate ownership. Family ownership lowers the probability of a public to private 
transaction.  Stronger creditor rights increase the probability of going private particularly for whole 
company and institutional buyouts.
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
This dissertation contributes to the fields of innovation and finance. Considering the increasingly 
competitive environment within which firms operate, innovation is critical in ensuring that firms 
can differentiate themselves from their competitors. In a knowledge based global economy, 
governments around the world are also placing a strong emphasis on innovation output and 
efficiency. Since innovative projects are both risky and capital intensive, a developed financial 
sector plays an important role in the innovation process (Amore et al., 2013; Laeven et al., 2015). 
Previous studies have looked at various financial factors that impact innovation such as banking 
deregulation (Chava et al., 2013), institutional ownership (Aghion et al., 2013) and stock liquidity 
(Fang et al., 2014).  
This dissertation comprises of three essays. The first two essays contribute to the 
innovation and finance literature by identifying additional factors such as stock market 
manipulation and public to private transactions, which have an impact on the quantity and quality 
of innovation. In the third essay, the dissertation delves further into public to private transactions 
and identifies ownership structure as having a significant impact on the decision to go private. 
In the first study we investigate whether stock market manipulation affects innovation. We 
hypothesize that a company whose stock is subject to a high degree of manipulation would have 
increased incentives to focus on short term factors at the cost of long term investments such as in 
innovation.  When the determinants of stock prices are influenced by non-fundamental factors such 
as manipulation, the managers of these companies would have less of an incentive to focus on long 
term investments in R&D that increase the fundamental value of the companies. 
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Most studies on market manipulation have focused on the financial impact of manipulation. 
For example, Cumming, Johan, & Li (2011) looked at how the exchange trading rules pertaining 
to market manipulation, over time and across markets, significantly affects liquidity. Aggarwal & 
Wu (2006) examine stock market manipulations and its implications for stock market efficiency. 
However, there have been no studies that consider the effect of stock market manipulation on real 
investments such as in innovation.  
The effects of financial market misconduct have been widely studied because the potential 
consequences can be dire. In this paper, we identify reduced innovative activity as an additional 
consequence to financial market misconduct. This is a result and study that has not been performed 
before. The study is an international one and we analyze whether there firms that get manipulated 
or whose management engages in Insider trading will subsequently have reduced incentives to 
innovate.  
Why do we think that manipulation affects innovation? The link between manipulation and 
innovation is not immediately evident – one may wonder why a manipulated firm’s scientist would 
behave any differently or innovate any less than the scientist in a competing non-manipulated firm. 
However, the presence of manipulation is strongly associated with short-termist behavior. Ferreira 
et al. (2014) has observed that public companies have strong incentives to focus on short term 
projects because good news is usually very quickly incorporated into the valuation of the company. 
A public company that is being constantly manipulated, whether the manipulation is positive or 
negative, is likely to have an exacerbated negative effect on innovation. If the manipulation leads 
to negative prices, there would be strong incentives for the management to engage in short term 
projects in order to infuse some good news into the market and help push the prices up. On the 
other hand, if manipulation leads to higher equity prices, then the management would have to take 
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on projects that would provide support for this over-valuation. This is more likely to be short term 
projects with an immediate payoff. 
Manipulation is also likely to negatively affect long term equity values – this would have 
a negative effect on scientists who may be holding equity options in the company. According to 
Chang et al. (2015) employee stock options have a positive effect on innovation. However, when 
employee stock options are coupled with managerial manipulation of stock prices, Zhang et al. 
(2008) find that this leads to incentive misalignment. 
Market manipulation may also negatively affect innovation by increasing information 
asymmetry and an associated increase in cost of capital. According to Hirshleifer, Hsu, & Li (2012) 
information about prospects of new innovations are especially hard to process and on average there 
will be positive (negative) abnormal returns after good (bad) news related to prospects for firms’ 
innovation. Aboody & Lev (2000) identified R&D intensity as a major source of information 
asymmetry which lead to larger insider trading gains. This information asymmetry associated with 
innovation is further exacerbated by the presence of manipulators who make information seekers 
(arbitrageurs) less effective at ferreting out information about the firm’s prospects (Allen and Gale 
1992). Aggarwal & Wu (2006) find that increasing the number of information seekers may worsen 
market efficiency when there are manipulators present.  
On the other hand, manipulation may enhance the gains to insiders from innovation, which 
would, in turn, increase the incentives for managers to innovate. The link between market 
manipulation and innovation is ambiguous in theory, and one must, therefore, look to data to 
ascertain the validity of the connection between manipulation and innovation. 
4 
 
PATSTAT provides an international patent dataset for 92 countries with firm level data on 
the number of patents applied, patents granted and citations. It contains basic bibliographic 
information on patents, including the identity number of the application and granted patent, the 
date of the patent application, the date when the patent is granted, the track record of patent 
citations and inventor identification for each patent application. The PATSTAT database is 
published biannually and we use the 2014 Autumn edition. 
This study covers 11 stock exchanges from nine countries from 2003 to 2010. The sample 
includes the Australian Securities Exchange, TSX Venture Exchange, Shanghai Stock Exchange, 
Bombay Stock Exchange, National Stock Exchange of India Ltd., Tokyo Stock Exchange, New 
Zealand Stock Exchange, Singapore Exchange, Stockholm Stock Exchange, Nasdaq Stock Market 
and New York Stock Exchange.  
We construct a dataset of the frequency and severity of various kinds of manipulations 
(such as the end of day manipulation measure used in Aitken, Cumming, & Zhan (2015a, 2015b)). 
We use two measures of manipulation: 1) end-of-day price dislocation (EOD), and 2) information 
leakage (infoleakage) alerts computed by the CMCRC and SMARTS surveillance staff. Next, we 
relate the frequency and severity of different types of market manipulations across markets and 
over time to various measures of innovation such as the number of patents and number of citations. 
In addition, this study matches firm-specific manipulation data with firm-specific innovation data 
to carry out more direct tests of whether manipulation affects innovation.   
In the second study, we investigate the effects of public to private buyout transactions (also 
known as a going private transaction) on investments in innovation using an international sample 
of buyout transactions from 1997 to 2011. This study makes a distinction between institutional and 
management buyouts, and between patents that are radical in nature and those that are incremental. 
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There have been various studies on the effect of Private Equity and Leveraged Buyouts 
(LBO) on firm’s financial and accounting performance. Cumming el al. (2007) reviews this 
literature and finds that in general performance of companies that experience buyouts improve 
following the buyout transaction. Desbrieres and Schatt (2002) find that following private equity 
buyouts, firms’ improve their accounting performance compared to similar firms that did not have 
a buyout transaction. Groh and Gottschalg (2006) find that the financial performance of buyout 
firms is higher compared to the control group of firms.  
There have also been numerous studies that analyzed the effect of buyouts on real factors 
such as productivity. Lichtenberg and Siegel (1990) analyzed data from the US Census Bureau’s 
Longitudinal Research Database (LRD) that contains information about 19,000 large US 
manufacturing plants for the years 1972-1988, and found that plants that had a management buyout 
had higher total factor productivity (TFP) compared to similar plants in the same industry that did 
not experience a management buyout. Lerner et al. (2011) analyzed the patenting behavior of 472 
US firms after being part of a private equity transaction. They find that firms’ patenting activity 
accelerates following private equity buyouts. They also find that firms are more focused on their 
patenting activity following these type of transactions – and they tend to innovate more in 
technology fields in which they have focused historically. They focus entirely on private equity 
transactions that have been funded through substantial amount of debt, which are referred to as 
Leveraged Buyouts (LBOs).  
My study differs from Lerner’s in many important aspects. First, theirs is solely US based, 
while my study has an international scope and incorporates data from 36 countries. Second, their 
study only considers Private Equity buyout transactions that are associated with a substantial 
amount of indebtedness, while my study considers several types of public to private buyout 
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transactions such as management buyouts and institutional buyouts (of which Leveraged Private 
Equity buyouts is a subset). Finally, their study does not make a distinction between radical and 
incremental patents, while my study uses an intuitive measure that distinguishes between these 
two types of innovation. 
Institutional buyouts refer to those buyouts where a Private Equity firm has taken a 50% 
stake or more in the target company or is the parent of the acquirer. The acquisition often takes 
place through a ‘new company’ (newco) or an acquisition vehicle. Management buyouts refer to 
those buyouts where the Management of the company buys at least 50% of the company from its 
existing owners. A private equity company is sometimes brought in to aid the purchase through 
provision of equity funding. A ‘new company’ (newco) is normally formed by the management 
team specifically to purchase the Target.   
We stipulate that institutional investors might have different incentives and long-term 
policies than management. It is often claimed that institutional buyouts by Private Equity firms 
have a shorter time horizon and hence, their objective is to restructure the company in a way that 
provides short term benefits at the cost of long term objectives such as innovation. If this view 
holds, then we would expect to see a drop in the quantity and quality of innovation following the 
Institutional buyout transactions. 
Not all patents are made the same and the importance of patents is another important 
dimension to consider while studying innovative activity. Previous studies on innovation has used 
citation counts and measures such as “Generality” and “Originality” to measure the quality and 
content of the patents. We propose an intuitive measure that uses Non-Patent literature to 
distinguish between radical and incremental patents. Patents are segregated into radical and 
incremental innovations similar to Griffith and Macartney (2014). If a patent has at least one 
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citation to Non-Patent literature (NPL), we consider that patent as a radical innovation. NPL 
generally refers to scientific journals and therefore, patents making citations to NPL are likely to 
be new and radical innovation. 
We collect buyout transactions from Zephyr database. Only deals where the acquirer 
bought 100% of the target firm are considered. We include all completed buyout transactions from 
1997 to 2011 (we need three years post buyout on patents) from 36 countries. We choose only 
buyout deals where the target firm had at least one successful patent applied for and granted from 
3 years before the transaction and to 3 years afterwards (similar to Lerner et al., 2011). Like the 
first study, the patent data is derived from EPO’s Worldwide Patent Statistical Database 
(PATSTAT). We are using the 2014 Autumn edition of this database. 
The main measure of innovation used in the paper is the number of citations received by 
patents. The number of patents applied for and granted is also used as a measure of innovation. 
Two separate measures of patent citations are used in the paper. The first measure, Citation count, 
considers all the citations received by a patent from the grant date onwards. The second measure, 
Absolute citation count, consider only the citations made within the three-year period, starting 
from the year of grant of the patent to 3 years following the grant date. The Absolute citation 
measure mitigates the issue of truncation towards the end of the sample.  
Due to the count nature of the innovation variables, we initially considered using the 
Poisson model. However, like other studies using patent data, we find over-dispersion in our main 
dependent variables and thus we decided to use the negative binomial model instead. The main 
independent variables of the model are year dummies of the patent filing relative to the buyout 
year. 
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In the third study, we examine the ownership structure prior to going private transactions 
in 33 countries around the world from 2002 to 2014, with the aim of identifying whether ownership 
structure impacts the decision of going private. Since most of the going private transactions are 
highly leveraged, and involve potential agency conflicts among existing shareholders, we 
hypothesize that ownership structure should have a significant effect on the decision to go private. 
We consider three types of ownership structures in the study, those characterized by higher 
institutional, corporate or family ownership. In addition, we also study the impact of creditor rights 
and legal conditions on the decision to go private. 
This study analyzes whether there are substantial differences between firms’ ownership 
structure prior to the going private transaction. We hypothesize that firms with certain ownership 
structure would be more likely to be taken private. Different types of owners would have different 
objectives and incentives on how they affect the firm’s policies, how they are affected by a decision 
to sell the firm and how they engage in the management of the firm. To identify different types of 
ownership structures, we consider the percentage ownership as well as block ownership by 
corporate, institutional and family owners. We expect that the agency problems are more severe 
when a greater percentage of the firm is controlled by corporate or institutional shareholders and 
it is possible to have more gains from public to private transactions in this case. In addition, the 
corporate and institutional investors have a shorter investment horizon when compared to family 
owners, and they would be more interested in an exit through a public to private transaction. Family 
owners, on the other hand typically have a tighter control over the management team and face 
fewer agency problems. They also usually have a longer investment horizon. These factors make 
it less likely that firms with family ownership experience a public to private transaction. 
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In addition, the fashion in which a firm is taken private might also differ. We consider the 
following types of public to private buyouts – whole firm buyouts, buildup strategy buyouts, 
management buyouts and institutional buyouts. In the case of whole firm buyout, the public to 
private transaction occurs as a single event, whereas in the case of a build up strategy the 
transaction is completed in several stages.  
A public to private transaction is termed as an institutional buyout if a Private Equity firm 
takes a majority stake in the target company or is the parent of the acquirer, whereas in a 
management buyout the existing management of the company buys at least 50% of the company 
from its existing owners. 
Institutional ownership is computed based on the ownership that is held by institutional 
investors such as private equity, banks, venture capital etc. Corporate ownership is the percentage 
of ownership held by an industrial company. Family ownership is based on the percentage of 
ownership by family. Block ownership is defined as the case where a single type of owner has 
more than 10% of the ownership of a company.   
We also study the effects of creditor rights and legal conditions on the likelihood of going 
private, for different types of buyouts. It is likely that stronger creditor rights increase the 
probability of going private.  
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Chapter 2 
Market Manipulation and Innovation 
 
“The stock-price manipulation involved in massive buybacks—and the resulting exorbitant executive 
pay—are thus not just moral or legal problems. The consequences… net disinvestment, loss of 
shareholder value, diminished investment in innovation, destruction of jobs, exploitation of workers, 
windfall gains for activist insiders, rapidly increasing inequality and sustained economic stagnation.” -- 
Forbes1 
2.1. Introduction 
Stock market volatility has been shown to redirect management towards short-term 
planning, which in turn influences R&D and marketing budgets (Chakravarty and Grewal, 2011).  
In this paper, we extend this notion to examine a link between stock market manipulation and 
R&D outcomes in the form of patents and patent citations. 
Financial market misconduct comes in a variety of forms. Two of the most commonly 
observed (and, therefore, commonly studied) forms of manipulation include insider trading (Allen 
and Gale, 1992; Allen and Gorton, 1992; Meulbrook, 1992; Bebchuk and Fershtman, 1994; 
Agrawal and Cooper, 2015; Bernilie et al., 2015; Aitken et al., 2015b) and end-of-day 
manipulation (Atanasov et al., 2015; Aitken et al., 2015a). It is well known that when there is 
information only known by insiders, they can trade in advance of public dissemination of the 
information for short-term profit at the expense of the counterparties in the trade and at the expense 
of the long-term value to the firm. It is perhaps somewhat less well known that there are massive 
                                                          
1 Steven Denning, 2017, “Resisting The Lure Of Short-Termism: Kill 'The World's Dumbest Idea'” in Forbes 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/stevedenning/2017/01/08/resisting-the-lure-of-short-termism-how-to-achieve-long-
term-growth/#26c739101ca0  
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incentives to manipulate closing price by ramping up end-of-day trading to push the closing price 
to an artificially high level. End-of-day prices are used to determine the expiration value of 
derivative instruments and directors’ options, determine the price of seasoned equity issues, 
evaluate broker performance, compute net asset values of mutual funds, and compute stock indices 
(Aitken et al., 2015).2 
 In theory, there are different perspectives on whether or not market manipulation should 
enhance or mitigate innovation. On one hand, the presence of market manipulation is associated 
with short-termism of the firm’s orientation, which is inconsistent with a long-term managerial 
focus on innovation. Over- or under-valuation of a firm’s equity causes agency problems (Jensen, 
2005; Marciukaityte and Varma, 2008), and in turn agency problems impede innovation (Manso, 
2011).  Also, market manipulation imposes long-term harm to a firm’s equity values and 
commensurate reduced incentives for employees to innovate. Ferreira et al. (2014) find that public 
firms have fewer incentives when exploring radical new innovations, because the rapid 
incorporation of good news into market prices creates incentives for short-termist behavior. 
Bereskin et al. (2014) find that firms engaging in managerial manipulation of R&D expenditures 
have reduced levels of firm innovation. Market manipulation may be yet another reason for why 
public firms innovate less and have more incentives for short-termist behavior. On the other hand, 
manipulation may enhance the gains to insiders from innovation, which would, in turn, increase 
the incentives for managers to innovate. The link between market manipulation and innovation is 
                                                          
2 See also Aggarwal and Wu (2006); Allen and Gale (1992); Allen and Gorton (1992); Allen et al. (2006), Comerton-
Forde and Putnins (2014) Merrick et al. (2005); O'Hara (2001); O’Hara and Mendiola (2003); Peng and Röell (2013); 
Pirrong (1999, 2004); and Röell (1993). 
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ambiguous in theory, and one must, therefore, look to data to ascertain the validity of the 
connection between manipulation and innovation. 
 In this paper, we empirically study the link between market manipulation and innovation 
by assembling a sample of 131,129 firm-year observations across nine countries (Australia, 
Canada, China, India, Japan, New Zealand, Singapore, Sweden, and the United States) spanning 
the years 2003-2010. It is widely regarded that insider trading is hard to prove, as trading before 
information announcements may be attributable to market anticipation. Similarly, end-of-day 
dislocation may not always be attributable to manipulation and, instead, arise through unusual 
volatility and end-of-day market activity. Our empirical measures of insider trading and end-of-
day manipulation are based on surveillance data of suspected insider trading and suspected end-
of-day dislocation derived from alerts (computer algorithms that send messages to surveillance 
authorities). The advantages of these measures are that they avoid delays in enforcement, and they 
are uniform without bias from differences in enforcement across firms and countries and over time. 
Also, suspected problems with a firm can be as equally harmful to a firm as litigated problems, 
regarding focusing management on short-termism, hurting equity values, and diverting attention 
away from innovative activities. 
The data examined in this paper indicate that end-of-day dislocation mitigates patents, and 
we argue that this evidence is consistent with the notion that manipulation is associated with short-
termism of the firm’s orientation, long-term harm to a firm’s equity values, and commensurate 
with reduced incentives for employees to innovate. The economic significance of this effect is 
greater when dislocation occurs on days when dislocation is more likely to be attributable to 
manipulation, such as at the end of the month, quarter, and/or year. The data indicate that end-of-
day dislocation has a pronounced negative impact on patenting, even after controlling for other 
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market efficiency variables such as liquidity, among other factors. The economic significance is 
such that the presence of end-of-day dislocation mitigates a subsequent year’s patenting by 7.3%. 
Estimated differently, a 1-standard deviation increase in the number of dislocation events in one 
year is associated with a 1.9% reduction in patenting during the subsequent year.  
In contrast to the negative impact of dislocation on patents, information leakage has no 
effect on low-quality patents, but it does have a positive impact on high-quality patents. The 
intuition behind this result is that insiders make use of superior information to profit from 
innovation. It is very similar in spirit to evidence from Agrawal and Cooper (2015) and Atanasov 
et al. (2015) who show that insider trading around times of scandal and market manipulation is 
common and used to enhance profits to insiders. In particular, we find that the economic 
significance is such that the presence of information leakage cases increases a subsequent year’s 
patent citations by 5.1%. Estimated differently, a 1-standard deviation increase in the number of 
information leakage cases in one year is associated with a 1.65 % increase in patent citations in 
the subsequent year. Interestingly, the strong positive association between insider trading and 
patents is only observed in non-crisis times and for high-quality patents. The intuition is that at 
any given time there exists the negative impact of misconduct on innovation due to short-termism 
and poor managerial focus. For information leakage, however, there is a counter force of insiders 
profiting more. In bad economic times, the ability to illegally profit as an insider is reduced, and 
the risk of being caught is greater, because regulators are especially diligent in crisis periods. 
Overall, the effect of short-termism associated with information leakage is stronger than the latter 
effect of expected profits during crisis periods. 
 
14 
 
One possible concern with the connection between innovation and manipulation is that 
“bad” firms are more likely to be associated with manipulation, and “bad” firms are less likely to 
innovate. If this is the case, a finding that firms with manipulated stock prices patent less is not 
particularly surprising, because both are symptomatic of firms being bad-type firms; put 
differently, the effect may be a selection effect versus a treatment effect. We can rule out this 
explanation at the outset, since, in our sample, we observe that in the period prior to end-of-day 
manipulation, firms that are manipulated have 0.43 patents on average, compared to 0.39 patents 
for those that do not face end-of-day manipulation. Similarly, in the period prior to information 
leakage, firms that have information leakage have 0.95 patents on average, compared to 0.35 
patents for those without information leakage. Therefore, the data do not support a connection 
between manipulation and innovation due to a third unobservable “bad quality” variable. We 
provide a variety of propensity score matching techniques and other checks to examine the change 
in patents from the pre-manipulation to post-manipulation period to establish a causal connection 
between manipulation and innovation and explicitly show the treatment estimates (Table 2.10, 
below). 
 The link between market manipulation and patenting brings into focus related literatures – 
market microstructure, financial misconduct and regulation, and innovation. To this end, there are 
two papers that are most closely related to ours. First, Levine et al. (2015) examine whether or not 
insider trading enforcement affects subsequent innovation, and they find a strong positive link, 
based on a sample of 94 countries from 1976 to 2006. Second, Fang et al. (2014) show that there 
is a negative relationship between liquidity and innovation due to increased exposure to hostile 
takeovers and a higher presence of institutional investors who do not actively gather information 
or monitor. Fan et al.’s evidence is taken from a sample of U.S. firms over from 1994 to 2005. 
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Our analyses, however, are distinct from these papers in a number of important ways. First, 
in Levine et al. (2015), the sample covers a period where there is variation in whether or not insider 
trading laws were enforced, and the enforcement of insider trading laws is the central variable of 
interest. By contrast, in our more recent sample, there is no variation in whether or not inside 
trading laws were enforced, but there is variation in enforcement pertaining to a broader set of 
ways in which stocks may be manipulated. We find such variation to have a positive effect on 
manipulation, consistent with Levine et al. 
Second, we examine whether or not there were actual events of apparent manipulation 
based on alerts (computer algorithms) examining historical microstructure data. To this end, our 
paper is distinct from the Fang et al. study, which relates liquidity to innovation; also, their study 
does not examine whether or not a stock was manipulated, such as through insider trading or end-
of-day manipulation. Unlike Fang et al., the literature surprisingly shows a negative relation 
between patenting and liquidity; we observe a robust and significantly positive effect of liquidity 
on patenting, including in the U.S. subsample, and we apply the same patent data source, as in 
prior papers, but for more recent years. This new finding suggests that the relation between 
liquidity and patenting is not stable over time. Our data indicate that the positive effect of liquidity 
on innovation, however, is mitigated by the presence of end-of-day dislocation, which implies that 
more nuanced market microstructure relationships explain innovation more (or better?) than 
previously documented. 
The data examined herein also confirm the importance of country-level factors that affect 
innovation, such as intellectual property rights across countries that encourage patenting, and firm-
specific variables like age and capital expenditures. Our findings are robust to numerous 
robustness checks, such as including/excluding the U.S. during financial crisis years, patent 
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applications versus patent grants, different liquidity deciles, propensity score matching analyses, 
and difference-in-differences tests for firms with and without dislocation, among other factors. 
 Our evidence has a number of important policy implications. Manipulation is common, 
and there are significant expenditures across countries to detect securities fraud (Jackson and Roe, 
2009). Our evidence suggests that there are significant externalities to manipulation, including a 
marked reduction in innovation. In view of these externalities, our findings imply that expenditures 
on the enforcement of securities regulations around the world may be more important than 
previously considered. 
 This paper is organized as follows: Section 2 discusses the economic link between market 
manipulation and innovation. Section 3 presents the data. Section 4 provides univariate tests of the 
relation between market manipulation and patents. Multivariate analyses are presented in Section 
5. Limitations and extensions are discussed in Section 6. The final section offers concluding 
remarks. Additional robustness tests are provided in the Appendices as well as in an accompanying 
Online Appendix.  
2.2. Economic Link between Market Manipulation and Innovation 
 Nearly without exception, financial market misconduct is viewed as being very costly to 
financial markets and, thus, is an active area of scholarly study (Kyle and Viswanathan, 2008). 
Research on the consequences of financial market misconduct can be categorized into four types 
of papers: (1) managerial consequences, such as salaries, termination, and jail terms (Karpoff et 
al., 2008a; Bereskin et al., 2014; Aharony et al., 2015); (2) stock market participation at the country 
level (La Porta at el., 1997, 1998, 2002, 2006) and individual level (Giannetti and Wang, 2016); 
(3) consequences in term funds under management, such as for hedge funds (Bollen and Pool, 
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2009; Gerken and Dimmock, 2012, 2016) and mutual funds (Chapman et al., 2013); and (4) share 
price declines and legal penalties (Karpoff et al., 2008b; Karpoff and Lou, 2010; Dyck et al., 2010, 
2014; Vismara et al., 2015). In this paper, we extend this line of literature by examining a fifth 
category not previously studied: the effect of financial market misconduct on innovation.  
Table 2.1 summarizes the economic causal link between market manipulation market, in a 
microstructure sense, and innovation. At first glance, the link between market microstructure an 
innovation, normally two very distinct fields, may seem unusual, but there is a stream of literature 
that connects market liquidity to innovation (e.g., Fang et al., 2014); therefore, this paper is not the 
first to make the connection. The innovation here is to change the analysis of liquidity (e.g., bid-
ask spreads) and instead focus on market manipulation. Arguably, as manipulation and fraud can 
have substantial consequences for a firm with respect to a firm’s long-term economic outcomes 
(Karpoff et al., 2008a,b, 2012), it is natural to focus on market manipulation and not see the other 
microstructure properties of a firm’s stock, such as its liquidity. It is widely regarded that 
governance affects innovation (Ayyagari et al., 2011, 2014; O’Connor and Rafferty 2012; Chen et 
al., 2014; Lyandres and Palazzo, 2016; Yung, 2016), and here, we are extending the governance 
impact to an analysis of market misconduct.   
[Table 2.1 here] 
As discussed in the introduction, here we consider the two most common types of 
manipulation: 1) end-of-day manipulation (defined by massive share price movements during the 
last 15 minutes of trading one day and a reversal the next morning), and 2) information leakage 
(defined by massive share price movements prior to news announcements). These manipulation 
events are measured in the year prior to the innovation year and pertain to manipulations that were 
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not caused by the announcement of the innovation outcome, but were, instead, in reference to other 
firm events. 
Table 2.1 consists of two panels: Panel A lists the first-order effects connecting 
manipulation to innovation. Over- or under-valuation of a firm’s equity gives rise to severe agency 
problems insofar as managers have short-term pressures to manipulate information released to the 
public to justify the improper valuation (Jensen, 2005; Marciukaityte and Varma, 2008), and in 
turn there agency problems and short-term perspectives impede innovation (Manso, 2011). 
Manipulation damages long-term equity values (Aggarwal and Wu, 2006; Karpoff et al., 2008a,b; 
Dyck and Zingales, 2010; Agrawal and Cooper, 2015; Aitken et al., 2015a,b). The reduced long-
term prospects for a firm worsen its ability to raise future equity (Brown et al., 2009, 2013) and 
shift the focus of a firm’s management to short-termism and short-term pay structures (Peng and 
Röell, 2014). The short-term focus of the firm is inconsistent with long-term innovation outcomes, 
as innovation requires a long-term horizon (Manso, 2011) and incentive pay (Shen and Zhang, 
2017). Therefore, in general, we expect manipulation -- such as that of end-of-day manipulation -
- to negatively impact innovation.  As well, we note that it does not matter who is actually 
responsible for the end-of-day manipulation in terms of either insiders or outsiders, as the effects 
summarized in Table 2.1 all point in the same direction that it will have a negative impact on a 
firm’s innovation. 
There is a caveat with respect to the impact of information leakage and insider trading on 
innovation that is distinct from end-of-day manipulation and innovation. Specifically, insiders may 
take advantage of the knowledge of innovation and trade in advance of the announcement of an 
innovation (see also Agrawal and Cooper, 2015; Levine, 2015). The ability of insiders to profit off 
of the inside knowledge of an innovation announcement may lead to exacerbated profits for 
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insiders and inspire a firm with wrongdoers as insiders to pursue more innovation. While advance 
knowledge about innovations would not be the only informational advantage held by insiders – we 
still believe that information on innovation would be particularly valuable to anyone engaged in 
insider trading because this information can have a large impact on the long term growth and 
valuation of the company. If this effect outweighs the other effects, it is possible that a firm with 
frequent and pronounced information leakage has more innovation. 
Our two hypotheses are, therefore, as follows: 
Hypothesis 1: End-of-day manipulation lowers innovation in subsequent years. 
Hypothesis 2: Information leakage raises innovation in subsequent years if the effect of 
insider profits outweighs other effects. 
Table 2.1, Panel B lists three second-order effects. First, stock price informativeness is a 
second-order effect insofar as end-of-day manipulation (insider trading) lowers (raises) stock price 
informativeness which, in turn, reduces (raises) information leakage to competing firms and 
thereby reduces (increases) incentives for firms to invest in innovation (see the model of Ding, 
2015, for complete details). Second, both end-of-day price manipulation and insider trading reduce 
liquidity, in line with the close connection between manipulation, price accuracy, and liquidity 
proposed by Kyle and Viswanathan (2008). A reduction in liquidity, in turn, may have a positive 
effect on innovation, if mergers are thereby less likely (Fang et al., 2014); conversely, a reduction 
in liquidity may have a negative effect on innovation if the ability to raise future capital is lower 
(Brown et al., 2009, 2013). Third, firms with pronounced end-of-day dislocation and information 
leakage may be less likely to be the subject of mergers, which, in turn, reduces the possibility of 
takeovers and, hence, reduces the likelihood of employee layoffs, thereby increasing the incentives 
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of employees to innovate (Fang et al., 2014). While these and possible other second-order effects 
may exist in practice, they are not expected to dominate the first-order effects summarized above. 
We test the two hypotheses summarized above and listed in Table 2.1, below. 
2.3. Data and Variable Construction 
2.3.1 Sample Selection and Data Sources 
This study covers 11 stock exchanges from nine countries from 2003 to 2010. The sample 
includes Australia (the Australian Securities Exchange [ASX]), Canada (the TSX Venture 
Exchange [TSXV]), China (the Shanghai Stock Exchange [SSE]), India (the Bombay Stock 
Exchange [BSE] and the National Stock Exchange of India Ltd. [NSE]), Japan (the Tokyo Stock 
Exchange [TSE]), New Zealand (the New Zealand Stock Exchange [NZX]), Singapore (the 
Singapore Exchange Ltd. [SGX]), Sweden (the Stockholm Stock Exchange [STO]) and the United 
States (the Nasdaq Stock Market [NASDAQ] and the New York Stock Exchange [NYSE]). Table 
2.2 provides the definition and source of variables used in the study.  
[Table 2.2 here] 
Patent data is obtained from the EPO’s Worldwide Patent Statistical Database 
(PATSTAT), which includes patent data on 90 million patent documents from over 100 patent 
offices around the world. The PATSTAT database is published biannually, and we use the 2014 
Autumn edition. The database provides information regarding the first publication and grant dates, 
citation links, technological classifications, and applicant and inventor identifications for each 
patent application. The patent data is augmented using the ECOOM-EUROSTAT-EPO PATSTAT 
Person Augmented Table (EEE-PPAT), which provides sector codes and harmonized company 
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names for each of the patent applications (Plessis et al., 2009; Magerman et al., 2009; Peeters et 
al., 2009). The manipulation data is obtained from SMARTS Group Inc. and the Capital Markets 
Cooperative Research Centre (CMCRC). SMARTS Group Inc. provides market surveillance 
products to over 40 stock exchanges around the world. Firm-level data is obtained from 
Datastream.  
2.3.2 Measuring Innovation 
In the study, we used two measures of patenting activity: 1) the number of patent 
applications made by a firm in a year, and 2) the number of citations received by these patents. 
The number of patent applications is a measure of the quantity or productivity of innovation, while 
the number of citations received is a measure of the relative importance or quality of innovation. 
R&D expenses were not considered in addition to patenting as a measure of innovation because of 
the lack of quality R&D data for international companies. 
We use the logarithm of one plus the number of patent applications in the year t+1, 
INNOV_PAT(t+1), as the main dependent variable in the study. We use the logarithm of the 
number of patents, because the patent data are right skewed with the 75th percentile of the number 
of patents equal to zero. We add one to the number of patents before taking the logarithm to ensure 
that we don’t have missing values for firms with 0 patents. We use the application date of patents 
instead of the grant date, because the application date is closer to the actual date of innovation.  
The second measure of innovation, INNOV_CITE(t+1), is the natural logarithm of one 
plus the number of citations received for patents filed in the year t+1. The number of citations 
received has been adjusted for truncation bias, based on the methodology developed by Hall et al. 
(2001, 2005). We implemented the following procedure to adjust for the truncation bias in 
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citations: (1) For each cohort of patents applied for between 1991 and 2002, we obtain the citation 
lag of the patents using 12 years of actual citation data. To illustrate, for patents applied in 1991 
(Cohort 1), we measure the number of citations received in each year from 1991 (citation lag of 0) 
to 2002 (citation lag of 11). Similarly, for patents applied for in 2002 (Cohort 12), we measure the 
number of citations received in each year from 2002 (citation lag of 0) to 2013 (citation lag of 11). 
(2) For each major IPC technology classification of patents, k, in each of the cohorts, we obtain 
the citation lag distribution, W, as the proportion of citations received with lags of 0 to 11 years 
with the total number of citations received. Subsequently, we compute the cumulative share of 
citations received with lags of 0 to 11 within each technology classification of patents. We average 
the cumulative share of citations across the 12 cohorts. (3) Finally, for patent citations received 
between 2003 and 2010, we divide the actual citations received by the average cumulative share 
of citations and use the formula: 
𝐴𝑑𝑗𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠௧௞ =
𝑈𝑛𝑎𝑑𝑗𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠௧௞
∑ 𝑊௦௞ଶ଴ଵଷି௧௦ୀ଴
, 
 
where Wsk is the average share of citations received with lag s, within technology classification k. 
As part of robustness checks, we also used two alternative measures for the number of 
patent applications: 1) the number of patents applied for and eventually granted 
(INNOV_PAT_GRNT), and 2) the number of patents applied for and eventually granted, adjusted 
for truncation bias (INNOV_PAT_GRNT_ADJ). Using only patent applications that have been 
eventually granted introduces truncation bias, because there is a lag between patent application 
and the grant date of the patent. We correct for this truncation bias by using the grant lag 
distribution, based on the methodology of Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg (2001, 2005). We compute 
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the grant lag distribution for patents filed and granted between 1991 and 2002. The truncation-
adjusted patents are then computed using: 
𝐴𝑑𝑗𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠 =
𝑈𝑛𝑎𝑑𝑗𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠
∑ 𝑊௦ଶ଴ଵସି௦ୀ଴
, 
where Ws is the application-grant lag distribution computed as the percentage of patents applied 
for in any year that has been granted in s year. 
Using patents as a measure of innovation has its disadvantages. By using the number of 
patents, we ignore differences between industries with regard to the intensity and duration of 
patents. We control for this by including industry- and firm-level controls for patent data. Using 
the number of patent applications also ignores how efficient the firms are at converting their 
innovative inputs (R&D expenditures and intangible inputs) to innovative outputs. 
2.3.3 Measuring Manipulation 
We use two measures of manipulation: 1) end-of-day price dislocation (EOD), and 2) 
information leakage (infoleakage) alerts computed by the CMCRC and SMARTS surveillance 
staff.  
An EOD price alert is created by looking at the price change between the last trade price 
(Pt) and last available trade price 15 minutes before the continuous trading period ends (Pt-15). For 
securities exchanges that have a closing auction, the close price at auction is used (Pauction). A price 
movement is dislocated if it is four standard deviations away from the mean price change during 
the benchmark period for the past 100 trading days. To be considered as a case of EOD price 
dislocation, at least 50% of the price dislocation has to revert at open on the next trading day. 
Hence, the price movement between the last trade price (Pt) and the next day’s opening price (Pt+1), 
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and between the last trade price (Pt) and last available trade price 15 minutes before the continuous 
trading period ends (Pt-15), has to be more than 50%. (Pauction or Pt - Pt+1)/(Pauction or Pt - Pt-15) ≥50%. 
To measure the information leakage alert, CMCRC and SMARTS first examine all news 
releases from the exchanges themselves. CMCRC and SMARTS measure the return to security 
from the six days prior to the announcement to the two days after the announcement. They double 
check the Thompson Reuters News Network to ensure that they did not miss any important news 
announcements. They consider only news events that have no companion news announcements 
that could explain price movements in the six days before and the two days after the relevant 
announcement that could explain the price movement. For each news announcement, a price 
movement is abnormal if it is three standard deviations away from the mean abnormal return 
during the 250-day benchmarking period ending 10 days before the news release. To be included 
in our sample, the stock must have at least 150 days’ worth of trading activities. A one-factor 
market model based on the market index for each exchange is used to calculate daily abnormal 
returns. To be included in the final data set as a suspected information leakage case, the CAR 
around each event over the period [t-6, t+2] must be three standard deviations away from the 
normal nine-day CAR for each individual stock. Once the suspected information leakage case is 
defined, the abnormal profit per case is calculated to include both the trading volume and multiple 
abnormal returns from six days before to the day before the news announcement. SMARTS 
surveillance staff independently examines the data to distinguish between market anticipation and 
suspected insider trading; since SMARTS includes as insider trading only large movements that 
are three-standard-deviation changes, the possibility that insider trades could be viewed as market 
anticipation is mitigated. 
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2.3.4 Measuring Control Variables 
The main control variables used in the study were obtained from Datastream. The control 
variables are measured at the end of the fiscal year t. We control for the profitability of the firm 
using the return on assets, ROA(t), measured as the income before extraordinary items divided by 
the book value of total assets. Asset tangibility, PPETA(t), is measured as the property, plant, and 
equipment expenditure divided by the book value of total assets. Leverage, LEV(t), is measured 
as the book value of debt divided by the book value of total assets. Investment in fixed assets, 
CAPEXTA(t), is measured as capital expenditures scaled by the book value of total assets. Firm 
age, LN_FIRM_AGE(t), is measured as a natural logarithm of one plus the firm i’s age, 
approximated by the number of years listed on Datastream. Manipulation’s negative effect on 
innovation might be stronger for smaller firms because innovators may be more aware of stock 
price manipulation, and hence may be more likely to change their behavior as a result. To account 
for this factor, we have included a MV_Decile variable within all the regression specification. The 
MV_Decile variable is a Market Value decile variable that takes a value of 1 to 10, based on the 
market value decile to which the firm belongs, within each country-year grouping, at the end of 
year t. 
Liquidity of the firm, Liquidity(t), is computed as the natural logarithm of the inverse of 
the AMIHUD measure of illiquidity. AMIHUD is computed as follows: 
𝐴௜௝ =
1
𝐷௜௬
෍
|𝑟௜௧|
𝐷𝑣𝑜𝑙௜௧
஽೔೤
௜ୀଵ
, 
where Aiy is the AMIHUD measure of firm i in year y. Rit and Dvolit are the daily return and daily 
dollar trading volume for stock i on day t. Diy is the number of days with available ratio in year y. 
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A higher AMIHUD value indicates a higher level of illiquidity. Hence, we use the logarithm of 
the inverse of AMIHUD as the measure of liquidity.  We have considered other variables such as 
price informativeness (Ding, 2015; Mathers et al., 2017) and other law and finance variables 
pertaining to creditor rights (La Porta et al., 1998), among other things, but did not find any 
material differences in the results reported herein.  Other specifications are available on request. 
The summary statistics of the main variables used in the study are provided in Table 2.3.  
[Table 2.3 here] 
2.4. Univariate Tests 
Table 2.4 presents univariate comparison of means tests and shows the comparison of the 
percentage change in patent applications [patent citations] for firms that experienced manipulation 
versus those that have not experienced end-of-day dislocation or information leakage over the 
period from t-1 to t+1, where t is the year in which there was manipulation. The non-manipulation 
sample in Table 2.4 is any firm-year observation where the EOD dummy or the information 
leakage dummy is equal to zero. Panel A shows the results for patent application. Panel B shows 
the results for patent citations. We separate the tests into regimes with high versus low intellectual 
property rights (where 5 is the cutoff, to account for very weak legal environments). 
The data indicate that prior to dislocation events, firms in low IPR environments that have 
experienced dislocation have significantly less pronounced changes in patent applications [patent 
citations] by -0.24%[0.57%] relative to those that have not experienced dislocation events where 
the change was 4.57% [4.46%], and these differences are statistically significant at the 1% level, 
consistent with Hypothesis 1. These differences are not statistically significant for firms in high 
IPR environments. 
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[Table 2.4 here] 
Table 2.4 also presents the univariate comparison tests for firms that have and have not 
experienced information leakage events. The data indicate that firms in low IPR environments that 
have experienced information leakage have a greater percentage increase, at 8.65%, in patent 
applications than those that have not, at 2.99%, and these differences are significant at the 1% 
level, consistent with Hypothesis 2; however, there is not a significant difference in patent citations 
among these firms in low IPR environments. Firms in high IPR environments that have 
experienced information leakage have a greater percentage increase, at 4.25% [21.89%], in patent 
applications [patent citations] than those that have not, at 0.43% [6.18%], and these differences 
are significant at the 1% level. 
Overall, the univariate tests are consistent with Hypothesis 1, that the impact of dislocation 
on patents is strongly negative and statistically significant, and this effect is particularly strong in 
low IPR regimes. However, the impact of information leakage on patents is strongly positive and 
significant, consistent with Hypothesis 2, and this effect is significant in both low and high IPR 
regimes. These effects are depicted graphically in Figures 2.1, 2.2.A and 2.2.B. 
[Figures 2.1 and 2.2 here] 
 To complement the univariate statistics, in Figure 2.1.A we present end-of-day dislocation 
and percentage changes in subsequent year patent applications by industry sector. The data indicate 
that for 8 of 11 sectors (not including oil and gas, banks, and software and computer services), 
there were higher levels of innovation among non-end-of-day dislocation firms. These differences 
were statistically significant for technology hardware and equipment, mining, industrial 
engineering, pharmaceuticals and biotechnology (consistent with other work linking capital 
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markets to market intelligence such as Markovitch, Steckel and Young, 2005), and software and 
computer services, at the 10% level, and insignificant in the other industries. Overall, the evidence 
in Figure 2.3.A strongly supports Hypothesis 1. 
[Figures 2.3.A and 2.3.B here] 
Figure 2.3.B presents information leakage and percentage changes in subsequent year 
patent applications by sector. The data indicate that innovation was higher in every sector in the 
year after information leakage except for in the area of financial services, and the differences were 
statistically significant for mining (1%), chemicals (5%), technology hardware and equipment 
(5%), and electronic and electrical equipment (10%). Overall, the evidence in Figure 2.3.B 
strongly supports Hypothesis 2. 
2.5. Multivariate Tests 
2.5.1. Base Model Specifications 
 Tables 2.5 and 2.6 present the baseline regression estimates with pooled OLS and random 
effects, respectively.3 We use the following regression specification in the case of pooled OLS 
method:  
INNOV_PAT(i, t + 1) [INNOV_CITE(i, t + 1)]  
=  a +  b1 ∗ EOD_Dummy_First(i, t)  +  b2 ∗ EOD_Dummy_Subsequent(i, t)  +  c
∗ Infoleak_Dummy(i, t)  +  c′Controls +  YR(t)  +  Firm(i)  +  error(i, t) 
The following regression specification is used in the case of Random effects model: 
                                                          
3 In addition to the Pooled OLS and Random Effects model, we used a Poisson model with the number of patent 
applications and the number of patent citations as the main dependent variable. We find similar results using either 
firm fixed effects or industry fixed effects Poisson models. 
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INNOV_PAT(i, t + 1) [INNOV_CITE(i, t + 1)]  
=  a +  b1 ∗ EOD_Dummy_First(i, t)  +  b2 ∗ EOD_Dummy_Subsequent(i, t)  +  c
∗ Infoleak_Dummy(i, t)  +  c1′Country_variable(Enforcement and IPR)  
+  c2′Interaction_Country_variable_EOD +  c3 ∗ Interaction_Liquidity_EOD 
+  d′Controls +  YR(t)  +  Sector(i)  +  error(i, t) 
Table 2.6 differs from Table 2.5 in that the use of random effects enables the inclusion of 
country-level institutional indices that do not vary over time. The results from the three regression 
models in Table 2.5 and five regression models in Table 2.6 are quite consistent and not sensitive 
to the inclusions of different sets of right-hand-side variables. 
[Tables 2.5 and 2.6 here] 
 Tables 2.5 and 2.6 indicate that the end-of-day dummy variable for the first year, in which 
there was dislocation, is statistically insignificant in all of the specifications, but the end-of-day 
subsequent dummy variable is negative and significant at least at the 5% level of significance in 
all of the specifications, consistent with Hypothesis 1. The economic significance is such that firms 
that have experienced end-of-day dislocation have lower patents by 3.5% in the most conservative 
estimate (Table 2.6, Panel A, Model 3), and by 7.7% in the least conservative estimate (Table 2.6, 
Panel A, Model 4).  
The dependent variable in these studies are certainly over dispersed with even the 75th percentile 
of patent equal to zero. To ensure our results are robust, we have also tried using a zero-inflated 
negative binomial model and found that our results were consistent in this specification as well. A 
zero-inflated negative binomial model is well suited to model data where the dependent variable 
has a lot of zero values. 
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In the above analyses, we have only considered the innovation output as measured by patent 
applications. This may raise the question that the negative effect of EOD manipulation on 
innovation may be a result of overinvestment. If this were the case, our results should not hold if 
we were considering only radically new and high-quality patents. While not a perfect measure of 
patent quality, citations do provide some insight into how important a patent is. Manipulation not 
just has a negative effect on total innovative output, as measured by patent applications, but we 
also observe a reduction in quality patents as well. This indicates that the reduction in innovation 
is not necessarily just associated with a fix to an overinvestment issue. Similarly, following end-
of-day dislocation, firms lower their citations by 15.4% in the most conservative estimate (Table 
2.6, Panel B, Model 5) and by 25.1% in the least conservative estimate (Table 2.6, Panel B, Model 
1). As an alternative specification, in which we use a count of the number of dislocation cases 
(Table 2.5, Model 2 and Table 2.6, Model 2), we see that a 1-standard deviation increase in the 
number of dislocation cases is associated with a 1.5% reduction in the number of patents in the 
most conservative estimate (Table 2.5, Panel A, Model 2) and a 1.9% reduction in the number of 
patents in the least conservative estimate (Table 2.6, Panel A, Model 2). Similarly, a 1-standard 
deviation increase in the number of dislocation cases is associated with a 5.9% reduction (Table 
2.5, Panel B, Model 2) in the number of citations in the least conservative estimate and a 6.4% 
reduction in the number of citations in the least conservative estimate (Table 2.6, Panel B, Model 
2) 
 A 1-standard deviation increase in liquidity is associated with a 46% increase in the number 
of patents and a 78.6% increase in the number of citations in the subsequent period (Table 2.6, 
Model 1 and Models 2-5 are very similar). This finding is in contrast to the Fang et al. (2014) 
results in the U.S., but that study was based on a U.S.-only sample from an earlier time period, 
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1994-2005, while our sample is based on nine countries from 2003 to 2010. In Appendix A, we 
study the U.S.-only sample from 2003 to 2005 and the same data as Feng et al. (2014) and find 
results consistent with Tables 4 and 5 with a positive effect of liquidity on innovation. Also, these 
results indicate that the relation between liquidity and patenting is perhaps not completely stable 
over time. Also, Fang at al. do not examine whether or not a stock was manipulated, such as 
through insider trading or end-of-day manipulation. Appendix B performs further robustness tests 
of the relation between liquidity and innovation with propensity score matched analyses, and 
shows a consistent and positive effect of liquidity on innovation for 3 out of four tests: nearest-
neighbor matching for the change in the number of patents, four-nearest-neighbor matching for 
the change in the number of patents, and four-nearest-neighbor matching for the change in the 
natural log of the number of patents; the nearest-neighbor matching for the change in the number 
of patents without logs shows a positive but statistically insignificant effect of liquidity on patents. 
Further, Table 2.6, Panel A (Panel B), Model 5 shows that the interaction between liquidity 
and end-of-day dislocation is statistically significant at the 1% level, and the positive association 
between liquidity and the number of patents (number of citations) is less pronounced by 8.7% 
(26.4%) for firms that have experienced end-of-day dislocation. These new findings in Tables 4 
and 5 indicate that the positive effect of liquidity on innovation is mitigated by the presence of 
end-of-day dislocation. Overall, the data indicate that the relation between liquidity and innovation 
may be more nuanced by other market microstructure factors, and the changes in microstructure 
factors over time could account for at least part of the changes in the relation between liquidity 
and innovation over time. 
 Some of the other control variables in Tables 4 and 5 are significant in ways that we might 
expect. Most notably, a 1-standard deviation increase in the IPR index is associated with a 47.8% 
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increase in the number of patents (Table 2.6, Panel A, Models 4 and 5) and a 66% increase in the 
number of citations in the subsequent period (Table 2.6, Panel B, Models 4 and 5), which is 
consistent with a large amount of literature documenting the importance of IPR in spurring 
innovation (e.g., Branstetter et al., 2006; Blind, 2012). As a related matter, at the country level, a 
1-standard deviation increase in the Enforcement Index (La Porta et al., 1998) is associated with a 
56.1% increase in the number of patents (Table 2.6, Panel A, Model 3) and a 50.5% increase in 
the number of citations in the subsequent period (Table 2.6, Panel B, Model 3). 
 Some of the firm-specific control variables are statistically significant as well. The data 
indicate that a 1-standard deviation increase in ROA is associated with a 2.3% decrease in the 
number of patents in the subsequent period (Table 2.6, Model 1 and Models 2-5 are similar). A 1-
standard deviation increase in leverage is associated with a 2.2% increase in the number of patents 
in the subsequent period (Table 2.6, Model 4, but this effect is insignificant in Models 1 and 2). A 
1-standard deviation increase in capital expenditures over assets is associated with a 2.1% decrease 
in the number of patents in the subsequent period (Table 2.6, Model 1 and Models 2-5 are similar). 
A 1-standard deviation increase in market/book is associated with a 2.5% decrease in the number 
of patents in the subsequent period (Table 2.6, Model 1 and Models 2-5 are similar). And, finally, 
a 1-standard deviation increase in the natural logarithm of the firm’s age is associated with a 47.5% 
increase in the number of patents in the subsequent period (Table 2.6, Model 1 and Models 2-5 are 
similar).  
2.5.2. Robustness Checks 
 The remaining regression tables and appendices present further robustness checks to 
account for other subsamples of the data, measurement issues, endogeneity, and regression model 
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specifications, which are as follows. To maintain conciseness, we present only the results 
considering the number of patents, INNOV_PAT, as the main dependent variable. Table 2.7, Panel 
A, Model 1 shows the results with the non-US subsample, and the data and results are consistent 
with the full-sample results reported in Table 2.5 and Table 2.6, with the economic significance of 
EOD manipulation slightly more pronounced. Model 2 excludes the global financial crisis period 
from August 2007 to December 2008, and the findings are consistent. Model 3 includes the global 
financial crisis period only, and the impact of EOD manipulation on patents is stronger (almost 
twice as large as the non-financial crisis period). Models 4, 5, and 6 show a negative effect of EOD 
manipulation on patents for the subset of applied and granted patents, including adjustments for 
truncation bias, and winsorizing, respectively. 
The information leakage variable for suspected insider trading is negative and statistically 
significant in Table 2.7, Model 3 for the crisis years only, consistent with Levine et al. (2015) that 
insider trading is a detriment to innovation. But these results are not stable for information leakage 
in Models 4 and 5 in Table 2.7, Panel A, which shows a positive and significant effect for applied 
and granted patents, and applied and granted patents adjusted for truncation bias, consistent with 
Hypothesis 2. These results imply that insiders have a pronounced incentive to encourage 
innovation if they can engage in insider trading and reap exacerbated benefits from such 
innovation. In particular, we find that the economic significance is such that the presence of 
information leakage increases a subsequent year’s patent citation from 5.1% (Table 2.5, Panel B, 
Model 2) to 6.4% (Table 2.5, Panel B, Model 1). Also, the economic significance is such that the 
presence of leakage cases increases a subsequent year’s patent citation by 5.1%. Estimated 
differently, a 1-standard deviation increase in the number of information leakage cases in one year 
is associated with a 1.65 % increase in patent citations in the subsequent year (Table 2.5, Panel B, 
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Model 2). This effect is slightly different in magnitude in Table 2.6, Panel B for patents that have 
been applied for and granted and adjusted for truncation bias; the presence of information leakage 
increases a subsequent year’s patents from 5.16% (Model 1) to 5.19% (Model 2). Table 2.6, Panel 
B, Model 3 shows that the economic significance is such that the presence of information leakage 
increases a subsequent year’s patents applied for and granted by 6.51%. 
 Table 2.7, Panel B shows robustness to different patent measures (adjusted applied and granted in 
Models 1 and 2, and applied and granted in Model 3), and citations per patent (Model 4).  Table 2.7, Panel 
C shows stability of the negative effect of EOD manipulation on patenting for different types of clustering 
(Petersen, 2009) and by industry-year and country-year in Models 1 and 2, respectively. Models 3 and 4 
show similar stability of this main result with different winsorizing at 2.5%/97.5%, and 5%/95%, 
respectively. 
The other control variables in Table 2.7, Panels A, B and C are statistically significant in 
ways that are consistent with the results in Tables 2.5 and 2.6. Liquidity and the Intellectual 
Property Rights Index are positively and significantly related to liquidity at the 1% level in all of 
Models 1-6. Likewise, the other firm-specific variables are consistent with the findings reported 
earlier. 
[Table 2.7 here] 
We also checked whether the direction of End of Day price manipulation had any effect on 
the subsequent effect on innovation (results not tabulated). We did not find any divergence in the 
effects, with both positive as well as negative EOD manipulations resulting in negative innovation 
outcomes in the following year. We believe that this is because in both cases, negative and positive 
EOD manipulation, firms have incentives to reduce innovative activity. In the case of negative 
EOD manipulation, the negative effect on equity valuations would reduce the incentives of 
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employees with stock options and encourage the management to engage in more short term 
projects with immediate payoffs. Whereas, in the case of positive EOD manipulation, we believe 
the management also has reduced incentives to innovate because they need to focus on short term 
projects with immediate payoffs in order to maintain the overvalued equity. In summary, any type 
of mis-valuation of equity, whether positive or negative, has a subsequent negative effect on 
innovation. 
It is possible for a firm to have experienced both EOD manipulation as well as Information 
leakage in a given year. We removed observations where a firm experienced both information 
leakage and EOD manipulation, and performed the baseline regression (results not tabulated). Our 
results were robust to the exclusion of these observation. 
Table 2.8 shows the results for different liquidity deciles. The data indicate that EOD 
manipulation has a strong, statistically significant negative effect on innovation in Models 1 and 2 
for the top 10th and 20th liquidity deciles, but not the bottom 80th and 90th deciles in Models 3 and 
4, respectively. The other control variables, including liquidity, are significant in ways indicated 
above for Models 1 and 2. However, in Models 3 and 4, the other control variables are largely 
insignificant, except for the IPR index and Liquidity in Model 3. 
Unlike EOD manipulation, information leakage has a statistically insignificant negative 
effect on innovation in Models 1 and 2 for the top 10th and 20th liquidity deciles, and a strong and 
statistically significant effect on innovation for the bottom 80th and 90th deciles, respectively. 
In short, for the most liquid stocks, EOD manipulation is harmful to innovation, consistent 
with Hypothesis 1, while liquidity helps promote innovation. For the least liquid stocks, by 
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contrast, insider trading has a pronounced negative effect on innovation, and this effect is the only 
relevant factor for the bottom liquidity decile. 
[Table 2.8 here] 
 Table 2.9 shows the results for the days on which EOD dislocation is more likely to be 
associated with manipulation, namely the end-of-the-month days, where manipulators have a 
pronounced incentive to push up the price for reasons of compensation and option expiration. The 
data indicate that the effect of EOD manipulation is stronger when end-of-month days are 
considered. Also, the data shows that the impact of EOD manipulation is statistically significant 
regardless of whether or not the other manipulation days are included in or excluded from the 
sample. 
[Table 2.9 here] 
 Table 2.10 reports the results with propensity score matching. The first step regressions 
show factors that are connected to more frequent EOD manipulation and information leakage. Note 
that the two alternative specifications with and without the liquidity variable affect the sign and 
significance of lagged patenting on EOD manipulation and information leakage. As mentioned in 
the introduction, on average, firms with more innovation are more likely to be associated with 
manipulation, and, similarly, firms with higher liquidity have more innovation (see Appendix A). 
The alternative first-stage specifications, however, do not affect the second-stage regressions. In 
the second step regressions, the data show a consistent and negative effect of EOD manipulation 
on innovation for four out of four tests in Models 1 and 2: nearest-neighbor matching for the 
change in the number of patents (with and without logs), and four-nearest-neighbor matching for 
the change in the number of patents (with and without logs). For the information leakage results 
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in Table 2.10, the effect is insignificant for the change in the number of patents in Model 3, but 
negative and significant for the change in the natural log of the number of patents in Model 4. 
[Table 2.10 here] 
 Also, we considered 2SLS tests of the impact of EOD manipulation and information 
leakage on innovation. One instrument we had used was the lagged patents in the industry, with 
the intuition that some industries may be subjected to different levels of manipulation. Another 
instrument we had used was lagged manipulation at the industry level, with the intuition that firms 
in some industries consistently experience more manipulation over time. We recognize that neither 
of these instruments is ideal, as they don’t perfectly satisfy the exclusion restriction. Nevertheless, 
the statistical and economic significance of the second-stage results for the effect of EOD patents 
are not materially affected by the specification of the first-stage model. The economic significance 
in the second-stage estimate for EOD manipulation on patents is stronger with the use of different 
instruments than without. Alternative specifications not presented here but are available on 
request. 
Due to the lack of a good instrument, we rely on propensity score matching analysis to 
mitigate the endogeneity issue. We find that in fact, before the manipulation event - the firms that 
did get manipulated had a much higher level of innovation than those that didn't get manipulated. 
So a highly innovative firm is in fact more likely to get manipulated, and we believe that any 
endogeneity present is likely to act against us finding any results. 
2.6. Limitations and Extensions 
This paper focuses on two types of manipulation: 1) EOD manipulation and information 
leakage, and 2) suspected insider trading. There are many other types of manipulation, such as 
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wash trades, option backdating, and accounting fraud, among others (see Cumming et al., 2015, 
for a survey). We are unable to ascertain these different types of manipulation in this sample for 
each of the countries and years in the data. Future research with different data could shed more 
light on the question of whether other types of manipulation have a stronger impact on 
manipulation. 
This paper focuses on nine countries (Australia, Canada, China, India, Japan, New Zealand, 
Singapore, Sweden, and the United States) from 2003 to 2010. We show that the sensitivity of 
prior results on liquidity and innovation depends on the time period chosen. While we show the 
robustness of our results to different subsets of the data by country and time period, future research 
may very well uncover new insights with different and more expansive data.  
2.7. Conclusion 
This paper studied the impact of suspected market manipulation, including end-of-day 
manipulation and insider trading around information leakage events, on the number of patents and 
the number of citations, based on a sample of nine countries spanning the years 2003-2010. The 
data indicate that end-of-day dislocation mitigates the number of patents and the number of 
citations received by patents due to the associated short-termism of the firm’s orientation, the long-
term harm to a firm’s equity values, and commensurate reduced incentives for employees to 
innovate. Our findings are robust to numerous robustness checks on subsamples of the data, 
propensity score matching analyses, difference-in-differences tests for firms with and without 
dislocation, among other factors. 
Unlike prior literature that shows a negative relation between patenting and liquidity, we 
observe a robust and significantly positive effect of liquidity on patenting. The positive effect of 
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liquidity on innovation, however, is mitigated by the presence of end-of-day dislocation. The data 
also confirm the importance of country-level factors such as intellectual property rights across 
countries that encourage patenting. 
Finally, unlike the negative effects of end-of-day manipulation on patents, we find an 
opposite positive effect of information leakage on patents for higher quality patents, and 
particularly in non-crisis periods. Insiders have, in some cases, pronounced incentives to engage 
in insider trading associated with announcement of innovations. Future research could examine 
specific cases in more detail, among other extensions related to those that we discussed in this 
paper. 
40 
 
Table 2.1. Connecting Market Microstructure to Innovation 
This table summarizes prior literature and predictions on the relationship between market microstructure 
and innovation. 
 Market Microstructure Events  
 End-of-Day (EOD) Dislocation Information Leakage Predicted Impact on Innovation 
Panel A: First-Order Effects  
    
Improper valuation of 
current equity values 
Positive Positive Over- or under-valuation of a firm’s 
equity causes agency problems where 
management releases misinformation 
to justify valuations (Jensen, 2005; 
Marciukaityte and Varma, 2008), and 
in turn agency problems and short-
termism impede innovation (Manso, 
2011). 
    
Effect on long-term 
equity value trends 
Negative Negative Lower prices damage incentive to 
innovate when innovators are 
compensated with equity.  
    
Ability to Raise Future 
Equity 
Negative Negative Reduced ability to raise external equity 
has a negative impact on innovation 
(Brown et al., 2009, 2013) 
    
Ability of Insiders to 
Profit on Proprietary 
Information 
 
Positive Ability of insiders to profit on 
proprietary information increases 
innovation as insiders that innovate 
gain exacerbated profits (Agarwal and 
Cooper, 2015 and Levine, 2015) 
    
Long-term orientation 
of Firm's 
Management 
Negative Negative Short-term orientation leads to less 
innovation activity (Manso, 2011) 
    
Overall Predicted 
Impact on Innovation 
Hypothesis 1: 
EOD Dislocation 
lowers innovation 
Hypothesis 2:  
Insider trading raises 
innovation if the 
effect of insider 
profits outweighs all 
of the other effects. 
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Panel B: Possible Second-Order Effects  
    
Stock price 
Informativeness 
Negative Positive Incentive to innovate may be reduced 
because stock prices may reveal firms’ 
private information on innovation 
progress to competitors through 
information leakage (Ding, 2015) 
    
Liquidity Negative Negative Liquidity lowers innovation if mergers 
are more likely (Fang et al., 2014), but 
raise innovation if ability to raise 
external capital increases (Brown et al., 
2009, 2013) 
    
Impact on Mergers Negative Negative Mergers lower incentive to innovate as 
takeovers lead to employee layoffs. 
(Fang et al, 2014) 
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Table 2.2. Variable Definitions 
Variable Definition Data 
source 
INNOV_PAT(t+1) Natural logarithm of one plus firm i’s total 
number of patents filed in year t+1. 
PATSTAT 
INNOV_CITE(t+1) Natural logarithm of one plus firm i’s total 
number of citations received for patents filed 
in year t+1. The number of citations has been 
adjusted for truncation bias using the citation 
lag distribution. 
PATSTAT 
INNOV_PAT_GRNT(t+1) Natural logarithm of one plus firm i’s total 
number of patents filed and eventually granted 
in the year t+1 
PATSTAT 
INNOV_PAT_GRNT_ADJ(t+1) Natural logarithm of one plus firm i’s total 
number of patents filed and eventually granted 
in the year t+1, which has been adjusted for 
truncation bias using the grant lag distribution. 
PATSTAT 
Average_industry-year_patents(t-1) The average INNOV_PAT(t-1) for an industry 
within each country, in the year t. 
PATSTAT 
CHANGE_NUM_PAT Change in the number of patents computed as 
firm i’s total number of patents filed in the 
year t+1 minus firm i’s total number of patents 
filed in the year t-1 
PATSTAT 
CHANGE_LN_PAT Natural logarithm one plus firm i’s total 
number of patents filed in the year t+1 minus 
the natural logarithm of one plus firm i’s total 
number of patents filed in the year t-1.  
PATSTAT 
EOD_Dummy Indicates if a firm i has experienced end-of-day 
(EOD) dislocation in year t 
CMCRC and SMARTS surveillance staff 
constructed the dislocation of EOD price case 
by looking at the price change between the 
last trade price (Pt) and the last available trade 
price 15 minutes before the continuous trading 
period ends (Pt-15). For securities exchanges 
that have a closing auction, the close price at 
auction is used (Pauction). A price movement is 
dislocated if it is four standard deviations away 
from the mean price change during the 
benchmarking period for the past 100 trading 
days. To be considered as a dislocation of EOD 
price case, at least 50% of the price dislocation 
has to revert at open on the next trading day. 
Hence, the price movement between the last 
trade price (Pt) and the next day opening price 
(Pt+1), and between the last trade price (Pt) and 
CMCRC 
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the last available trade price 15 minutes before 
the continuous trading period ends (Pt-15) has 
to be more than 50%. (Pauction or Pt - Pt+1)/(Pauction 
orPt - Pt-15) ≥50%. Source: Capital Markets 
Cooperative Research Centre (CMCRC) and 
SMARTS, Inc. 
EOD_Dummy_First(t) Indicates if firm i has experienced end-of-day 
(EOD) dislocation in year t, under the condition 
that firm i never previously experienced EOD 
dislocation until year t.  
CMCRC 
EOD_Dummy_Subsequent(t) Indicates if firm i has experienced any EOD 
price dislocation in year t, under the condition 
that it was manipulated before year t.  
CMCRC 
Num_EOD_Cases_First(t) Number of times a firm has had EOD price 
dislocation in year t, under the condition that 
firm i has never previously experienced EOD 
price dislocation until year t. 
CMCRC 
Num_EOD_Cases_Subsequent(t) Number of times in year t a firm has 
experienced EOD price dislocation, under the 
condition that it experienced EOD price 
dislocation before year t.  
CMCRC 
EOD_Dummy_Positive(t) Indicates if firm i has experienced more 
positive EOD price dislocations than negative 
price dislocations in year t.  
CMCRC 
Infoleak_Dummy(t) Indicates if firm i has experienced information 
leakage in year t.  
CMCRC and SMARTS surveillance staff 
constructed this variable. CMCRC and SMARTS 
first examined all news releases from the 
exchanges themselves. CMCRC and SMARTS 
measured the return to the security in the six 
days prior to the announcement up to the two 
days after the announcement. They double-
checked the Thompson Reuters News Network 
to ensure that they did not miss any important 
news announcements. They consider only 
news events that have no companion news 
announcements that could explain price 
movements in the six days before and the two 
days after the relevant announcement that 
could explain the price movement. For each 
news announcement, a price movement is 
abnormal if it is three standard deviations 
away from the mean abnormal return during 
the 250-day benchmarking period ending 10 
days before the news release. To be included 
in our sample, the stock must have at least 150 
CMCRC 
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days’ worth of trading activities. A one-factor 
market model based on the market index for 
each exchange is used to calculate daily 
abnormal returns. To be included in the final 
data set as a suspected information leakage 
case, the CAR around each event over the 
period [t-6, t+2] must be three standard 
deviations away from the normal nine-day CAR 
for each individual stock. Once the suspected 
information leakage case is defined, abnormal 
profit per case is calculated as the trading-
volume-multiple abnormal returns from six 
days before to the day before the news 
announcement. SMARTS surveillance staff 
independently examines the data to 
distinguish between market anticipation and 
suspected insider trading; since SMARTS 
includes as insider trading only large 
movements that are three-standard-deviation 
changes, the possibility that insider trades 
could be viewed as market anticipation is 
mitigated. 
Num_Infoleak_Cases(t) Number of times a firm has experienced 
information leakage in year t.  
CMCRC 
Strong(Weak)_EOD_First(t) Indicates if firm i has experienced any EOD 
price dislocation in year t during the days more 
likely to experience manipulation (except on 
days more likely to experience manipulation), 
under the condition that firm i never 
previously experienced EOD dislocation until 
year t. Manipulation is considered more 
common during the last three trading days of a 
month. 
CMCRC 
Strong(Weak)_EOD_Subsequent(t) Indicates if firm i has experienced any EOD 
price dislocation in year t during the days more 
likely to experience manipulation (except on 
days more likely to experience manipulation), 
under the condition that it was manipulated 
before year t. Manipulation is considered more 
common during the last three trading days of a 
month. 
CMCRC 
Strong(Weak)_Infoleak_First(t) Indicates if firm i has experienced any 
information leakage in year t during the days 
more likely to experience manipulation (except 
on days more likely to experience 
manipulation), under the condition firm i never 
previously experienced information leakage 
until year t. Manipulation is considered more 
CMCRC 
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common during the last three trading days of a 
month. 
Strong(Weak)_Infoleak_Subsequent(t) Indicates if firm i has experienced any 
information leakage in year t during the days 
more likely to experience manipulation (except 
on days more likely to experience 
manipulation), under the condition that it was 
manipulated before year t. Manipulation is 
considered more common during the last 
three trading days of a month. 
CMCRC 
Liquidity(t) Denotes the natural logarithm of the inverse of 
the AMIHUD illiquidity variable. The AMIHUD 
illiquidity variable is computed as: 
𝐴௜௝ =
1
𝐷௜௬
෍
|𝑟௜௧|
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, 
where Aiy is the AMIHUD measure of firm i in 
year y. Rit and Dvolit are daily return and daily 
dollar trading volume for stock i on day t. Diy is 
the number of days with an available ratio in 
year y. A higher AMIHUD value indicates a 
higher level of illiquidity. Hence, the logarithm 
of the inverse of AMIHUD would be a measure 
of liquidity rather than illiquidity. 
Datastream 
MV_Decile(t) Market value decile variable takes the value of 
1 to 10, based on the market value decile to 
which firm i belongs, within each country-year 
grouping, at the end-of-year t. 
Datastream 
ROA(t) Return on assets, defined as the Income before 
extraordinary items, divided by book value of 
total assets, measured at the end of fiscal year 
t. 
Datastream 
RDTA(t) Research and development expenditures 
divided by book value of total assets measured 
at the end of fiscal year t, set to zero if missing. 
Datastream 
PPETA(t) Property, plant, and equipment divided by 
book value of total assets measured at the end 
of fiscal year t. 
Datastream 
LEV(t) Firm i’s leverage ratio, defined as book value of 
debt, divided by book value of total assets, 
measured at the end of fiscal year t. 
Datastream 
CAPEXTA(t) Capital expenditures scaled by book value of 
total assets, measured at the end of fiscal year 
t. 
Datastream 
Q(t) Firm i’s market-to-book ratio during fiscal year 
t, calculated as the market value of equity, plus 
book value of debt, divided by book value of 
assets. 
Datastream 
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LN_Firm_Age(t) Natural logarithm of one plus firm i’s age, 
approximated by the number of years listed on 
Datastream. 
Datastream 
IPR_Index(t) Intellectual Property Rights Index obtained 
from the International Property Rights Index 
Report published from 2007 to 2010. For 2003 
to 2006, we use the oldest available index 
value from 2007. 
Property 
Right 
Alliance 
Enforcement_index The index is formed by adding the rule of law, 
the efficiency of the judiciary, risk of 
expropriation, repudiation of contracts by 
government, and corruption variables provided 
by LLSV and the scaling index to be between 0 
and 1 (1998) 
LLSV 
Interaction_Liquidity_EOD(t) Interaction variable computed as 
EOD_Dummy_Subsequent(t) x Liquidity(t) 
Datastream 
and CMRC 
Interaction_Enforcement_EOD(t) Interaction variable computed as 
EOD_Dummy_Subsequent(t) x 
Enforcement_index(t) 
LLSV and 
CMCRC 
Interaction_IPR_EOD(t) Interaction variable computed as 
EOD_Dummy_Subsequent(t) x IPR_index(t) 
Property 
rights 
alliance 
and CMCRC 
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Table 2.3. Summary Statistics 
Table 2.3 reports the summary statistics for variables constructed using a sample of public firms from Australia, Canada, China, India, Japan, New 
Zealand, Singapore, Sweden, and the United States. The Innovation variables are measured from 2004 to 2011. The EOD / Infoleak variables and 
the control variables are measured from 2003 to 2010. 
 
Description N Mean 
25th 
percentile Median 
75th 
percentile 
95th 
percentile SD Max Min 
INNOV_PAT(t+1) 131129 0.3266 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 2.5649 0.9580 5.2523 0.0000 
INNOV_PAT_GRNT(t+1) 131129 0.2355 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 1.9459 0.7747 4.4886 0.0000 
INNOV_PAT_GRNT_ADJ(t+1) 131129 0.2609 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 2.1803 0.8396 4.7474 0.0000 
INNOV_CITE(t+1) 131129 0.3745 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 3.8687 1.3410 7.2374 0.0000 
EOD_Dummy_First(t) 131129 0.0765 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 0.2657 1.0000 0.0000 
EOD_Dummy_Subsequent(t) 131129 0.1206 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 0.3257 1.0000 0.0000 
Num_EOD_Cases_First(t) 131129 0.7077 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 6.0000 2.7109 16.0000 0.0000 
Num_EOD_Cases_Subsequent(t) 131129 1.2821 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 11.0000 3.9860 22.0000 0.0000 
Infoleak_Dummy(t) 131129 0.0789 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 0.2696 1.0000 0.0000 
Num_Infoleak_Cases(t) 131129 0.0902 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 0.3236 2.0000 0.0000 
Liquidity(t) 126513 2.5603 -1.3837 2.9381 6.3070 9.6037 4.6318 11.8470 -6.6823 
ROA(t) 103963 -0.0683 -0.0287 0.0196 0.0594 0.1571 0.3871 0.3242 -2.7669 
RDTA(t) 104159 0.0217 0.0000 0.0000 0.0062 0.1275 0.0677 0.4726 0.0000 
PPETA(t) 103377 0.2910 0.0608 0.2263 0.4566 0.8260 0.2606 0.9495 0.0000 
LEV(t) 104030 0.2154 0.0103 0.1576 0.3439 0.6409 0.2274 1.1153 0.0000 
CAPEXTA(t) 103210 0.0583 0.0078 0.0274 0.0681 0.2369 0.0865 0.4957 0.0000 
Q(t) 99383 1.7107 0.6198 0.9766 1.6834 4.9931 2.7493 21.6262 0.0893 
LN_Firm_Age(t) 131121 2.8475 2.4849 2.9444 3.2581 3.7612 0.5483 3.7612 1.0986 
IPR_Index(t) 131129 7.1834 7.5000 8.0000 8.2000 8.6000 1.5445 8.6000 3.5000 
Enforcement_index 123971 0.8579 0.9189 0.9196 0.9276 0.9276 0.1311 0.9616 0.5965 
Interaction_Liquidity_EOD(t) 126511 0.1640 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 2.1306 1.2924 9.2867 -9.2427 
Interaction_Enforcement_EOD(t) 123971 -0.0097 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0697 0.0633 0.1037 -0.2613 
Interaction_IPR_EOD(t) 131129 -0.0604 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.8166 0.6179 1.4166 -3.6834 
   
48 
 
 
Table 2.4. Comparison of the Percentage of Change in the Number of Patent Applications 
Table 2.4 compares the percentage of change in the number of patents between t-1 and t+1, for both firms that have experienced end-of-day 
price manipulation (information leakage) and those that have not experienced end-of day-price manipulation (information leakage). The sample 
has been split into High IPR and Low IPR, where High IPR are observations with an IPR index value over 5 and Low IPR are observations with an 
IPR index value less than 5. ***(**)(*) denotes significance at the 1%(5%)(10%) two-tailed level. 
 
  End-of-Day Manipulation Information Leakage 
  % change in the number of patent applications % change in the number of patent applications 
  
N 
Low 
IPR 
firms 
N 
High 
IPR 
firms 
N All firms N 
Low 
IPR 
firms 
N 
High 
IPR 
firms 
N All firms 
Panel A: Number of Patent Applications 
Firms that have been 
manipulated [A] 
6,020 -0.2438 19,826 0.1131 25,846 0.0300 946 8.6446 9,404 4.2493 10,350 4.6510 
Firms that have not 
been manipulated [B] 
15,711 4.5722 89,572 0.9030 105,283 1.4506 20,785 2.9920 99,994 0.4317 120,779 0.8723 
Difference [A] - [B] 
 
-4.8160 
 
-0.7899 
 
-1.4206   5.6527 
 
3.8176 
 
3.7787 
  ***    **   ***  ***  *** 
Panel B: Number of Patent Citations 
Firms that have been 
manipulated [A] 
6,020 0.5653 19,826 7.2946 25,846 5.7272 946 2.6729 9,404 21.8940 10,350 20.1372 
Firms that have not 
been manipulated [B] 
15,711 4.4594 89,572 7.5816 105,283 7.5116 20785 3.4129 99,994 6.1787 120,779 5.7027 
Difference [A] - [B]  -3.8941  -0.2870  -1.7844   -0.7400  15.7153  14.4344 
  **         ***  *** 
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Table 2.5. Pooled OLS Specification 
Table 2.5, Panel A [B] reports Pooled OLS regression results of the model INNOV_PAT(i,t+1) 
[INNOV_CITE(i,t+1)] = a + b1*EOD_Dummy_First(i, t) + b2*EOD_Dummy_Subsequent(i,t) + 
c*Infoleak_Dummy(i,t) + c'Controls + YR(t) + Firm(i) + error(i,t). INNOV_PAT(i,t+1) is the natural 
logarithm of one plus firm i’s total number of patents filed in year t+1. INNOV_CITE(i,t+1) is the natural 
logarithm of one plus firm i’s total number of citations received for patents filed in year t+1, which has 
been adjusted for truncation bias using the citation lag distribution. EOD_Dummy_First 
[EOD_Dummy_Subsequent] indicates if firm i has experienced end-of-day (EOD) dislocation in year t, 
under the condition that firm i never previously experienced [has previously experienced] EOD 
dislocation. Infoleak_Dummy indicates if firm i has experienced information leakage in year t. Similarly, 
Num_EOD_Cases_First, Num_EOD_Cases_Subsequent and Num_Infoleak_cases measure the number of 
times firm i has experienced EOD or Information leakage in year t. EOD_Dummy_Positive(t) indicates if 
firm i has experienced more positive EOD price dislocations than negative price dislocations in year t. 
Liquidity(t) is the natural logarithm of the inverse of the AMIHUD illiquidity variable. 
Interaction_Liquidity_EOD(t) mixes Liquidity(t) and EOD_Dummy_Subsequent variables. Intellectual 
Property Rights Index, IPR_Index(t), is the Intellectual Property Rights Index obtained from the 
International Property Rights Index Report. Market value decile is (MV_Decile(t)), to which firm i belongs 
within each country-year; Return on Assets is (ROA(t)); Property plant and equity to total assets is 
(PPTA(t)); leverage measured as the book value of debt to book value of assets is (LEV(t)); Capital 
expenditure to total assets is (CAPEXTA(t)); Tobin’s Q is (Q(t)); and natural logarithm of one plus firm i’s 
age, approximated by the number of years listed on Datastream is (LN_Firm_Age(t)), used as controls in 
all the models. No time invariant variables or interactions of time invariant variables are included in this 
model. Year fixed effects YR(i) and firm fixed effects Firm(i) are included in all the regressions. 
Coefficient estimates are shown. The standard errors are clustered by firm. ***(**)(*) denotes 
significance at the 1%(5%)(10%) two-tailed level. 
 
Panel A: Innovation measured by INNOV_PAT(i, t+1) 
  (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   
EOD_Dummy(t) -0.00803 **       
EOD_Dummy_First(t)   0.00380  -  0.00365  
EOD_Dummy_Subsequent(t)   -0.01742 *** -  -0.01328 *** 
EOD_Dummy_Positive(t)   -0.00120  -0.00368  -0.00145  
Infoleak_dummy(t) -0.00640  -0.00622  -  -0.00624  
Num_EOD_Cases_First(t)   -  0.00061  -  
Num_EOD_Cases_Subsequent(t)   -  -0.00122 *** -  
Num_Infoleak_cases(t)   -  -0.00372  -  
Liquidity(t) 0.01235 *** 0.08598 *** 0.08624 *** 0.01266 *** 
Interaction_Liquidity_EOD (t)   -  -  -0.00267 ** 
IPR_index(t) 0.08491 *** 0.01228 *** 0.01218 *** 0.08594 *** 
MV_Decile(t) 0.00246 * 0.00258 * 0.00259 * 0.00256 * 
ROA(t) -0.00468  -0.00483  -0.00482  -0.00498  
PPETA(t) 0.00530  0.00547  0.00535  0.00537  
LEV(t) 0.02556 ** 0.02618 ** 0.02599 ** 0.02637 ** 
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CAPEXTA(t) -0.03452 ** -0.03519 ** -0.03475 ** -0.03553 ** 
Q(t) -0.00132 * -0.00135 * -0.00134 * -0.00136 * 
Year and Firm fixed effects Included  Included  Included  Included  
Sector fixed effects Included  Included  Included  Included  
Number of observations used 97148  
                      
97,148   
                      
97,148  
 
97148  
Adjusted R2 0.9106  0.9106  0.9106  0.9106  
 
Panel B: Innovation measured by INNOV_CITE(i, t+1) 
  (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   
EOD_Dummy(t) -0.03222 ***       
EOD_Dummy_First(t)   0.00070  -  -0.00030  
EOD_Dummy_Subsequent(t)   -0.08753 *** -  -0.05907 *** 
EOD_Dummy_Positive(t)   0.03086 ** 0.01836  0.02916 ** 
Infoleak_dummy(t) 0.01661  0.01725  -  0.01707  
Num_EOD_Cases_First(t)   -  0.00043  -  
Num_EOD_Cases_Subsequent(t)   -  -0.00554 *** -  
Num_Infoleak_cases(t)   -  0.01494  -  
Liquidity(t) 0.02333 *** 0.02309 *** 0.21432 *** -0.01838 *** 
Interaction_Liquidity_EOD (t)   -  -  0.21350 *** 
IPR_index(t) 0.20886 *** 0.21377 *** 0.02264 *** 0.02569 *** 
MV_Decile(t) 0.01911 *** 0.01962 *** 0.01961 *** 0.01951 *** 
ROA(t) -0.02831 *** -0.02887 *** -0.02875 *** -0.02994 *** 
PPETA(t) 0.02721  0.02823  0.02768  0.02751  
LEV(t) 0.03178  0.03438  0.03303  0.03562  
CAPEXTA(t) -0.18480 *** -0.18833 *** -0.18587 *** -0.19065 *** 
Q(t) -0.00414 *** -0.00422 *** -0.00417 *** -0.00428 *** 
Year and Firm fixed effects Included  Included  Included  Included  
Sector fixed effects Included  Included  Included  Included  
Number of observations used 97148  
                      
97,148   
                      
97,148  
 
97148  
Adjusted R2 0.7259  0.72600  0.72600  0.7262  
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Table 2.6. Random Effects Specification 
Table 2.6, Panel A [B] reports Firm Random Effects regression results of the model INNOV_PAT(i,t+1) [INNOV_CITE(i,t+1)] = a + 
b1*EOD_Dummy_First(i, t) + b2*EOD_Dummy_Subsequent(i,t) + c*Infoleak_Dummy(i,t) + c1'Country_variable(Enforcement and IPR) + 
c2'Interaction_Country_variable_EOD + c3*Interaction_Liquidity_EOD + d'Controls + YR(t) + Sector(i) + error(i,t). INNOV_PAT(i,t+1) is the natural 
logarithm of one plus firm i’s total number of patents filed in year t+1. INNOV_CITE(i,t+1) is the natural logarithm of one plus firm i’s total 
number of citations received for patents filed in year t+1, which has been adjusted for truncation bias using the citation lag distribution. 
EOD_Dummy_First [EOD_Dummy_Subsequent] indicates if firm i has experienced end-of-day (EOD) dislocation in year t, under the condition 
that firm i never previously experienced [has previously experienced] EOD dislocation. Infoleak_Dummy indicates if firm i has experienced 
information leakage in year t. Similarly, Num_EOD_Cases_First, Num_EOD_Cases_Subsequent and Num_Infoleak_cases measure the number of 
times firm i has experienced EOD or Information leakage in year t. EOD_Dummy_Positive(t) indicates if firm i has experienced more positive EOD 
price dislocations than negative price dislocations in year t. Liquidity(t) is the natural logarithm of the inverse of the AMIHUD illiquidity variable. 
The Enforcement_index is formed by adding the rule of law, efficiency of judiciary, risk of expropriation, repudiation of contracts by government, 
and corruption variables provided by LLSV, and scaling the index to be between 0 and 1 (1998). The Intellectual Property Rights index, IPR_Index, 
is obtained from the International Property Rights Index report. Interaction_Liquidity_EOD, Interaction_Enforcement_EOD, and 
Interaction_IPR_EOD mixes the Liquidity(t), Enforcement_index(t) and IPR_Index(t), respectively, with the EOD_Dummy_Subsequent variable. 
Market value decile is (MV_Decile(t)), to which firm i belongs within each country-year; Return on Assets is (ROA(t)); Property plant and equity 
to total assets is (PPTA(t)); leverage measured as the book value of debt to book value of assets is (LEV(t)); Capital expenditure to total assets is 
(CAPEXTA(t)); Tobin’s Q is (Q(t)); and the natural logarithm of one plus firm i’s age, approximated by the number of years listed on Datastream is 
(LN_Firm_Age(t)), used as controls in all the models. Year fixed effects and industry fixed effects are included in all the regressions. Coefficient 
estimates are shown. The standard errors are clustered by firm. ***(**)(*) denotes significance at the 1%(5%)(10%) two-tailed level. 
 
Panel A: Innovation Measured by INNOV_PAT(i,t+1) 
  (1) 
Simple 
EOD 
Dummy 
  (2) 
EOD 
Dummy 
  (3) 
Number 
of EOD 
Cases 
  (4) 
Enforcement 
index 
  (5) 
IPR Index 
  (6) 
EOD & 
Liquidity 
  
EOD_Dummy(t) -0.01345 *** 
          
EOD_Dummy_First(t)   -0.00108    0.00080  -0.00048  0.00362  
EOD_Dummy_Subsequent(t)   -0.02415 ***   -0.01158 ** -0.02519 *** -0.02119 *** 
Infoleak_dummy(t) -0.00333 -0.00313    -0.00454  -0.00491  -0.00493  
Num_EOD_Cases_First(t)     0.00017        
Num_EOD_Cases_Subsequent(t)     -0.00159 ***      
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Num_Infoleak_cases(t)     -0.00212        
Liquidity(t) 0.03245 *** 0.03244 *** 0.03230 *** 0.02548 *** 0.03014 *** 0.03048 *** 
Enforecement_index       1.39727 ***     
IPR_Index         0.10116 *** 0.10152 *** 
Interaction_Enforcement_EOD       0.03676 *     
Interaction_IPR_EOD         0.00159    
Interaction_Liquidity_EOD           -0.00266 ** 
MV_Decile(t) 0.00236 * 0.00246 * 0.00242 * 0.00579 *** 0.00461 ***  *** 
ROA(t) -0.01919 *** -0.01930 *** -0.01929 *** -0.01656 *** -0.01923 *** 0.00458 *** 
PPETA(t) -0.00199 
 
-0.00182  -0.00191  0.01521 * 0.00904  -0.01938  
LEV(t) 0.01463 
 
0.01526  0.01498  0.02433 ** 0.03146 *** 0.00890 *** 
CAPEXTA(t) -0.07966 *** -0.08043 *** -0.07995 *** -0.05881 *** -0.07135 *** 0.03156 *** 
Q(t) -0.00298 *** -0.00300 *** -0.00297 *** -0.00395 *** -0.00389 *** -0.07175 *** 
LN_Firm_Age(t) 0.28193 *** 0.28267 *** 0.28291 *** 0.27571 *** 0.26254 *** -0.00390 *** 
Year fixed effects Included  Included  Included  Included  Included  Included  
Industry fixed effects Included  Included  Included  Included  Included  Included  
Number of observations used 97,148  97,148  97,148  90,272  97,148  97,148  
R2 0.2310  0.2314  0.2310  0.2550  0.2543  0.2541  
             
Panel B: Innovation Measured by INNOV_CITE(i,t+1) 
  (1) 
Simple 
EOD 
Dummy 
  (2) 
EOD 
Dummy 
  (3) 
Number 
of EOD 
Cases 
  (4) 
Enforcement 
index 
  (5) 
IPR Index 
  (6) 
EOD & 
Liquidity 
  
EOD_Dummy_First(t) -0.04841 *** 0.00668    0.01014  0.01059  0.00861  
EOD_Dummy_Subsequent(t)   -0.09415 ***   -0.07728 *** -0.08366 *** -0.05779 *** 
Infoleak_dummy(t) 0.02378 ** 0.02463 **   0.02532 ** 0.01797  0.01771  
Num_EOD_Cases_First(t)     0.00065        
Num_EOD_Cases_Subsequent(t)     -0.00604 ***      
Num_Infoleak_cases(t)     0.01909 **       
Liquidity(t) 0.06373 *** 0.06359 *** 0.06333 *** 0.05979 *** 0.06218 *** 0.06357 *** 
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Enforecement_index       1.44248 ***     
IPR_Index  ***       0.16000 *** 0.15408 *** 
Interaction_Enforcement_EOD       -0.22679 ***     
Interaction_IPR_EOD         -0.03288 ***   
Interaction_Liquidity_EOD           -0.01676 *** 
MV_Decile(t) 0.01612 *** 0.01654 *** 0.01632 *** 0.02055 *** 0.01768 *** 0.01881 *** 
ROA(t) -0.07764  -0.07782 *** -0.07787 *** -0.06956 *** -0.06673 *** -0.06829 *** 
PPETA(t) -0.00089 * -0.00010  -0.00025  0.03112  0.03267 * 0.03136  
LEV(t) -0.04747 *** -0.04453 * -0.04585 * 0.00319  0.00656  0.00769  
CAPEXTA(t) -0.25134 *** -0.25371 *** -0.25237 *** -0.20404 *** -0.22188 *** -0.21957 *** 
Q(t) -0.00745 *** -0.00753 *** -0.00746 *** -0.00915 *** -0.00811 *** -0.00817 *** 
LN_Firm_Age(t) 0.26087 *** 0.26412 *** 0.26421 *** 0.23686 *** 0.22725 *** 0.22608 *** 
Year fixed effects Included  Included  Included  Included  Included  Included  
Industry fixed effects Included  Included  Included  Included  Included  Included  
Number of observations used 97148  97,148  97,148  90,272  97,148  97,148  
R2 0.2005  0.2309  0.2305  0.2750  0.2687  0.2534  
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Table 2.7. Robustness Checks 
Table 2.7 reports various robustness check regression results of the Firm Random Effects model INNOV_PAT(i,t+1) = a + b1*EOD_Dummy_First(i, 
t) + b2*EOD_Dummy_Subsequent(i,t) + c*Infoleak_Dummy(i,t) + c1'IPR_Index + d1*Liquidity + d2*Interaction_Liquidity_EOD + e'Controls + YR(t) 
+ Industry(i) + error(i,t). Year fixed effects YR(i) and Industry(i) fixed effects are included in all the regressions. Coefficient estimates are shown. 
The standard errors are clustered by firm. ***(**)(*) denotes significance at the 1%(5%)(10%) two-tailed level.  
 
Panel A: Model 1 excludes US observations from the sample. Model 2 excludes the financial crisis years of 2007 and 2008. Model 3 includes only 
the financial crisis year observations. Model 4 uses variables without any winsorization.  
 
Panel B: Model 1 and 2 uses patent applications that are eventually granted, which has been adjusted for truncation bias as the dependent 
variable. Model 3 uses patent applications that are eventually granted as the dependent variable. Model 4 uses Citations per patent computed 
as the Log(1 + (Number of citations received in the year t+1 / Number of patent application in the year t)). 
 
Panel C: Model 1 clusters the standard errors by industry-year. Model 2 clusters the standard errors by country-year. Model 3 winsorizes the 
variables at 2.5% and 97.5%. Model (4) winsorizes the variables at 5% and 95%. 
 
Panel A: Robustness to Non-US Observations, Exclusion of Crisis Years, Only Crisis Years, Other Measures of Innovation, 
and No Winsorization  
(1) 
Non-US 
(2) 
Excludes Crisis 
Years 
(3) 
Only Crisis  
Years 
(4) 
Without 
Winsorization 
EOD_Dummy_First(t) 0.00048  -0.00253 
 -0.02384 *** 0.00048  
EOD_Dummy_Subsequent(t) -0.02105 *** -0.02430 *** -0.05051 *** -0.01978 *** 
Infoleak_dummy(t) -0.00339  -0.00286 
 -0.01769 ** -0.00498  
IPR_Index(t) 0.11904 *** 0.10969 *** 0.09817 *** 0.10256 *** 
Liquidity(t) 0.03236 *** 0.03587 *** 0.05556 *** 0.02982 *** 
Interaction_Liquidity_EOD(t) -0.00336 ** -0.00224  -0.00535 ** -0.00200  
MV_Decile(t) 0.00060  0.00451 *** 0.01706 *** 0.00281 ** 
ROA(t) -0.01983 *** -0.02518 *** -0.04814 *** -0.00001  
PPETA(t) 0.00927  0.00549 
 0.02132  0.00764  
LEV(t) 0.03307 *** 0.03960 *** -0.04294 ** 0.00006  
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CAPEXTA(t) -0.07043 *** -0.09071 *** -0.02307  -0.00060  
Q(t) -0.00354 *** -0.00520 *** -0.00610 *** 0.00000 *** 
LN_Firm_Age(t) 0.37413 *** 0.25431 *** 0.24447 *** 0.28811 *** 
Year fixed effects Included  Included  Included  Included  
Industry fixed effects Included  Included  Included  Included  
Number of observations used 66,195  70,752  26,396  97148  
R2 0.2935   0.2610   0.2788   0.2474   
         
Panel B: Robustness to Applied and Granted Measure of Innovation 
 
(1) 
Adjusted Applied 
& Granted Patents 
(2) 
Adjusted Applied 
& Granted 
Patents 
(3) 
Applied &  
Granted Patents 
(4) 
Citations 
per 
Patent  
EOD_Dummy(t) -0.00949 *** 
    
  
EOD_Dummy_First(t)   -0.00449  -0.00086  0.01029  
EOD_Dummy_Subsequent(t)  -0.01460 *** -0.01001 *** -0.02659 *** 
Infoleak_dummy(t) 0.01346 *** 0.01355 *** 0.01532 *** 0.00607  
IPR_Index(t) 0.10698 *** 0.10697 *** 0.10144 *** 0.06107 *** 
Liquidity(t) 0.03141 *** 0.03133 *** 0.02817 *** 0.02939 *** 
Interaction_Liquidity_EOD(t) -0.00020 
 
0.00039  0.00037  -0.00886 *** 
MV_Decile(t) 0.00334 *** 0.00338 *** 0.00514 *** 0.00615 *** 
ROA(t) -0.01989 *** -0.01988 *** -0.02090 *** -0.03169 *** 
PPETA(t) 0.00433 
 
0.00444  0.00829  0.00124  
LEV(t) 0.01182 
 
0.01206  0.01698 * -0.00602  
CAPEXTA(t) -0.08512 *** -0.08535 *** -0.09796 *** -0.09081 *** 
Q(t) -0.00424 *** -0.00424 *** -0.00439 *** -0.00320 *** 
LN_Firm_Age(t) 0.19679 *** 0.19715 *** 0.17644 *** 0.06157 *** 
Year fixed effects Included  Included  Included  Included  
Industry fixed effects Included  Included  Included  Included  
Number of observations used 97,148  97,148  97,148  97,148  
R2 0.2377   0.2378   0.2357    0.1656   
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Panel C : Robustness to Various Types of Clustering of Standard Errors and Different Levels of Winsorization  
(1) 
Cluster by 
Industry-Year 
(2) 
Cluster by 
Country-Year 
(3) 
Winsor at 2.5% and 
97.5% 
(4) 
Winsor at 5% 
and 95% 
EOD_Dummy_First(t) -0.00071  -0.00071 
 -0.00139  -0.00134  
EOD_Dummy_Subsequent(t) -0.02119 *** -0.02119 ** -0.02174 *** -0.01995 *** 
Infoleak_dummy(t) -0.00493  -0.00493 
 -0.00484  -0.00423  
IPR_Index(t) 0.10152 *** 0.10152 *** 0.09500 *** 0.07961 *** 
Liquidity(t) 0.03048 *** 0.03048 *** 0.03010 *** 0.02810 *** 
Interaction_Liquidity_EOD(t) -0.00266  -0.00266 
 -0.00234 ** -0.00158  
MV_Decile(t) 0.00458 *** 0.00458  0.00422 *** 0.00296 *** 
ROA(t) -0.01938 *** -0.01938 *** -0.02761 *** -0.04117 *** 
PPETA(t) 0.00890  0.00890 
 0.00439  -0.00010  
LEV(t) 0.03156 *** 0.03156 * 0.03268 *** 0.01929 * 
CAPEXTA(t) -0.07175 *** -0.07175 *** -0.07849 *** -0.07916 *** 
Q(t) -0.00390 *** -0.00390 *** -0.00692 *** -0.00766 *** 
LN_Firm_Age(t) 0.26229 *** 0.26229 *** 0.22041 *** 0.16339 *** 
Year fixed effects Included  Included  Included  Included  
Industry fixed effects Included  Included  Included  Included  
Number of observations used 97,148  97,148  97,148  97,148  
R2 0.2541  0.2541  0.2596  0.2611  
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Table 2.8. Liquidity Deciles 
Table 2.8 reports the Firm Random Effects regression results of the model INNOV_PAT(i,t+1) = a + 
b1*EOD_Dummy_First(i, t) + b2*EOD_Dummy_Subsequent(i,t) + c*Infoleak_Dummy(i,t) + c1'IPR_Index  
+d1*Liquidity + e'Controls + YR(t) + Industry(i) + error(i,t), for the 10th, 20th, 80th, and 90th deciles of 
the Liquidity(t) measure. Year fixed effects YR(i) and Industry(i) fixed effects are included in all the 
regressions. Coefficient estimates are shown. The standard errors are clustered by firm. ***(**)(*) 
denotes significance at the 1%(5%)(10%) two-tailed level. 
  
(1) 
Top 10th Decile 
of Liquidity 
(2) 
Top 20th Decile 
of Liquidity 
(3) 
Bottom 80th 
Decile of 
Liquidity 
(4) 
Bottom 90th 
Decile of 
Liquidity 
EOD_Dummy_First(t) -0.00004 
 
-0.00776 
 
-0.01061 
 
0.02004 
 
EOD_Dummy_Subsequent(t) -0.05043 *** -0.03836 *** 0.00001 
 
-0.00236 
 
Infoleak_dummy(t) -0.00795 
 
-0.00640 
 
-0.01753 *** -0.02460 *** 
IPR_Index 0.14863 *** 0.13150 *** 0.01050 ** 0.00508 
 
Liquidity(t) 0.10636 *** 0.08290 *** 0.00314 * -0.00103 
 
MV_Decile(t) 0.03925 *** 0.02642 *** -0.00109 
 
-0.00121 
 
ROA(t) 0.06544 
 
0.02360 
 
-0.00150 
 
-0.00339 
 
PPETA(t) 0.13913 
 
0.12528 ** -0.00572 
 
0.00283 
 
LEV(t) 0.08000 
 
0.00050 
 
-0.00559 
 
-0.00268 
 
CAPEXTA(t) -0.11891 
 
-0.05173 
 
-0.01386 
 
-0.01844 
 
Q(t) -0.02638 ** -0.02499 *** -0.00001 
 
-0.00024 
 
LN_Firm_Age(t) 0.43894 *** 0.36686 *** 0.00454 
 
0.00900 
 
Year fixed effects Included 
 
Included 
 
Included 
 
Included 
 
Industry fixed effects Included 
 
Included 
 
Included 
 
Included 
 
Number of observations 
used 11,817 
 
23,572 
 
13,244 
 
6,042 
 
R2 0.3685 
 
0.3331 
 
0.0155 
 
0.0236 
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Table 2.9. Manipulation on Month End Dates 
Table 2.9 reports the regression results of the Firm Random Effects model INNOV_PAT(i,t+1) = a + b1'Strong(Weak) _EOD_Dummy_First(i, t) + 
b2'Strong(Weak)_EOD_Dummy_Subsequent(i,t) + c1'Strong(Weak)_Infoleak_Dummy_First(i,t) + c2'Strong(Weak)_Infoleak_Dummy_Subsequent 
+ c1'IPR_Index +d1*Liquidity +  e'Controls + YR(t) + Industry(i) + error(i,t). The Strong form of EOD and Infoleak considers only EOD / Infoleak 
cases occurring during the last three trading days of the month. Model 1 includes all the firms in the sample and uses only strong form 
manipulation dummies. Model 2 excludes all firms that were weakly manipulated from the sample and uses only strong form manipulation 
dummies. Model 3 includes all the firms in the sample and uses both strong form and weak form manipulation dummies. Year fixed effects and 
industry fixed effects are included in all the regressions. Coefficient estimates are shown. The standard errors are clustered by firm. ***(**)(*) 
denotes significance at the 1%(5%)(10%) two-tailed level. 
  
(1) 
Including Weakly 
Manipulated Firms 
(2) 
Excluding Weakly 
Manipulated 
Firms 
 
(3) 
Including Weak 
Manipulation 
Dummies  
Strong_EOD_Dummy_First(t) -0.00546  -0.01260 * 0.00052  
Strong_EOD_Dummy_Subsequent(t) -0.01887 ** -0.03999 *** -0.02862 *** 
Strong_Infoleak_Dummy_First(t) 0.00540  0.00919  0.01114  
Strong_Infoleak_Dummy_Subsequent(t) -0.05905 ** -0.05696 * -0.06027 ** 
Weak_EOD_Dummy_First(t)     -0.00202  
Weak_EOD_Dummy_Subsequent(t)     -0.02509 *** 
Weak_Infoleak_Dummy_First(t)     0.00275  
Weak_Infoleak_Dummy_Subsequent(t)     -0.01890 *** 
IPR_Index(t) 0.10136 *** 0.10881 *** 0.10147 *** 
Liquidity(t) 0.03000 *** 0.03323 *** 0.03014 *** 
MV_Decile(t) 0.00432 *** 0.00511 *** 0.00457 *** 
ROA(t) -0.01909 *** -0.02005 *** -0.01928 *** 
PPETA(t) 0.00890  0.00768  0.00919  
LEV(t) 0.03033 *** 0.03066 *** 0.03131 *** 
CAPEXTA(t) -0.07083 *** -0.08019 *** -0.07156 *** 
Q(t) -0.00383 *** -0.00373 *** -0.00390 *** 
LN_Firm_Age(t) 0.26263 *** 0.26184 *** 0.26315 *** 
Year and industry fixed effects Included  Included  Included  
Number of observations used 97,148  75,280  97,148  
R2 0.2535  0.2538  0.2541  
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Table 2.10. Propensity Scoring Matching Analysis 
Table 2.10, Panel A [Panel B] reports the Propensity score matching analysis using nearest and four-nearest matching methods for estimating the 
treatment effect of manipulation on innovation. First, the propensity scores for treatment (EOD or Infoleak manipulation) are computed using 
Probit regression of the model EOD_Dummy(t)/Infoleak_Dummy(t) = a + b*INNOV_PAT(t-1) + c*IPR_Index(t) + d*Enforcement_index(t) + 
e*Liquidity(t) + f'Controls. In Panel B, we exclude Liquidity(t) as an independent variable in this Probit regression.  
 
Next, the nearest (four-nearest) neighbor propensity scoring methods match, within each country-industry-year strata, manipulated firms with 
control firms having the nearest (four-nearest) propensity scores as the manipulated firms. Both the propensity score matching methods discard 
treatment observations whose propensity score is higher than the maximum or less than the minimum propensity score of the controls. The 
nearest (four-nearest) neighbor matching method matches without (with) replacement. Finally, the Average Treatment effect on the Treated 
(ATT) is the average difference between the manipulated and control firms of the change in the number (logarithm of the number) of patents in 
the year after and before the manipulation. 
 
Panel A: Probit Regression Includes Liquidity(t) as an Independent Variable 
 
Probit Regression 
        
Dependent Variable EOD_Dummy(t) Infoleak_Dummy(t) 
    
INNOV_PAT(t-1) -0.02231 *** -0.02803 ***     
IPR_Index(t) 0.15828 *** -0.15098 ***     
Enforcement_index(t) -4.79175 *** 1.44600 ***     
Liquidity(t) 0.03028 *** 0.11987 ***     
MV_Decile(t) 0.03205 *** -0.01251 ***     
ROA(t) 0.24070 *** -0.01572      
PPETA(t) -0.47437 *** -0.04168      
LEV(t) -0.05950 ** 0.23043 ***     
CAPEXTA(t) 0.32205 *** 0.11448      
Q(t) 0.00130  -0.02262 ***     
LN_Firm_Age(t) -0.14729 *** -0.02305 *     
Constant 2.54262 *** -1.76371 ***     
Year and Firm fixed effects Not Included  Not Included      
Industry fixed effects Not Included  Not Included      
Number of observations used 90,272  90,272      
R2 0.0945  0.0945      
         
60 
 
Average Treatment Effect on the Treated (ATT)        
 EOD INFOLEAK 
  
(1) 
CHANGE_NUM_PAT 
(2) 
CHANGE_LN_PAT 
(3) 
CHANGE_NUM_PAT 
(4) 
CHANGE_LN_PAT 
Nearest neighbor estimator         
ATT Difference-in-difference estimator -0.21285  -0.01454  -0.04482  -0.01164  
Standard error 0.05233  0.00399  0.09350  0.00606  
t-statistics -4.07 *** -3.65 *** -0.48  -1.92 * 
         
Four-nearest neighbor estimator         
ATT Difference-in-difference estimator -0.18912  -0.01397  -0.09412  -0.01347  
Standard error 0.05789  0.00449  0.09318  0.00603  
t-statistics -3.27 *** -3.11 *** -1.01  -2.23 ** 
         
Panel B: Probit Regression Excludes Liquidity(t) as an Independent Variable 
 
Probit Regression 
        
Dependent variable EOD_Dummy(t) Infoleak_Dummy(t) 
    
INNOV_PAT(t-1) 0.00089  0.04465 ***     
IPR_Index(t) 0.21712 *** 0.12074 ***     
Enforcement_index(t) -5.26973 *** -0.90855 ***     
MV_Decile(t) 0.05612 *** 0.07194 ***     
ROA(t) 0.31177 *** 0.32888 ***     
PPETA(t) -0.50833 *** -0.13913 ***     
LEV(t) -0.00812  0.41383 ***     
CAPEXTA(t) 0.26327 *** -0.21964 **     
Q(t) -0.00379  -0.03380 ***     
LN_Firm_Age(t) -0.11021 *** 0.12455 ***     
Constant 2.37400 *** -2.18663 ***     
Year and Firm fixed effects Not Included  Not Included      
Industry fixed effects Not Included  Not Included      
Number of observations used 91,186  91,186      
R2 0.0906  0.0473      
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Average Treatment Effect on the Treated (ATT)        
 EOD INFOLEAK 
  
(1) 
CHANGE_NUM_PAT 
(2) 
CHANGE_LN_PAT 
(3) 
CHANGE_NUM_PAT 
(4) 
CHANGE_LN_PAT 
Nearest neighbor estimator         
ATT Difference-in-difference estimator -0.19418  -0.01130  -0.02257  -0.01037  
Standard error 0.05010  0.00392  0.08438  0.00595  
t-statistics -3.88 *** -2.88 *** -0.27  -1.74 * 
         
Four-nearest neighbor estimator         
ATT Difference-in-difference estimator -0.17223  -0.01323  0.00007  -0.00983  
Standard error 0.05973  0.00450  0.08407  0.00586  
t-statistics -2.88 *** -2.94 *** 0  -1.68 * 
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Figure 2.1. Percentage of Change in Patent Applications/Citations and Manipulation 
Figure 2.1 compares the percentage of change in the number of patent applications and patent citations from one period before the 
manipulation (t-1) to one period after the manipulation (t+1) for all the firms that have been manipulated and for those that have not 
experienced any end-of-day manipulation / information leakage. 
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Figure 2.2.A. Percentage of Change in Patent Applications, Manipulation, and Intellectual Property Rights 
Figure 2.2.A compares the percentage of change in the number of patent applications from one period before the manipulation (t-1) to one 
period after the manipulation (t+1) for firms that have been manipulated and for those that have not experienced any end-of-day manipulation / 
information leakage, after splitting the sample into firms that belong to countries with a high level of intellectual property rights (IPR) and those 
with a low level of IPR. 
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Figure 2.2.B. Percentage of Change in Patent Citations, Manipulation and Intellectual Property Rights 
Figure 2.2.B compares the percentage of change in the number of patent citations from one period before the manipulation (t-1) to one period 
after the manipulation (t+1) for firms that have been manipulated and for those that have not experienced any end-of-day manipulation / 
information leakage, after splitting the sample into firms that belong to countries with a high level of intellectual property rights (IPR) and those 
with a low level of IPR. 
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Figure 2.3.A. Percentage of Change in Patent Applications across Sectors and End-of-Day Dislocation 
Figure 2.3.A compares the percentage of change in the number of patent applications from one period before the end-of-day manipulation (t-1) 
to one period after the manipulation (t+1) for firms that have been manipulated and for those that have not experienced any manipulation, after 
splitting the sample into sectors. 
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Figure 2.3.B. Percentage of Change in Patent Applications across Sectors and Information Leakage 
Figure 2.3.B compares the percentage of change in the number of patent applications from one period before the information leakage 
manipulation (t-1) to one period after the manipulation (t+1) for firms that have been manipulated and for those that have not experienced any 
manipulation, after splitting the sample into sectors. 
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Appendix 2.A. Replication of Tian et al. (2014) 
Appendix A reports the pooled OLS regression results from replicating the Tian (2014) model 
INNOV_PAT(i,t+1) = a + b*Liquidity(t) + c'Controls(t) + YR(t) + Firm(i) + error(i,t) from 2003 to 2005 using 
the NBER patent data used by Tian (2014). Year fixed effects YR(i) and firm fixed effects Firm(i) are 
included in all the regressions. Coefficient estimates are shown. The standard errors are clustered by 
firm. ***(**)(*) denotes significance at the 1%(5%)(10%) two-tailed level. 
 
Dependent Variable (1) INNOV_PAT(t+1) 
Liquidity(t) 0.01550 * 
LN_MV(t) 0.05818 *** 
RDTA(t) -0.40989  
ROA -0.09381  
PPETA(t) 0.23270  
LEV(t) -0.09802  
CAPEXTA(t) -0.25895  
Q(t) -0.02138 * 
   
Year and Firm fixed effects Included  
Number of observations used 11,885  
R2 0.6222  
 Appendix 2.B. Propensity Score Matching Analysis – Liquidity and Innovation 
Appendix B reports the Propensity score matching analysis using nearest and four-nearest matching 
methods for estimating the ATT of Liquidity on innovation. First, the propensity scores are computed 
using Probit regression of the model Liquidity_treatment(t) = a + b1*EOD_Dummy(t) + 
b2*Infoleak_Dummy(t) + b3*INNOV_PAT(t-1) + c'Controls. Liquidity_treatement(t) is the treatment 
variable that takes a value of 1 when the firm is in the top tercile of change in liquidity and takes a 
value of 0 when the firm is in the bottom tercile of change in liquidity. Change in liquidity is 
measured as Liquidity(t+1) minus Liquidity(t-1). Next, the nearest (four-nearest) neighbor propensity 
scoring methods match the treated firms with control firms having the nearest (four-nearest) 
propensity scores as the treated firms. Both the propensity score matching methods discard 
treatment observations whose propensity score is higher than the maximum or less than the 
minimum propensity score of the controls. The matching is done with replacement. Finally, the 
Average Treatment effect on the Treated (ATT) is the average difference between the treated and 
control firms of the change in the number (logarithm of the number) of patents in year after and 
before the treatment. 
 
Panel A: Probit regression 
    
Dependent variable Liquidity treatment(t) 
 
EOD_Dummy(t) -0.06258 ***   
Infoleak_Dummy(t) 0.01702    
INNOV_PAT(t-1) 0.05918 ***   
ROA 0.32250 ***   
PPETA(t) -0.17926 ***   
LEV(t) -0.07633 **   
CAPEXTA(t) 0.24813 ***   
Q(t) -0.00541 *   
LN_Firm_Age(t) 0.11804 ***   
Constant 0.69849 ***   
Year and Firm fixed effects Included    
Industry fixed effects Included    
Number of observations used 48,477    
R2 0.3928         
Panel B: Average Treatment Effect on the Treated (ATT)    
 Liquidity 
 
(1) 
CHANGE_NUM_PAT 
(2) 
CHANGE_LN_PAT 
Nearest neighbor estimator     
ATT Difference-in-difference estimator 0.23367  0.01319  
Standard error 0.08314  0.01071  
t-statistics 2.81  1.23  
     
Four-nearest neighbor estimator     
ATT Difference-in-difference estimator 0.29638  0.02364  
Standard error 0.06291  0.01041  
t-statistics 4.71  2.27  
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ONLINE APPENDIX 
 
In this Online Appendix, we show robustness to the subset of firms that only have a patent 
(Table 2.A.1), the subset of firms excluding China (Table 2.A.2), and the subset of a financial crisis 
versus a non-crisis period. 
Table 2.A.1 indicates that end-of-day manipulation negatively affects patents in all robustness 
checks. Information leakage negatively affects patents applied for but positively affects patents 
applied for and granted, suggesting that insiders take advantage of superior knowledge when then 
apply for a high-quality patent. 
Table 2.A.2 shows that the results are consistent with the exclusion of China from the sample. 
Table 2.A.3 shows that the results for end-of-day manipulation are robust in the subsamples 
including and excluding the crisis years. Table 2.A.3 also shows that the results for information 
leakage hold in the non-crisis period but not in the crisis period. The intuition is as follows. At any 
time there is the negative impact of end-of-day manipulation and information leakage on innovation 
due to short-termism and poor focus for both types of manipulation. For information leakage, 
however, there is a counter force of insiders profiting more. In bad economic times that counter force 
is less profitable for insiders, and the risk of being caught is greater because regulators are especially 
diligent in crisis periods. Consequently, the former effect of short-termism associated with 
information leakage is stronger than the latter effect of expected profits during crisis periods.  
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Table 2.A.1. Only Patenting Firms 
Table 2.A.1, Panel A [B] reports Firm Random Effects regression results, which include only firms 
with at least one patent of the model INNOV_PAT(i,t+1) [INNOV_CITE(i,t+1)] = a + 
b1*EOD_Dummy_First(i, t) + b2*EOD_Dummy_Subsequent(i,t) + c*Infoleak_Dummy(i,t) + 
c1'Country_variable(Enforcement and IPR) + c2'Interaction_Country_variable_EOD + 
c3*Interaction_Liquidity_EOD + d'Controls + YR(t) + Sector(i) + error(i,t). INNOV_PAT(i,t+1) is the 
natural logarithm of one plus firm i’s total number of patents filed in year t+1. INNOV_CITE(i,t+1) is 
the natural logarithm of one plus firm i’s total number of citations received for patents filed in year 
t+1, which has been adjusted for truncation bias using the citation lag distribution. 
EOD_Dummy_First [EOD_Dummy_Subsequent] indicates if firm i has experienced end-of-day (EOD) 
dislocation in year t, under the condition that firm i never previously experienced [has previously 
experienced] EOD dislocation. Infoleak_Dummy indicates if firm i has experienced information 
leakage in year t. Similarly, Num_EOD_Cases_First, Num_EOD_Cases_Subsequent and 
Num_Infoleak_cases measure the number of times firm i has experienced EOD or Information 
leakage in year t. EOD_Dummy_Positive(t) indicates if firm i has experienced more positive EOD 
price dislocations than negative price dislocations in year t. Liquidity(t) is the natural logarithm of the 
inverse of the AMIHUD illiquidity variable. The Enforcement index is formed by adding the rule of 
law, efficiency of judiciary, risk of expropriation, repudiation of contracts by government, and 
corruption variables provided by LLSV and a scaling index between 0 and 1 (1998). The Intellectual 
Property Rights Index, IPR_Index, is obtained from the International Property Rights Index Report. 
Interaction_Liquidity_EOD, Interaction_Enforcement_EOD, and Interaction_IPR_EOD mixes the 
Liquidity(t), Enforcement_index(t), and IPR_Index(t), respectively, with the 
EOD_Dummy_Subsequent variable. Market value decile is (MV_Decile(t)), to which firm i belongs 
within each country-year; Return on Assets is (ROA(t)); Property plant and equity to total assets is 
(PPTA(t)), leverage measured as the book value of debt to book value of assets (LEV(t)); Capital 
expenditure to total assets is (CAPEXTA(t)); Tobin’s Q is (Q(t)); and natural logarithm of one plus firm 
i’s age, approximated by the number of years listed on Datastream (LN_Firm_Age(t)) are used as 
controls in all the models. Year fixed effects and industry fixed effects are included in all the 
regressions. Coefficient estimates are shown. The standard errors are clustered by firm. ***(**)(*) 
denotes significance at the 1%(5%)(10%) two-tailed level. 
 
Panel A: Innovation Measured by INNOV_PAT(i,t+1)  
(1) 
Simple EOD 
Dummy 
 
(2) 
EOD Dummy 
 
(3) 
Number 
of EOD / 
Infoleak 
Cases 
 
EOD_Dummy(t) -0.03751 *** 
    
EOD_Dummy_First(t)   -0.00698    
EOD_Dummy_Subsequent(t)   -0.06540 ***   
Infoleak_dummy(t) -0.01393      
Num_EOD_Cases_First(t)     -0.00007  
Num_EOD_Cases_Subsequent(t)     -0.00480 *** 
Num_Infoleak_cases(t)   -0.01347  -0.00856  
Liquidity(t) 0.07656 *** 0.07624 *** 0.07603 *** 
IPR_Index 0.19115 *** 0.19251 *** 0.19211 *** 
MV_Decile(t) 0.03319 *** 0.03339 *** 0.03336 *** 
ROA(t) -0.06583 *** -0.06592 *** -0.06584 *** 
PPETA(t) 0.14331 ** 0.14338 ** 0.14400 ** 
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LEV(t) 0.09710 ** 0.10004 ** 0.09886 ** 
CAPEXTA(t) -0.20342 ** -0.20872 ** -0.20686 ** 
Q(t) -0.01689 *** -0.01700 *** -0.01688 *** 
LN_Firm_Age(t) 0.35544 *** 0.35692 *** 0.35760 *** 
Year fixed effects Included  Included  Included  
Industry fixed effects Included  Included  Included  
Number of observations used 30,892  30,892  30,892  
R2 0.3175  0.3173  0.3170  
       
Panel B: Innovation Measured by INNOV_CITE(i,t+1)  
(1) 
Simple EOD 
Dummy 
 
(2) 
EOD Dummy 
 
(3) 
Number 
of EOD / 
Infoleak 
cases 
 
EOD_Dummy(t) -0.03934 ***     
EOD_Dummy_First(t)   0.00986    
EOD_Dummy_Subsequent(t)   -0.07892 ***   
Infoleak_dummy(t) 0.02311 ** 0.02381 **   
Num_EOD_Cases_First(t)     -0.00245  
Num_EOD_Cases_Subsequent(t)     -0.01938 *** 
Num_Infoleak_cases(t)     0.02697  
Liquidity(t) 0.05672 *** 0.05672 *** 0.13082 *** 
Enforecement_index(t)       
IPR_Index 0.14123 *** 0.13988 *** 0.28216 *** 
Interaction_Enforcement_EOD       
Interaction_IPR_EOD       
Interaction_Liquidity_EOD       
MV_Decile(t) 0.02291 *** 0.02317 *** 0.07722 *** 
ROA(t) -0.07131 *** -0.07150 *** -0.19019 *** 
PPETA(t) 0.03006  0.03054  0.17811  
LEV(t) 0.00683  0.00946  -0.08074  
CAPEXTA(t) -0.19207 *** -0.19465 *** -0.34583  
Q(t) -0.00942 *** -0.00946 *** -0.02600 *** 
LN_Firm_Age(t) 0.23147 *** 0.23443 *** 0.30498 *** 
Year fixed effects Included  Included  Included  
Industry fixed effects Included  Included  Included  
Number of observations used 97,148  97,148  90,272  
R2 0.2309  0.2305  0.2750  
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Table 2.A.2. Excluding China 
Table 2.A.2, Panel A [B] reports Firm Random Effects regression results, excluding China, of the 
model INNOV_PAT(i,t+1) [INNOV_CITE(i,t+1)] = a + b1*EOD_Dummy_First(i, t) + 
b2*EOD_Dummy_Subsequent(i,t) + c*Infoleak_Dummy(i,t) + c1'Country_variable(Enforcement and 
IPR) + c2'Interaction_Country_variable_EOD + c3*Interaction_Liquidity_EOD + d'Controls + YR(t) + 
Sector(i) + error(i,t). INNOV_PAT(i,t+1) is the natural logarithm of one plus firm i’s total number of 
patents filed in year t+1. INNOV_CITE(i,t+1) is the natural logarithm of one plus firm i’s total number 
of citations received for patents filed in year t+1, which has been adjusted for truncation bias using 
the citation lag distribution. EOD_Dummy_First [EOD_Dummy_Subsequent] indicates if firm i has 
experienced end-of-day (EOD) dislocation in year t, under the condition that firm i never previously 
experienced [has previously experienced] EOD dislocation. Infoleak_Dummy indicates if firm i has 
experienced information leakage in year t. Similarly, Num_EOD_Cases_First, 
Num_EOD_Cases_Subsequent, and Num_Infoleak_cases measure the number of times firm i has 
experienced EOD or Information leakage in year t. EOD_Dummy_Positive(t) indicates if firm i has 
experienced more positive EOD price dislocations than negative price dislocations in year t. 
Liquidity(t) is the natural logarithm of the inverse of the AMIHUD illiquidity variable. The 
Enforcement_index is formed by adding the rule of law, efficiency of judiciary, risk of expropriation, 
repudiation of contracts by government, and corruption variables provided by LLSV, and scaling the 
index between 0 and 1 (1998). The Intellectual Property Rights Index, IPR_Index, is obtained from 
the International Property Rights Index Report. Interaction_Liquidity_EOD, 
Interaction_Enforcement_EOD, and Interaction_IPR_EOD mixes the Liquidity(t), 
Enforcement_index(t), and the IPR_Index(t), respectively, with the EOD_Dummy_Subsequent 
variable. The market value decile is (MV_Decile(t)), to which firm i belongs within each country-year. 
Return on Assets is (ROA(t)); Property plant and equity to total assets is (PPTA(t)), leverage 
measured as the book value of debt to book value of assets (LEV(t)); Capital expenditure to total 
assets is (CAPEXTA(t)); Tobin’s Q is (Q(t)); the natural logarithm of one plus firm i’s age is 
(LN_Firm_Age(t)), approximated by the number of years listed on Datastream, used as controls in all 
the models. Year fixed effects and industry fixed effects are included in all the regressions. 
Coefficient estimates are shown. The standard errors are clustered by firm. ***(**)(*) denotes 
significance at the 1%(5%)(10%) two-tailed level. 
 
Panel A: Innovation Measured by INNOV_PAT(i,t+1) 
 
(1) 
Simple EOD 
Dummy 
 
(2) 
EOD Dummy 
 
(3) 
Number 
of EOD / 
Infoleak 
cases 
 
EOD_Dummy(t) -0.00930 *** 
    
EOD_Dummy_First(t)   0.00107    
EOD_Dummy_Subsequent(t)   -0.01796 ***   
Infoleak_dummy(t) -0.00616  -0.00601    
Num_EOD_Cases_First(t)     0.00047  
Num_EOD_Cases_Subsequent(t)     -0.00126 *** 
Num_Infoleak_cases(t)     -0.00365  
Liquidity(t) 0.02414 *** 0.02413 *** 0.02398 *** 
Enforecement_index       
IPR_Index 0.08775 *** 0.08822 *** 0.08841 *** 
Interaction_Enforcement_EOD       
Interaction_IPR_EOD       
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Interaction_Liquidity_EOD       
MV_Decile(t) 0.00680 *** 0.00686 *** 0.00686 *** 
ROA(t) -0.01865 *** -0.01872 *** -0.01871 *** 
PPETA(t) 0.01283  0.01296  0.01288  
LEV(t) 0.02487 ** 0.02554 ** 0.02536 ** 
CAPEXTA(t) -0.05726 *** -0.05785 *** -0.05741 *** 
Q(t) -0.00415 *** -0.00416 *** -0.00414 *** 
LN_Firm_Age(t) 0.30249 *** 0.30305 *** 0.30333 *** 
Year fixed effects Included  Included  Included  
Industry fixed effects Included  Included  Included  
Number of observations used 90,272  90,272  90,272  
R2 0.2507  0.2509  0.2507  
       
Panel B: Innovation Measured by INNOV_CITE(i,t+1)  
(1) 
Simple EOD 
Dummy 
 
(2) 
EOD Dummy 
 
(3) 
Number 
of EOD / 
Infoleak 
cases 
 
EOD_Dummy(t) -0.03934 ***     
EOD_Dummy_First(t)   0.00986    
EOD_Dummy_Subsequent(t)   -0.07892 ***   
Infoleak_dummy(t) 0.02311 ** 0.02381 **   
Num_EOD_Cases_First(t)     0.00136  
Num_EOD_Cases_Subsequent(t)     -0.00494 *** 
Num_Infoleak_cases(t)     0.01951 ** 
Liquidity(t) 0.05672 *** 0.05672 *** 0.05634 *** 
Enforecement_index       
IPR_Index 0.14123 *** 0.13988 *** 0.14123 *** 
Interaction_Enforcement_EOD       
Interaction_IPR_EOD       
Interaction_Liquidity_EOD       
MV_Decile(t) 0.02291 *** 0.02317 *** 0.02305 *** 
ROA(t) -0.07131 *** -0.07150 *** -0.07148 *** 
PPETA(t) 0.03006  0.03054  0.03059  
LEV(t) 0.00683  0.00946  0.00856  
CAPEXTA(t) -0.19207 *** -0.19465 *** -0.19302 *** 
Q(t) -0.00942 *** -0.00946 *** -0.00941 *** 
LN_Firm_Age(t) 0.23147 *** 0.23443 *** 0.23476 *** 
Year fixed effects Included  Included  Included  
Industry fixed effects Included  Included  Included  
Number of observations used 90,272  90,272  90,272  
R2 0.2309  0.2305  0.2750  
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Table 2.A.3. Crisis Years – Patents Applied, Granted, and Adjusted 
Table 2.A.3 reports Firm Random Effects regression results of the model 
INNOV_PAT_GRNT_ADJ(i,t+1) = a + b1*EOD_Dummy_First(i, t) + b2*EOD_Dummy_Subsequent(i,t) + 
c*Infoleak_Dummy(i,t) + c1'Country_variable(Enforcement and IPR) + 
c2'Interaction_Country_variable_EOD + c3*Interaction_Liquidity_EOD + d'Controls + YR(t) + Sector(i) 
+ error(i,t). INNOV_PAT(i,t+1) is the natural logarithm of one plus firm i’s total number of patents 
filed and granted, which have been adjusted for truncation bias, in year t+1. EOD_Dummy_First 
[EOD_Dummy_Subsequent] indicates if firm i has experienced end-of-day (EOD) dislocation in year t, 
under the condition that firm i never previously experienced [has previously experienced] EOD 
dislocation. Infoleak_Dummy indicates if firm i has experienced information leakage in year t. 
Liquidity(t) is the natural logarithm of the inverse of the AMIHUD illiquidity variable. The Intellectual 
Property Rights Index, IPR_Index, is obtained from the International Property Rights Index Report. 
Interaction_Liquidity_EOD mixes Liquidity(t) with the EOD_Dummy_Subsequent variable. Market 
value decile is (MV_Decile(t)), to which firm i belongs within each country-year; Return on Assets is 
(ROA(t)); Property plant and equity to total assets is (PPTA(t)); leverage measured as the book value 
of debt to book value of assets is (LEV(t)); Capital expenditure to total assets is (CAPEXTA(t)); Tobin’s 
Q is (Q(t)); and natural logarithm of one plus firm i’s age, approximated by the number of years listed 
on Datastream is (LN_Firm_Age(t)), used as controls in all the models. Year fixed effects and industry 
fixed effects are included in all the regressions. Coefficient estimates are shown. The standard errors 
are clustered by firm. ***(**)(*) denotes significance at the 1%(5%)(10%) two-tailed level. 
 
Innovation Measured by INNOV_PAT_GRNT_ADJ(i,t+1) 
 
(1) 
Excluding Crisis Years 
 
(2) 
Only Crisis Years 
 
EOD_Dummy_First(t) 0.00026  -0.03258 *** 
EOD_Dummy_Subsequent(t) -0.00877 * -0.03334 *** 
Infoleak_dummy(t) 0.01455 ** -0.00494  
Liquidity(t) 0.03657 *** 0.03859 *** 
Interaction_Liquidity_EOD 0.00298 ** -0.00320  
IPR_Index 0.10623 *** 0.09642 *** 
MV_Decile(t) 0.00331 ** 0.02465 *** 
ROA(t) -0.02182 *** -0.04653 *** 
PPETA(t) -0.00321  0.01859  
LEV(t) 0.03316 *** -0.02585  
CAPEXTA(t) -0.09876 *** -0.03247  
Q(t) -0.00441 *** -0.00545 *** 
LN_Firm_Age(t) 0.17715 *** 0.23327 *** 
Year fixed effects Included  Included  
Industry fixed effects Included  Included  
Number of observations used 70,752  26,396  
R2 0.2414  0.2593  
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Chapter 3 
Buyouts and innovation 
"We must help companies acting in the interest of their future and the future of their 
employees against irresponsible locust swarms, who measure success in quarterly intervals, 
suck off substance and let companies die once they have eaten them bare..." 
Franz Müntefering (November 2004) 4 
3.1. Introduction 
In the global economy we have been observing a shift in the ownership structure. A 
significant proportion of firms are now owned by institutional investors from private equity 
(PE) industry. In principle, the existing theories suggest, that post buyout transactions, the 
target firms should improve in terms of operating performance, investment, and productivity 
(Jensen, 1989). The early evidence suggested that the impact of private equity leveraged 
buyouts (LBOs) and management buyouts (MBOs) showed positive effects on productivity 
based on plant level data (Lichtenberg and Siegel, 1990). There was also some evidence of 
improved operating performance during the first buyout wave (Kaplan, 1989; Baker and 
Wruck, 1989; Smith, 1990).  
 The famous locusts speech of Franz Müntefering has arguably inspired much 
additional research about the value of private equity to their investee companies.  The evidence, 
however, is mixed.  For example, subsequent evidence is consistent with the positive effect of 
private equity on innovation, with data from the U.S. over 1983-2007 (Lerner et al., 2011) and 
data from the U.K. from 1998-2005 (Ames et al., 2016). Also Davis et al., (2014) show that 
while buyouts lead to job loses, they bring improvements in productivity. The intuition is 
straightforward: private equity managers are value-added active investors that put in place 
                                                          
4https://web.archive.org/web/20050905185716/https://partei.spd.de/servlet/PB/show/1043150/221204_program
mheft_1.pdf  
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efficient incentive mechanisms and connect appropriate suppliers and strategic partners to 
enhance firm productivity and performance (e.g., Ahlers et al., 2017; Ames et al., 2016; 
Cornelli and Karakaş, 2015; Jensen, 1989). On the other hand, critics of LBOs argue that they 
are transitory organizations (Kaplan, 1991) which focus on projects with short term payoff and 
reduce the investment in long term projects, to ensure that they can meet their debt servicing 
obligations (Rappaport, 1990). One example of the dark side of the private equity deals is the 
case of the public-to-private deal that took place in the UK. The buyout of Debenhams 
generated enormous profits for the private equity owners, yet it left the company with huge 
debt and the company plummeted in value after its IPO.5 
However, not only individual cases but also the recent empirical evidence has left us 
puzzled about the real outcome of the public to private transactions. Recent literature has 
questioned the results of performance and productivity improvements following buyouts (Cohn 
et al., 2014; Weir et al., 2015; Ayash and Schütt, 2016; Ayash, B. and Rastad, 2017). There is 
evidence that shows private equity institutional buyouts (IBO) have had negative effects on 
employment and productivity (Goergen et al., 2014a,b).  An IBO involves the private equity 
fund acquiring a controlling interest in the target firm, hiring new management and exiting the 
deal typically within 5 years, while a MBO involves the current management and taking a large 
ownership position in the company.  
One may come to the preliminary conclusion that the body of prior work on the topic 
of private equity and innovation is sufficiently detailed to encourage one to think that the case 
is closed on this topic.  Yet, the evidence on the effect of buyouts on target firm is mixed and 
seems to depend on the type of the buyout wave. This recent evidence of Goergen et al. (2017) 
gives rise to the first of two questions that we address in this paper. Do private equity 
                                                          
5 https://www.ft.com/content/6fd92a0c-437d-11dc-a065-0000779fd2ac 
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institutional buyouts have a differential effect on innovation relative to other types of buyouts? 
The recent work of Goergen et al. (2014a,b) and the global financial crisis that began in August 
2007 inspires a second question that we further examine in this paper: Has there been a 
differential effect of private equity on innovation at different points of time, and is the effect 
of buyouts on innovation stable across countries?  Institutional incentives for long-term value 
creation versus short-term profiting may have evolved in light of the financial consequences of 
the financial crisis.  Prior work on buyouts and innovation precedes the financial crisis, and has 
been focused on U.S. and U.K. data. 
  We examine these questions and issues by using international data for 36 countries for 
a period 1997 to 2011. We create a unique dataset by merging several databases including 
Zephyr, Orbis and PATSTAT. We propose a firm-level measure of innovation from EPO’s 
Worldwide Patent Statistical Database (PATSTAT). So far most of the previous studies used 
mainly R&D expenditures or the innovations registered only in the US Patent and Trademark 
office, yet both measures have their limitations. Our measures of innovation are based on 
patents registered in a country’s office. PATSTAT provides data on more than 80 million patent 
applications filed in over 100 patent offices around the world. Furthermore, the depth of the 
data offered by PATSTAT allows us to create measures like radical innovation, innovation 
efficiency and innovator count that have not been used in the previous studies.  
We find that in general buyouts reduce investment in innovation. Our tests are based 
on pooled and panel regressions with fixed effects. The effect of buyouts on investment in 
innovation is quite sizable in terms of quantity and quality. A decline in the number of patents 
after the buyout transaction is between 5 to 11 % in year 2 and up to 17% in year 3 post buyout 
transaction. The drop in quality is mostly observed in year 3 post buyout transaction and is 
between 22 to 38 %.  
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We also find that the evidence is supported for institutional buyouts, while the results 
from management buyouts are inconclusive.  
We find a consistent negative effect following buyout, for a sample of firms that 
engaged in radical innovation i.e. the more scientific innovation that cites non-patent literature. 
The number of radical patents falls by 14% from a year after the buyout to three years after the 
buyout,  
Furthermore, Innovation efficiency also decreases after the buyout, with Institutional 
buyouts experiencing a greater decrease than Management buyouts. The decrease in innovation 
efficiency ranges between 17% for Institutional buyouts to 15% for Management buyouts, three 
years after the buyout. 
When we look at deals financed only by private equity we find that the effect is 
aggravated in post 2006 period. It suggests that the nature of deals changed. Our evidence is 
international and hold even after excluding the countries that are the most engaged in 
innovation like Germany, UK or US.  
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 3.2 discusses the sample selection, 
measures of innovation and control variables. Section 3.3 presents our main results. Section 
3.4 explores additional analysis. Section 3.5 concludes.  
3.2. Data 
3.2.1. Sample Construction 
In order to identify the sample we collect buyout transactions from Zephyr database. 
We only analyse the deals where the acquirer bought 100% of the target firm. We rely on 
Zephyr database because it shares common identities with Orbis database. We use Orbis 
database to obtain data on patent publication identifiers for the target companies in the Zephyr 
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database. We then merge Zephyr – Orbis dataset with the detailed patent data derived from 
EPO’s Worldwide Patent Statistical Database (PATSTAT), which provides data on more than 
80 million patent applications filed in over 100 patent offices around the world. It contains 
basic bibliographic information on patents, including the identity number of the application 
and granted patent, the date of the patent application, the date when the patent is granted, the 
track record of patent citations and inventor identification for each patent application. The 
PATSTAT database is published biannually and we use the 2017 edition. 
In essence, PATSTAT database covers patents filed in 93 non-U.S countries and has 
greater coverage than the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) Patent and Citation 
database that is compiled based on the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) 
(Moshirian, Tian, Zhang, and Zhang, 2015). USPTO only collects the patents filed in the U.S..  
In summary, using databases that share common identifiers allows us to avoid many 
pitfalls. Both databases Zephyr and Orbis are provided by the same supplier Bureau Van Dyck 
therefore it is possible to match deal information from Zephyr to firm level data and patent 
activity from Orbis more accurately than if one were to match Thomson One SDC or CapitalIQ 
to Orbis. We further match these data with PATSTAT using patent publication identifier. Also, 
using Orbis and PATSTAT data we can directly measure firm innovation level irrespective 
where the patent application was filed. In addition, Zephyr’s coverage of private-firm 
acquisitions is better than Thomson One SDC’s (Erel, Jang, and Weisbach, 2015). 
 We include all completed buyout transactions from 1997 to 2011 (we need six years 
post buyout on patents) from 36 countries. Six years of post-buyout patent data is required to 
construct our patent citation measures. We choose only buyout deals where the target firm had 
at least one successful patent applied for and granted from 3 years before the transaction and 
to 3 years afterwards (similar to Lerner, Sorensen, and Strömberg, 2011). Our final sample 
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involves 1,471 deals with at least one patent granted to the target firm 3 years before to 3 years 
after transaction. Overall those firms were granted 53,799 patents.  
3.2.2 Measuring innovation 
The main measure of innovation at the firm level used in the paper is the number of 
citations received by patents. The number of patents applied for and granted is also used as a 
measure of innovation. 
Patents are segregated into radical and incremental innovations similar to Griffith and 
Macartney (2014). If a patent has at least one citation to Non-Patent literature (NPL), we 
consider that patent as a radical innovation. NPL generally refers to scientific journals and 
therefore, patents making citations to NPL are likely to be new and radical innovation. 
Three separate measures of patent citations are used in the paper. The first measure, 
Citation count, considers all the citations received by a patent from the grant date onwards. The 
second measure, Absolute citation count, consider only the citations made within the three-
year period, starting from the year of grant of the patent to 3 years following the grant date. 
The Absolute citation measure mitigates the issue of truncation towards the end of the sample. 
The third measure, Relative citation, computes the citations received for patents filed and 
subsequently granted during the year of grant to 3 years following the grant, less the average 
number of citations during this period that is received by matching patents. We follow Lerner 
(2011) to define matching patents as the patents granted in the same year and assigned the same 
technology class.     
Since Absolute and relative citation measures require three years forward patent data 
and the study require citation measures three years from the date of the buyout, we require a 
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total of 6 years of patent data from the date of the buyout. This limits us to considering buyout 
transaction up to the year 2011. 
In addition, we also use a measure of Innovation Efficiency in the paper, which is 
computed as the number of patent application that has been filed during the year and 
subsequently granted, divided by the number of unique innovators. Unique innovators, are 
individuals that are listed in the patent application. If the same person has been included in 
multiple patent applications, we count that person only once. 
3.2.3. Control Variables 
There are many factors that drive innovative activity at the country and firm level. 
Following the previous literature on innovation we control for several characteristics at the 
country and firm level. In particular, we include intellectual property protection index created 
by Park (2008) and the level of country’s innovativeness measured by patent applications 
scaled by GDP.  
Also, as previously suggested the financial markets development affects innovative 
activity (Nanda and Rhodes-Kropf 2013; Hsu, Tian, and Xu, 2014). Thus, we include equity 
development measures proxied by the value of shares traded scaled by GDP and two credit 
market development measures. CMD1 is the domestic credit to private sector that is an 
important indicator of possibilities to finance production, consumption, and capital formation, which 
in turn affect economic activity. CMD2 is the domestic credit provided by financial sector scaled by 
GDP that measured the banking sector depth and financial sector development in terms of size. We also 
include GDP growth of a country to proxy for general economic conditions.  
 At the firm level the vector of control variables includes firm size (SIZE), firm age (AGE), and 
profitability (ROA). We winsorize all variables at the 1st and 99th percentiles to eliminate the effects 
of outliers. We provide all definitions of variables and data sources in Appendix AII.  
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3.2.4. Sample Characteristics 
In Table 3.1 we present summary statistics. We first present the yearly distribution in 
Panel A. There is a sharp increase in the number of transactions after 2005 due to the cheap 
access to credit that was the main source of financing for LBOs. After 2008 the number of 
deals dropped to a level from the late 90s that can be explained by a total standstill in deals 
caused by financial crisis. The number of patents increases significantly from 2000. Similar to 
Lerner, Sorensen, and Strömberg (2011) it might be explained by increasing volume as well as 
growing share of technology firms that typically innovate more.  
In Panel B of Table 3.1 we show the distribution of transactions by industry. Similar to 
previous studies (Lerner, Sorensen, and Strömberg (2011) manufacturing industries dominate 
in our sample.  
In Panel C of Table 3.1 we present the distribution by target’s country. Most of the 
innovative target firms are from the US, followed by the UK, Germany and France.  
In Panel D of Table 3.1 we show the distribution by deal type. Our sample comprises 
mostly of institutional buyouts, with around 71% of the total number of buyouts. The remaining 
19% are management buyouts. We define and institutional buyout as an indicator variable 
equal to one if “This is an acquisition where a Private Equity firm has taken a 50% stake or 
more in the Target company, or is the parent of the acquirer. The acquisition often takes place 
through a ‘new company’ (newco) or an acquisition vehicle. Often the Target company’s 
management will take a small stake (If the buy-out is for less than 100 per cent of the Target 
company, the deal is coded as IBO X%). Many deals described in the media as MBOs are 
coded on Zephyr as IBOs since the management team do not take a majority stake in the Target. 
There are very few occasions when Venture Capital may be inserted instead of Private Equity 
as the financing method. This would only occur when an early-stage company raises 
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development capital funding and the investors achieve a majority stake.” [Zephyr Definition]. 
Management buyout is an indicator variable equal to one if “All or some of the existing 
management of the company buy at least 50% of the company from its existing owners.” A 
private equity company is often brought in to aid the purchase through provision of equity 
funding. A ‘new company’ (newco) is normally formed by the management team specifically 
to purchase the Target. The acquirer company would show ‘MBO Team’ unless the name of 
the newco is known. If the name of the newco has been released, this company would be 
entered as the acquirer. If the Private Equity firm backing the deal takes a majority stake in the 
Target, the deal is not defined as an MBO and would be coded as an IBO.” [Zephyr Definition] 
[Table 3.1 here] 
3.3. Results 
3.3.1. Summary Statistics 
In Table 3.2 we present the descriptive statistics for the full sample. The firms targeted 
in the buyout transactions have on average 3.79 patents. Given the patent count variable is 
highly skewed we transform it into ln(1+patent count) in the regression analysis. The relative 
and absolute citations are comparable with previous studies and are 1.48 and 0.651, 
respectively. The mean number of Radical patents is 0.3 and the mean of Innovation efficiency 
is 0.62. 
Our country level controls such as the measure of Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) 
has a mean of 8.1. The country innovativeness intensity (INV) measure implies that 1.286 
patent applications are made per 100 million of GDP measured in US dollars. The equity 
market development has a mean value of 128.559. The mean credit market development 
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measured as private credit to GDP (CMD1) is 136.632 and as domestic credit provided by 
financial sector to GDP (CDM2) is 165.548. The average GDP growth is 2.083.  
We have a limited number of data at the firm level. Due to those limitations the sample 
size drops by almost a half. Yet, we decided to present some controls related to the financial 
position of the target firm. On average target firms have total sales of 10.63 million Euro, 37 
years since incorporation and zero return on assets.  
[Table 3.2 here] 
3.3.2. Univariate Analysis 
Table 3.3 presents univariate comparison of means tests and shows the comparison of various 
innovation metrics one year before the buyout to three years after the buyout. Panel A shows 
the results for radical patent applications. Panel B shows the results for patent citations. Panel 
C shows the results for innovation efficiency. We separate the tests into Institutional Buyouts, 
Management Buyouts and All Buyouts. 
The data indicate that three years following Institutional Buyouts, firms reduce their radical 
patent applications by 27% compared to one year before the buyout. They also have 
significantly fewer patent citations (51% lower) and have decreased level of innovation 
efficiency (14% lower). On the other hand, firms that experienced a Management Buyout do 
not significantly change their radical patenting activity, citation intensity and innovation 
efficiency. Similar results were obtained from using Absolute citations and Relative citation 
measures in the place of the general citation measure (results not tabulated). 
[Table 3.3 here] 
Figure 3.1 graphs the mean of the number of patent application, radical patent applications, 
absolute citations and relative citations, from 3 years before the buyout event to three or five 
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years after the event. Figure 3.1 shows that firms have a lower level of innovative activity 
following the buyout whether we consider the quantity or quality of patenting. We also notice 
that the innovation measures prior to the buyout are either constant or rising. This implies that 
it is not necessarily firms with lower level of innovative activity that are being targeted for 
buyouts. 
[Figure 3.1 here] 
Figure 3.2 graphs the mean level of innovation efficiency and the number of unique 
innovators, from three years before the buyout to five years after the buyout. We find that 
after buyout, the firms’ innovation efficiency and number of unique innovators fall. This 
implies that despite reducing the number of innovators, innovation efficiency decreases 
because the rate of decrease in patenting is even higher than the rate of decrease in the 
number of unique innovators. Additionally, we observe that innovation efficiency remains 
constant before the buyout, while the number of unique innovators increases steadily.  
[Figure 3.2 here] 
3.3.3. Baseline Regressions  
In the multivariate analysis we use patent count and citations as dependent variables. 
Given the patent count variable is highly skewed we transform it into ln(1+patent count) in the 
regression analysis. Considering the count nature of citations along with the over-dispersion 
observed in this variable, similar to other studies, we decided to use a negative binomial model.  
In Table 3.4 we show the regressions of patent count on year dummies. In model (1) 
we use a simple pooled OLS regression and in model (2) and (3) we estimate a panel regression. 
In model (3) apart from country characteristics we also include firm controls, due to which the 
sample size drops quite significantly. We find there is a significant decline in the number of 
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patent applications to the effect of 5 -11 % in year 2 and up to 17% in year 3 post buyout 
transaction.  
The signs of coefficient estimate of other control variables are consistent with previous 
evidence. For example, IPR and INV have positive and significant effect on innovation.  
Since patent counts only capture the quantity of innovative output, in the next sections 
we study the effect of buyouts on the quality of innovation by measuring citation activity. 
[Table 3.4 here] 
3.3.3.1 Buyouts and Innovation Quality 
In Table 3.5 we show regressions using negative binomial model of citation count on 
year dummies. Year dummies of the patent filling relative to the buyout year are independent 
variables in all the models. In Panel A we present the results where we measure innovation 
quality using absolute citation, and in Panel B using relative citation. In model (1) we use a 
simple pooled OLS regression and in model (2) and (3) we estimate a panel regression. In 
model (2) we include country characteristics and in model (3) apart from country characteristics 
we also include firm level controls. 
We find some evidence that just before the buyout transaction patents of the target firm 
are cited more heavily, yet after the buyout transaction the patents granted have fewer absolute 
as well as relative citation measures. The effect of drop in citation measures are particularly 
severe in year 2 and 3 after the buyout transaction. The negative effect is not only statistically 
significant but also economically sizable. For instance, for absolute citation models (1) – (3) 
indicate that the drop in absolute citation intensity in year 2 is 29%, while in year 3 it is between 
26% and 61%. The relative citation models (1) – (3) indicate that the fall in innovation in year 
3 is between 37% and 46%.   
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[Table 3.5 here] 
3.3.4. Institutional and Management Buyouts 
In this analysis, we distinguish between institutional and management buyouts. We 
expect that institutional investors are likely to have different incentives and long-term 
objectives than management buyouts. In Table 3.6 we present the results where we limit the 
sample to institutional buyouts only. We find that there is a very significant drop in both 
absolute and relative citations following institutional buyouts. Two years after the buyout 
event, absolute citations decrease around 35%. Three years after the buyout, the negative effect 
on innovation quality measures is further strengthened. We observe that absolute citations 
decrease between 31% and 42%, while relative citations fall between 43% and 48%. 
[Table 3.6 here] 
In Table 3.7 we show results where we include management buyouts only.  The effect 
of buyouts on absolute and relative citations is much weaker in the case of management buyouts 
when compared to Institutional buyouts. Within model (1) and (2) of Panel A, we do not 
observe any statistically significant effect on absolute citations post buyout. Within model (3), 
we find a statistically significant negative effect one year after the buyout on absolute citation 
intensity. However, no statistically significant effects are observed on relative citations in 
models (1), (2) and (3). The results indicate that the negative effect from buyouts is 
predominantly observed for institutional buyouts and not management buyouts. 
 [Table 3.7 here] 
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3.3.5. Radical Innovation 
Thus far we have analysed various general measures of innovation. However, the nature 
of innovation might differ. For example, certain patents might refer directly to scientific 
literature and be more radical in nature, while other patents might be just incremental in nature 
and improve the existing innovation, thus refer more to patent literature. We distinguish 
between the two and define radical innovation as the total number of patents granted to a firm 
i in the year t, which have at least one citation to a non-patent literature.  
In order to identify the effect of buyouts on radical innovation we limit our sample to 
only those target firms that had at least one radical patent applied for and granted within a 
period of 3 years before to 3 years after the buyout. 
We present the results in Table 3.8. We find that the number of radical innovations 
drops after buyout transaction. We observe a statistically and economically significant drop in 
radical innovation one, two and three years after the buyout. In year one, we see a drop of 4% 
of radical patents in model (3). The drop in radical innovation in year 2 is between 2 to 5% and 
in year 3 between 3 to 6%.   
[Table 3.8 here] 
3.3.6 Innovation Efficiency 
This analysis considers how efficiently a firm utilizes its R&D team following the 
buyout. Innovation efficiency can be improved by either increasing the number of patent 
applications while keeping the size of the R&D team constant or by producing the same 
number of patent applications using a smaller R&D team.  
 The results for innovation efficiency are presented in Table 3.9. Panel A, show 
the results for the entire sample. Panel B, show the results for only Institutional Buyouts and 
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Panel C for only Management Buyouts. Similar to the findings from patent counts, radical 
patent counts, absolute citations and relative citations, we find that institutional buyouts have 
the most significant negative effect on innovation efficiency. The decrease in innovation 
efficiency ranges between 17% for Institutional buyouts to 15% for Management buyouts, three 
years after the buyout. 
[Table 3.9 here] 
3.4. Additional Analysis 
3.4.1. Method of Financing: Private Equity 
The method of financing a deal can vary, some deals are just financed with resources 
from limited partners, and others can be financed through combination of private equity and 
debt. We therefore here limit the sample to deals that are exclusively financed with private 
equity. We thus intend to make it comparable with previous studies such as Lerner, Sorensen, 
and Strömberg (2011). In Table 3.10, columns (1) and (2) have absolute citations as their 
dependent variable, while columns (3) and (4) have relative citations as their dependent 
variables. Columns (1) and (3) include only Pre-2006 deals while columns (2) and (4) include 
only Post-2006 deals. 
Comparing our sample with Lerner, Sorensen, and Strömberg (2011) is not 
straightforward as the datasets are quite different and Lerner, Sorensen, and Strömberg (2011) 
dataset finishes in 2006 and is a US only study. We therefore obtain a US only sample, and 
split this sub-sample into two periods: before and after 2006. Columns 1 and 3, within Panel A 
of Table 3.10, includes deals that are most similar to Lerner, Sorensen, and Strömberg (2011) 
study. Pre-2006, for the US only sample, we do not observe a statistically significant positive 
or negative effect of buyouts on either absolute or relative citation intensity. In column 2 and 
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4 we include deals post 2006. It looks like quite significant changes happened in the nature of 
deals after 2006 and the negative effect of buyouts on innovation that we obtain are present 
strongly in the post 2006 period.  
In Panel B, of Table 3.10, we study international Private equity sample and find that 
similar to the US Private Equity deals only results, the negative effect of buyouts is limited to 
the post-2006 period. The negative effect is also weaker for Private equity only sample. 
In Panel C, of Table 3.10, we analyse the absolute and relative citation intensity of all 
deals pre and post 2006. We find that while the negative effect on innovation is more significant 
post-2006, we do find some negative effect pre-2006 as well, such as in the case of Absolute 
citations in model (3) during year 2 and year 3.  
 [Table 3.10 here] 
3.4.2. Subsample Analysis 
In our sample several countries dominate in terms of the domicile of the most 
innovative firms. To verify whether our results are not driven by a subsample set of countries 
we run regressions including only Germany, UK and US in Table 3.11.  We find a similar 
pattern that the investment in innovation drops after the buyout transaction. We also check if 
the results hold if we exclude those countries i.e. Germany, UK and US, and find significant 
drop in innovative activity after the buyout transaction.  
[Table 3.11 here] 
I did a propensity score matching analysis between firms that went through a public to private  
transaction (the treated firms) and those firms who got an offer to be taken private, but this 
offer was eventually withdrawn (the untreated firms). The results for this study have not been 
91 
 
tabulated. There were very few deals within the withdrawn category. The results were 
however, consistent with the findings in the paper. 
3.5. Conclusion 
 This paper studies the impact of public to private buyout transactions on the innovation 
activity of target firms. We analyzed both quantity and quality of patenting activity. We find 
that following buyouts, firms produce fewer patents overall, fewer radical innovations and 
receive fewer citations on the patents produced. In addition, buyouts also have a negative effect 
on innovation efficiency, despite reducing the number of innovators in the firm following the 
buyout. The negative effects on innovation are more pronounced for institutional buyouts 
compared to management buyouts, and for post-2006 period compared to pre-2006 period. 
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Figure 3.1. Change in Innovation metrics 
Figure 3.1 shows the change in various innovation metrics starting three years before the public to 
private transaction event (T-3) to 3 or 5 years after the event (T+3 / T+5). In Panel A, we consider the 
mean number patent application each year. In Panel B, we consider the mean number of only radical 
patents. In Panel C, we consider the mean number of Absolute citations received by patents applied 
for in that year. In Panel D, we consider the mean relative citations received by patents applied for in 
that year. See Table 3.1 for the sample description and Appendix Table 3.AII for the variable 
definitions. 
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Figure 3.2. Change in Innovation Efficiency metrics 
Figure 1 shows the change in various innovation efficiency metrics starting three years before the 
public to private transaction event (T-3) to 5 years after the event (T+3 / T+5). In Panel A, we 
consider the mean Innovation Efficiency pre- and post-buyout. In Panel B, we consider the mean 
number of Innovators pre- and post-buyout. See Table 3.1 for the sample description and 
Appendix Table 3.AII for the variable definitions. 
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Table 3.1. Sample Distribution  
This table presents the sample construction and the distribution of sample by announcement year 
(Panel A), target industry (Panel B), target country (Panel C), and by deal type (Panel D) for deals 
announced in 1997-2011 with at least one patent granted to the target firm 3 years before to 3 years 
after the transaction.  
 
Panel A: Distribution by year 
Year 
Deals 
# Patents # 
Mean 
Innovation 
Efficiency 
Deals # with 
Radical Patents Radical Patent # 
      
1997 29 1,266 0.5437 5 91 
1998 43 661 0.6922 8 43 
1999 62 713 0.4975 16 35 
2000 62 3,107 0.5942 19 152 
2001 63 2,502 1.0325 25 177 
2002 83 2,634 0.7069 26 155 
2003 128 6,319 0.7999 56 745 
2004 146 3,075 0.6338 56 196 
2005 190 6,631 0.6439 68 294 
2006 174 7,114 0.6738 57 1,210 
2007 232 11,184 0.6338 75 963 
2008 133 2,437 0.5890 39 111 
2009 68 1,459 0.5568 26 142 
2010 98 1,317 0.6208 29 111 
2011 110 3,380 0.6792 38 255 
Total 1,621 53,799 0.6602 543 4,680 
 
Panel B: Distribution by industry 
Industry Deals# Patents# 
Mean 
Innovation 
Efficiency 
Deals# with 
Radical 
Patents 
Radical 
Patents 
Agriculture (00-09) 6 123 0.5052 5 10 
Mining (10-14) 18 68 0.4311 1 1 
Construction (15-17) 6 967 0.4914 2 192 
Manufacturing (20-39) 1,255 47,988 0.7197 397 3,841 
Transportation, 
Communications (40-49) 10 284 0.6064 5 8 
Wholesale Trade (50-51) 26 241 0.4866 5 25 
Retail Trade (52-59) 219 3,439 0.4583 103 523 
Finance, Insurance, and 
Real Estate (60-67) 34 212 0.3400 15 30 
Services (70-89) 47 477 0.4819 10 50 
Total 1,621 53,799 0.6602 543 4,680 
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Panel C: Distribution by target’s country  
 
Country  Deals # Patents # 
Mean 
Innovation 
Efficiency 
Deals# with 
Radical 
Patents 
Radical 
Patents 
AT Austria 21 361 0.9281 5 11 
AU Australia  7 40 0.3332 2 8 
BE Belgium 17 301 0.6713 2 6 
BR Brazil 1 1 0.1429 0 0 
CA Canada 34 2,911 0.6037 16 198 
CH Switzerland 28 641 0.7203 5 12 
CN China 3 89 0.3859 0 0 
CZ Czech Republic 8 21 0.1278 0 0 
DE Germany 243 12,588 1.0159 102 716 
DK Denmark 21 355 0.9100 5 10 
ES Spain 28 392 0.9071 3 3 
FI Finland 35 267 0.4405 1 1 
FR France 187 4,270 0.8023 29 72 
GB UK 266 3,282 0.5379 61 177 
IE Ireland 1 7 0.7143 0 1 
IL Israel 5 307 0.5029 3 30 
IT Italy 47 1,106 0.7389 6 25 
JP Japan 17 3,214 0.5074 10 246 
KR Korea Republic 8 681 0.5351 1 1 
KY Cayman 
Islands 1 1 0.0714 0 0 
LT Lithuania 1 1 0.0714 0 0 
LU Luxemburg 3 208 1.3227 1 9 
MX Mexico 2 3 0.2143 0 1 
NL Netherlands 64 572 0.5200 20 23 
NO Norway 14 133 0.5108 5 9 
NZ New Zealand 2 9 0.2229 1 1 
PL Poland 2 48 1.1637 0 0 
PT Portugal 1 3 0.4286 0 0 
RO Romania 1 3 0.4286 0 0 
RU Russia 1 4 0.0571 0 0 
SE Sweden 47 2,363 0.7220 17 112 
SG Singapore 3 283 0.5408 2 45 
SI Slovenia 1 1 0.1429 0 0 
TW Taiwan 2 527 1.1454 0 0 
US United States 496 18,786 0.5143 245 2,964 
ZA South Africa 3 20 0.4841 1 1 
Total 1,621 53,799 0.6602 543 4,680 
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Panel D: Distribution by deal type 
Deal type Deals # Patents # 
Mean 
Innovation 
Efficiency 
Deals# with 
Radical 
Patents 
Radical 
Patents 
Institutional Buyout 1,169 44,225 0.6925 107 681 
Management 
Buyout 452 9,574 0.5767 436 3,999 
Total 1,621 53,799 0.6602 543 4,680 
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Table 3.2. Summary Statistics 
This table presents summary statistics for deals announced in 1997-2011 with at least one patent 
granted to the target firm 3 years before to 3 years after the transaction. 
 
Variable # of Deals 
# of 
Deal- 
years 
Mean S.D. 25% Median 75% 
Innovation Variables 
        
Patent count 10,829 1,547 3.7869 10.2709 0.0000 1.0000 3.0000 
Radical Patent 
count 10,829 1,547 0.2968 1.1129 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Citations 10,829 1,547 5.6396 25.7136 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Absolute citation 10,829 1,547 1.4808 6.7374 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Relative Citation  10,829 1,547 0.6481 3.5782 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Innovation 
efficiency 10,829 1,547 0.6149 0.9134 0.0000 0.2500 1.0000 
        
Country-level Variables  
        
IPR  10,794 1,542 8.0992 0.5909 8.0000 8.2000 8.3000 
INV 10,689 1,527 1.2856 1.2062 0.6249 1.3483 1.6006 
EMD 10,388 1,484 128.5589 86.0556 60.7588 103.0314 196.9813 
CMD1 10,829 1,547 136.6320 46.5264 96.7833 126.8692 183.9363 
CDM2 10,829 1,547 165.5480 51.4744 126.6678 155.5680 213.4666 
GDP_GR 10,829 1,547 2.0830 1.8671 1.6015 2.3749 3.2014 
 
Firm-level Variables 
        
SIZE 4,641 663 10.6266 1.9061 9.6004 10.6065 11.7019 
AGE  9,646 1378 36.6582 29.2099 18.0000 27.0000 47.0000 
ROA 4,592 656 -0.0034 0.8026 -0.0104 0.0534 0.1363 
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Table 3.3 Comparison of change in Innovation measure following Buyout 
Table 3.3 compares various measures of innovation one year before buyout transaction to 3 years 
after the buyout transaction, for all types of buyout, Institutional buyouts and Management buyouts.  
***(**)(*) denotes significance at the 1%(5%)(10%) two-tailed level. 
 
  N Institutional Buyouts N 
Management 
Buyouts N All Buyouts 
Panel A: Number of Radical Patent Applications 
One year before buyout (t-1) [A] 1,102 0.3303085 439 0.1594533 1,541 0.2816353 
Three years after buyout (t+3) [B] 1,102 0.2413793 439 0.1480638 1,541 0.2147956 
Difference [A] - [B] 
 
0.0889292 
 
0.0113895 
 
0.0668397 
  **    ** 
Panel B: Number of Patent Citations 
One year before buyout (t-1) [A] 1,102 6.76225 439 2.954442 1,541 5.677482 
Three years after buyout (t+3) [B] 1,102 3.314882 439 1.851936 1,541 2.898118 
Difference [A] - [B]  3.447368  1.102506  2.779364 
  ***    *** 
Panel C: Innovation efficiency 
One year before buyout (t-1) [A] 1,102 0.6718388 439 0.5533803 1,541 0.6380924 
Three years after buyout (t+3) [B] 1,102 0.5767191 439 0.6216192 1,541 0.5895102 
Difference [A] - [B]  0.0951198  -0.0682389  0.0485822 
  ***    * 
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Table 3.4. Estimates of Patent Count 
This table presents regressions where the dependent variable is the ln(1+patents granted to the target firm). In model (1) we present pooled OLS 
regression, in model (2) and (3) panel regression. In all models we show the regression where the independent variables are the relative years pre and post 
to the buyout transaction (event year 0 is the omitted base category with a coefficient normalized to one). All variables are defined in Appendix. ***, **, 
and * represent 1%, 5%, and 10% significance levels respectively. Marginal effects are reported.  
 
  (1) (2) (3) 
  Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat 
Event year −3 -0.0667* [-1.82] -0.0692*** [-3.16] -0.0353 [-0.96] 
Event year −2 -0.0423 [-1.16] -0.0439** [-2.00] -0.0191 [-0.52] 
Event year −1 -0.0379 [-1.04] -0.0389* [-1.77] -0.0478 [-1.29] 
Event year 1 -0.0229 [-0.63] -0.0320 [-1.46] -0.0804** [-2.18] 
Event year 2 -0.0408 [-1.12] -0.0529** [-2.42] -0.1136*** [-3.07] 
Event year 3 -0.0731** [-2.00] -0.0853*** [-3.89] -0.1744*** [-4.72] 
IPR   0.0423 [1.00] 0.0825 [1.35] 
INV   0.1491*** [6.41] 0.0953** [2.00] 
EMD   -0.0004 [-1.07] -0.0001 [-0.09] 
CMD1   -0.0023* [-1.85] -0.0034* [-1.69] 
CDM2   0.0012 [1.04] 0.0017 [0.84] 
GDP_GR   -0.0076 [-0.57] 0.0033 [0.15] 
SIZE     0.1016*** [4.39] 
AGE      0.0408 [0.67] 
ROA     -0.0409 [-0.91] 
Obs. 10297   9688   3584   
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Table 3.5. Negative Binomial Estimates of Citations (All Buyouts) 
This table presents regressions where the dependent variable is citation count measured by absolute citations in Panel A and relative citations in Panel B. In 
model (1) we present pooled regression, in model (2) and (3) panel regression. In all models we show the regression where the independent variables are 
the relative years pre and post to the buyout transaction (event year 0 is the omitted base category with a coefficient normalized to one). All variables are 
defined in Appendix. ***, **, and * represent 1%, 5%, and 10% significance levels respectively. Marginal effects are reported.  
 
 
Panel A. Absolute citations             
  (1) (2) (3) 
  Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat 
Event year −3 -0.0256 [-0.13] -0.1448 [-1.38] -0.2282 [-1.29] 
Event year −2 -0.1861 [-0.93] -0.2356** [-2.21] -0.1572 [-0.90] 
Event year −1 0.0009 [0.00] -0.0522 [-0.51] -0.0518 [-0.30] 
Event year 1 -0.0799 [-0.40] -0.0467 [-0.45] -0.1391 [-0.80] 
Event year 2 -0.2898 [-1.45] -0.2510** [-2.34] -0.2399 [-1.35] 
Event year 3 -0.4785** [-2.39] -0.3055*** [-2.73] -0.4039** [-2.12] 
IPR   0.1015 [1.25] 0.0945 [0.89] 
INV   0.2883*** [5.88] 0.4650*** [4.88] 
EMD   -0.0013 [-1.61] 0.0009 [0.57] 
CMD1   -0.0023 [-0.74] -0.0078 [-1.64] 
CDM2   0.0033 [1.22] 0.0027 [0.56] 
GDP_GR   0.0055 [0.22] -0.0207 [-0.51] 
SIZE     0.1487*** [3.26] 
AGE      0.2953** [2.48] 
ROA     0.6421** [1.98] 
Obs. 10297   9051   3290   
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Panel B. Radical citations.       
  (1) (2) (3) 
Event year −3 -0.0005 [-0.00] 0.0080 [0.06] -0.2752 [-1.09] 
Event year −2 -0.1717 [-0.67] -0.1346 [-0.95] -0.0793 [-0.33] 
Event year −1 -0.0305 [-0.12] 0.0632 [0.47] 0.1281 [0.55] 
Event year 1 -0.1454 [-0.56] -0.0599 [-0.43] -0.0009 [-0.00] 
Event year 2 -0.3050 [-1.18] -0.1260 [-0.89] -0.0721 [-0.30] 
Event year 3 -0.6020** [-2.32] -0.4651*** [-3.03] -0.6154** [-2.20] 
IPR   0.0298 [0.30] 0.1655 [1.18] 
INV   0.1524** [2.40] 0.0610 [0.60] 
EMD   0.0015 [1.64] 0.0009 [0.50] 
CMD1   0.0061 [1.64] -0.0031 [-0.61] 
CDM2   -0.0026 [-0.77] 0.0083 [1.63] 
GDP_GR   0.0527* [1.68] 0.1227** [2.36] 
SIZE     0.1663*** [2.87] 
AGE      0.0854 [0.58] 
ROA     1.0699** [2.48] 
Obs. 10297   9688   3584   
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Table 3.6. Negative Binomial Estimates of Citation (Institutional Buyouts) 
This table presents regressions where the dependent variable is citation count measured by absolute citations in Panel A and relative citations in Panel B. In 
model (1) we present pooled regression, in model (2) and (3) panel regression. In all models we show the regression where the independent variables are 
the relative years pre and post to the buyout transaction (event year 0 is the omitted base category with a coefficient normalized to one). All variables are 
defined in Appendix. ***, **, and * represent 1%, 5%, and 10% significance levels respectively. Marginal effects are reported.  
 
Panel A. Absolute citations             
  (1) (2) (3) 
  Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat 
Event year −3 -0.0188 [-0.08] -0.1101 [-0.92] -0.2019 [-0.94] 
Event year −2 -0.2274 [-1.01] -0.2369* [-1.93] -0.1644 [-0.78] 
Event year −1 -0.0515 [-0.23] -0.0320 [-0.27] 0.0654 [0.32] 
Event year 1 -0.0876 [-0.39] 0.0061 [0.05] 0.0825 [0.41] 
Event year 2 -0.3681 [-1.63] -0.2989** [-2.39] -0.3257 [-1.48] 
Event year 3 -0.5443** [-2.40] -0.3759*** [-2.91] -0.4312* [-1.91] 
IPR   0.0029 [0.03] 0.0178 [0.15] 
INV   0.2117*** [4.83] 0.2972* [1.91] 
EMD   -0.0015* [-1.69] 0.0008 [0.41] 
CMD1   -0.0002 [-0.07] -0.0031 [-0.39] 
CDM2   0.0015 [0.52] -0.0031 [-0.39] 
GDP_GR   -0.0165 [-0.61] -0.0438 [-0.92] 
SIZE     0.1290** [2.38] 
AGE      0.2982** [2.11] 
ROA     0.3173 [0.87] 
Obs. 7322   6237   2177   
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Panel B. Relative citations             
  (1) (2) (3) 
Event year −3 -0.0052 [-0.02] -0.0704 [-0.45] -0.1129 [-0.38] 
Event year −2 -0.2191 [-0.75] -0.2159 [-1.33] 0.1423 [0.51] 
Event year −1 -0.1058 [-0.36] 0.0162 [0.11] 0.3138 [1.15] 
Event year 1 -0.1930 [-0.66] -0.0380 [-0.24] 0.1838 [0.66] 
Event year 2 -0.4409 [-1.51] -0.2324 [-1.43] -0.1468 [-0.50] 
Event year 3 -0.6490** [-2.22] -0.5579*** [-3.15] -0.6177* [-1.83] 
IPR   -0.0700 [-0.64] 0.1727 [1.07] 
INV   0.1449* [1.72] 0.2758 [1.40] 
EMD   0.0007 [0.68] -0.0007 [-0.30] 
CMD1   0.0099* [1.90] -0.0119 [-1.60] 
CDM2   -0.0039 [-0.83] 0.0192** [2.48] 
GDP_GR   0.0213 [0.60] 0.1115* [1.76] 
SIZE     0.1467** [2.04] 
AGE      0.1417 [0.81] 
ROA     0.7467 [1.49] 
Obs. 7322   6237   2436   
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Table 3.7. Negative Binomial Estimates of Citation (Management Buyouts) 
This table presents regressions where the dependent variable is citation count measured by absolute citations in Panel A and relative citations in Panel B. In 
model (1) we present pooled regression, in model (2) and (3) panel regression. In all models we show the regression where the independent variables are 
the relative years pre and post to the buyout transaction (event year 0 is the omitted base category with a coefficient normalized to one). All variables are 
defined in Appendix. ***, **, and * represent 1%, 5%, and 10% significance levels respectively. Marginal effects are reported.  
 
Panel A. Absolute citations             
  (1) (2) (3) 
  Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat 
Event year −3 -0.0736 [-0.18] -0.1922 [-1.17] -0.3481 [-1.24] 
Event year −2 0.0585 [0.14] -0.0596 [-0.37] -0.1093 [-0.38] 
Event year −1 0.3009 [0.72] -0.0511 [-0.32] -0.3111 [-1.09] 
Event year 1 -0.0288 [-0.07] -0.1485 [-0.91] -0.6080* [-1.71] 
Event year 2 0.1264 [0.30] -0.1499 [-0.93] -0.1830 [-0.67] 
Event year 3 -0.1165 [-0.28] 0.0354 [0.22] -0.1134 [-0.32] 
IPR   0.8181** [2.32] 0.2706 [0.84] 
INV   0.6818*** [5.08] 0.5346*** [2.70] 
EMD   -0.0019 [-0.86] 0.0046 [1.03] 
CMD1   -0.0029 [-0.51] -0.0039 [-0.60] 
CDM2   0.0064 [1.07] 0.0035 [0.49] 
GDP_GR   0.0827 [1.31] 0.0458 [0.57] 
SIZE     0.2667** [2.45] 
AGE      0.3143 [1.33] 
ROA     2.1789*** [2.86] 
Obs. 2975   2898   1148   
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Panel B. Relative citations             
  (1) (2) (3) 
Event year −3 0.0587 [0.11] -0.1360 [-0.42] -0.6676 [-1.33] 
Event year −2 0.2991 [0.56] -0.1580 [-0.48] -0.8366 [-1.64] 
Event year −1 0.6328 [1.20] 0.1921 [0.63] -0.3828 [-0.83] 
Event year 1 0.3263 [0.61] -0.1690 [-0.51] -0.5547 [-1.11] 
Event year 2 0.6695 [1.27] 0.1581 [0.52] 0.1418 [0.35] 
Event year 3 -0.1348 [-0.25] -0.1892 [-0.57] -0.7052 [-1.39] 
IPR   1.1445** [2.35] 0.8038 [1.36] 
INV   0.1046 [0.74] -0.0293 [-0.15] 
EMD   0.0063** [2.48] 0.0104 [1.64] 
CMD1   0.0011 [0.15] -0.0033 [-0.35] 
CDM2   -0.0004 [-0.06] 0.0030 [0.28] 
GDP_GR   0.0842 [1.03] 0.0491 [0.45] 
SIZE     0.2516* [1.81] 
AGE      0.1034 [0.31] 
ROA     1.8502* [1.90] 
Obs. 2975   2898   1148   
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Table 3.8. Estimates of Radical Patent Count 
This table presents regressions where the dependent variable is the ln(1+radical patents granted to the target firm). In model (1) we present pooled OLS 
regression, in model (2) and (3) panel regression. In all models we show the regression where the independent variables are the relative years pre and post 
to the buyout transaction (event year 0 is the omitted base category with a coefficient normalized to one). All variables are defined in Appendix. ***, **, 
and * represent 1%, 5%, and 10% significance levels respectively. Marginal effects are reported. 
  
  (1) (2) (3) 
  Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat 
Event year −3 -0.0051 [-0.37] -0.0043 [-0.43] 0.0075 [0.48] 
Event year −2 -0.0035 [-0.25] -0.0034 [-0.34] 0.0017 [0.11] 
Event year −1 -0.0040 [-0.29] -0.0036 [-0.36] -0.0075 [-0.48] 
Event year 1 -0.0134 [-0.96] -0.0145 [-1.45] -0.0378** [-2.44] 
Event year 2 -0.0182 [-1.31] -0.0184* [-1.84] -0.0450*** [-2.90] 
Event year 3 -0.0347** [-2.51] -0.0385*** [-3.86] -0.0607*** [-3.92] 
IPR   0.0310** [2.10] 0.0453** [2.23] 
INV   0.0421*** [5.14] 0.0401** [2.53] 
EMD   0.0002 [1.39] 0.0005 [1.59] 
CMD1   0.0004 [0.96] 0.0008 [1.17] 
CDM2   -0.0001 [-0.28] -0.0004 [-0.64] 
GDP_GR   -0.0012 [-0.25] -0.0036 [-0.49] 
SIZE     0.0264*** [3.44] 
AGE      0.0049 [0.24] 
ROA     -0.0198 [-1.34] 
Obs. 10297   9688   3584   
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Table 3.9. Estimates of Innovation Efficiency  
This table presents regressions where the dependent variable is innovation efficiency. In model (1) we present pooled OLS regression, in model (2) and (3) 
panel regression. In all models we show the regression where the independent variables are the relative years pre and post to the buyout transaction 
(event year 0 is the omitted base category with a coefficient normalized to one). All variables are defined in Appendix. ***, **, and * represent 1%, 5%, and 
10% significance levels respectively. Marginal effects are reported.  
 
Panel A. All Sample 
  (1) (2) (3) 
  Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat 
Event year −3 -0.0096 [-0.28] -0.0129 [-0.44] 0.0660 [1.30] 
Event year −2 0.0202 [0.59] 0.0117 [0.40] 0.0280 [0.55] 
Event year −1 -0.0041 [-0.12] -0.0086 [-0.29] -0.0255 [-0.50] 
Event year 1 -0.0372 [-1.09] -0.0603** [-2.04] -0.0683 [-1.35] 
Event year 2 -0.0590* [-1.74] -0.0758** [-2.57] -0.0789 [-1.56] 
Event year 3 -0.0657* [-1.94] -0.0746** [-2.53] -0.1800*** [-3.56] 
IPR   0.0893*** [3.10] 0.0655 [1.52] 
INV   0.0027 [0.17] -0.0481 [-1.43] 
EMD   -0.0005* [-1.81] -0.0008 [-1.21] 
CMD1   -0.0028*** [-3.26] -0.0033** [-2.34] 
CDM2   0.0011 [1.44] 0.0021 [1.44] 
GDP_GR   -0.0014 [-0.15] 0.0055 [0.36] 
SIZE     0.0283* [1.74] 
AGE      0.0013 [0.03] 
ROA     0.0133 [0.42] 
Obs. 10297   9688   3584   
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Panel B. Institutional Buyouts 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Event year −3 -0.0114 [-0.28] -0.0155 [-0.43] 0.0741 [1.21] 
Event year −2 0.0162 [0.39] 0.0086 [0.24] 0.0026 [0.04] 
Event year −1 -0.0005 [-0.01] -0.0047 [-0.13] 0.0218 [0.36] 
Event year 1 -0.0207 [-0.50] -0.0514 [-1.44] -0.0232 [-0.38] 
Event year 2 -0.0617 [-1.50] -0.0826** [-2.31] -0.0628 [-1.03] 
Event year 3 -0.1041** [-2.53] -0.1125*** [-3.14] -0.1902*** [-3.11] 
IPR   0.0855*** [2.60] 0.0517 [1.01] 
INV   -0.0012 [-0.06] -0.0394 [-1.00] 
EMD   -0.0011*** [-3.32] -0.0011 [-1.43] 
CMD1   -0.0008 [-0.73] -0.0016 [-0.81] 
CDM2   -0.0000 [-0.03] 0.0007 [0.38] 
GDP_GR   -0.0033 [-0.30] 0.0049 [0.25] 
SIZE     0.0125 [0.60] 
AGE      -0.0178 [-0.33] 
ROA     0.0216 [0.61] 
Obs. 7322   6790   2436   
Panel C. Management Buyouts 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Event year −3 -0.0050 [-0.08] -0.0068 [-0.13] 0.0486 [0.54] 
Event year −2 0.0300 [0.50] 0.0189 [0.36] 0.0820 [0.91] 
Event year −1 -0.0131 [-0.22] -0.0175 [-0.34] -0.1257 [-1.39] 
Event year 1 -0.0778 [-1.31] -0.0809 [-1.56] -0.1640* [-1.81] 
Event year 2 -0.0525 [-0.88] -0.0597 [-1.15] -0.1129 [-1.25] 
Event year 3 0.0287 [0.48] 0.0143 [0.28] -0.1584* [-1.75] 
IPR   0.2078*** [3.06] 0.1894** [2.17] 
INV   0.0018 [0.05] -0.1100 [-1.57] 
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EMD   0.0008 [1.37] 0.0014 [1.00] 
CMD1   -0.0047*** [-3.54] -0.0057*** [-2.81] 
CDM2   0.0012 [0.86] 0.0038 [1.61] 
GDP_GR   -0.0070 [-0.43] 0.0074 [0.28] 
SIZE     0.0633** [2.10] 
AGE      0.0437 [0.58] 
ROA     0.1113 [1.15] 
Obs. 2975   2898   1148   
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Table 3.10. Comparison analysis with Lerner 
This table presents regressions where the dependent variable is citation count measured by absolute citations in model (1) - (2) and relative citations in 
model (3) - (4). In all models we show the regression where the independent variables are the relative years pre and post to the buyout transaction (event 
year 0 is the omitted base category with a coefficient normalized to one). All variables are defined in Appendix. ***, **, and * represent 1%, 5%, and 10% 
significance levels respectively. Marginal effects are reported.  
 
Panel A: Sample of US Private Equity deals (Lerner Sample) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  Pre 2006 Post 2006 Pre 2006 Post 2006 
  Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat 
Event year −3 0.1411 [0.50] 0.0633 [0.21] 0.0801 [0.23] 0.0126 [0.04] 
Event year −2 -0.1219 [-0.41] -0.2294 [-0.72] -0.0902 [-0.24] -0.0640 [-0.18] 
Event year −1 0.1789 [0.63] -0.5290 [-1.54] 0.4261 [1.30] -0.5628 [-1.41] 
Event year 1 0.2752 [0.99] -0.2491 [-0.78] 0.2885 [0.84] -0.3545 [-0.94] 
Event year 2 -0.4743 [-1.44] -0.6206* [-1.77] -0.2287 [-0.59] -0.2885 [-0.78] 
Event year 3 0.2328 [0.82] -1.5152*** [-3.28] 0.4420 [1.33] -1.7989*** [-2.87] 
Obs. 756   945   756   945   
Panel B: All Private Equity deals 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  Pre 2006 Post 2006 Pre 2006 Post 2006 
  Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat 
Event year −3 -0.1013 [-0.51] 0.0099 [0.05] -0.1627 [-0.55] 0.2093 [0.78] 
Event year −2 -0.2687 [-1.29] -0.0979 [-0.47] -0.1287 [-0.44] 0.0370 [0.13] 
Event year −1 0.1756 [0.92] -0.0709 [-0.34] 0.4255 [1.62] 0.0481 [0.18] 
Event year 1 0.1586 [0.83] 0.1045 [0.53] 0.1942 [0.70] 0.0611 [0.22] 
Event year 2 -0.2755 [-1.32] -0.1252 [-0.60] 0.0181 [0.06] 0.0417 [0.15] 
Event year 3 0.0654 [0.33] -0.4313* [-1.94] 0.3473 [1.28] -0.9250*** [-2.63] 
Obs. 2331   2842   2331   2842   
111 
 
Panel C: All sample 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  Pre 2006 Post 2006 Pre 2006 Post 2006 
  Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat 
Event year −3 -0.1473 [-1.04] -0.0455 [-0.31] -0.1666 [-0.83] 0.1672 [0.88] 
Event year −2 -0.3048** [-2.07] -0.1174 [-0.80] -0.1975 [-0.97] -0.0492 [-0.25] 
Event year −1 -0.0256 [-0.18] -0.1119 [-0.76] 0.1884 [1.01] -0.0193 [-0.10] 
Event year 1 -0.1093 [-0.77] -0.0454 [-0.31] -0.1292 [-0.64] 0.0092 [0.05] 
Event year 2 -0.3098** [-2.11] -0.2082 [-1.39] -0.1685 [-0.84] -0.0513 [-0.26] 
Event year 3 -0.2431* [-1.66] -0.4542*** [-2.89] -0.1561 [-0.77] -0.7889*** [-3.35] 
Obs. 4949   5348   4949   5348   
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Table 3.11. Negative Binomial Estimated of Citation by Country 
This table presents regressions where the dependent variable is citation count measured by absolute citations. In models (1) & (3) we limit the sample to 
US, UK or Germany, while in models (2) & (4) we limit the sample to all countries except US, UK or Germany. In models (1) & (2) absolute citations is the 
main dependent variable while in models (3) and (4) relative citations is the main dependent variable. In all models we show the regression where the 
independent variables are the relative years pre and post to the buyout transaction (event year 0 is the omitted base category with a coefficient normalized 
to one). ***, **, and * represent 1%, 5%, and 10% significance levels respectively. Marginal effects are reported.  
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  US, UK & Germany only 
Excluding US, UK & 
Germany 
US, UK & Germany 
only 
Excluding US, UK & 
Germany 
  Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat 
Event year −3 0.0366 [0.18] -0.1469 [-0.95] 0.0427 [0.17] -0.1071 [-0.49] 
Event year −2 0.0850 [0.43] -0.0683 [-0.45] 0.1106 [0.45] 0.0717 [0.35] 
Event year −1 0.0620 [0.31] -0.0393 [-0.26] 0.2284 [0.95] 0.1707 [0.84] 
Event year 1 -0.0692 [-0.34] -0.1286 [-0.84] -0.1847 [-0.70] -0.0312 [-0.15] 
Event year 2 -0.4561** [-2.05] -0.2357 [-1.50] -0.4485 [-1.62] -0.0865 [-0.41] 
Event year 3 -0.6286*** [-2.72] -0.4653*** [-2.83] -0.9918*** [-3.03] -0.7068*** [-2.80] 
SIZE 0.0771 [1.45] 0.1443*** [4.17] 0.1995*** [3.25] 0.2663*** [5.81] 
AGE 0.3624*** [2.67] 0.3171*** [3.01] 0.2312 [1.41] 0.1183 [0.89] 
ROA 0.5743 [1.64] 0.4998* [1.84] 0.2494 [0.64] 0.3088 [0.88] 
Obs. 1386   4284   1386   4284   
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Appendix 
Table 3.AI. Sample Selection 
   Number of observations 
All buyouts 36,201 
Zephyr matched with Orbis 21,296 
Deals with patent data 3 years before and 3 
years after transaction 
2,468 
Deals where the acquirer bought 100% of 
the target 
1,621 
After eliminating deals with missing data 1,471 
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Table 3.AII. Variable definitions 
Variable Definition Data source 
Innovation Measures   
Patent count The total number of patents applied for and 
granted to firm i in year t. 
PATSTAT 
Radical innovation The total number of patents granted to a firm 
i in the year t, which have at least one 
citation to a Non-Patent literature 
PATSTAT 
Citation count The total number of citations received for 
patents filed and subsequently granted in the 
year t.  
PATSTAT 
Absolute citation The total number of citations received for 
patents filed and subsequently granted during 
the year that a patent is granted and the 
following three periods. 
PATSTAT 
Relative citation The total number of citations received for 
patents filed and subsequently granted during 
the year and the following three periods, less 
the average number of citations during this 
period that is received by matching patents. 
PATSTAT 
Innovation efficiency The number application that has been filed 
and subsequently granted during the year, 
divided by the number of unique innovators. 
PATSTAT 
Country-level Characteristics 
IPR  Intellectual Property Rights measures aspects 
of intellectual property. In particular, 
protection of intellectual property, and 
additionally it reviews a country’s policies and 
their effectiveness regarding patents, 
copyrights, and trademarks. 
 
Park (2008) 
INV  Country innovativeness measures as the 
number of resident patent applications scaled 
by GDP (in mln). 
WDI/GDF 
database 
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EMD  Equity Market Development measured as the 
value of shares traded (the total number of 
shares traded, both domestic and foreign, 
multiplied by their respective matching 
prices) scaled by GDP.  
WDI/GDF 
database 
CMD1  Credit Market Development measured as 
domestic credit to private sector (% of GDP). 
Domestic credit to private sector refers to 
financial resources provided to the private 
sector by financial corporations, such as 
through loans, purchases of nonequity 
securities, and trade credits and other accounts 
receivable, that establish a claim for 
repayment. Credit is an important link in 
money transmission; it finances production, 
consumption, and capital formation, which in 
turn affect economic activity. 
WDI/GDF 
database 
CMD2 Credit Market Development measured as 
domestic credit provided by financial sector 
(% of GDP). Domestic credit provided by the 
financial sector includes all credit to various 
sectors on a gross basis, with the exception of 
credit to the central government, which is net. 
The financial sector includes monetary 
authorities and deposit money banks, as well 
as other financial corporations where data are 
available (including corporations that do not 
accept transferable deposits but do incur such 
liabilities as time and savings deposits). 
Domestic credit provided by the financial 
sector as a share of GDP measures banking 
sector depth and financial sector development 
in terms of size. 
WDI/GDF 
database 
GDP_GR GDP growth (annual %). Annual percentage 
growth rate of GDP at market prices based on 
constant local currency. Aggregates are based 
on constant 2010 U.S. dollars. GDP is the sum 
of gross value added by all resident producers 
in the economy plus any product taxes and 
minus any subsidies not included in the value 
of the products. It is calculated without 
making deductions for depreciation of 
WDI/GDF 
database 
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fabricated assets or for depletion and 
degradation of natural resources. 
Firm-level Characteristics   
SIZE Natural logarithm of operating revenue.  ORBIS 
AGE Natural logarithm of the number of years since 
the firm incorporation date.  
ORBIS 
ROA Return on assets, defined as operating income 
before depreciation divided by total assets 
(book value of total assets). 
ORBIS 
 
 
  
117 
 
Chapter 4 
Pre-Going Private Ownership around the World 
4.1. Introduction 
Public to private buyout transactions (hereafter “going-private” or “buyout” transactions1) 
have grown in popularity around the world. For example, the Carlyle Group, one of the world’s 
largest and most successful private equity organizations, highlighted in their 2013 Q2 Results: 
“We have been active in Asia, recently closing one and announcing another public to private 
transaction in China.” Although, buyouts are supposed to create value by improving target firm 
efficiency (Guo, et al. 2011; Goergen et al., 2014a,b; Brewster et al., 2017), at different points in 
time, buyout transactions have been criticized in the media and have even been banned in some 
countries such as Italy. There has been growing concern in the media around the world that buyouts 
should be regulated. In 2006, for example, The NY Times reported that “LBOs should be illegal”.2 
In 2007, The Economist stated that private equity funds need regulation.3 German governmental 
officials have characterized private equity firms as “locusts”.4 Yet, an active buyout market for 
corporate control also serves a role of external corporate governance, and its aim is to improve 
efficiency. Introducing regulation might distort the governance role of the buyout funds as external 
monitors.  
Although going private transactions have been widely studied in different countries 
(DeAngelo et al., 1984; Lehn and Poulsen, 1989; Halpern et al., 1999; Renneboog and 
Vensteenkiske, 2017), and ownership structures vary widely in different countries (Faccio and 
Lang, 2002), there is scant work that examines ownership structure and shareholder rights prior to 
going private in an international setting, apart from the continental European evidence of 
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Achleitner et al. (2013). The worldwide growth in buyout funds taking firms private gives rise to 
question about whether there are differences in the ownership structure of firms prior to going 
private in different countries. Ownership naturally affects internal and external corporate 
governance.  Different types of owners have different incentives in terms of how they affect a 
firm’s corporate policies (Connelly, et al. 2010; Anderson, et al. 2012; Coffee and Palia, 2016; 
McCahery and Vermeulen, 2016; Wood and Brewster, 2016), how efficiently they run the 
company, and also how they make decisions on whether to sell off the firm.  
Given that buyout funds seek to improve a firm’s efficiency, we claim that firms with 
certain ownership structure might be more likely to be taken private. Also, the way they are taken 
private might differ, as well. In order to assess the validity of these claims, it is helpful to 
understand whether or not shareholder ownership is systematically different before going private. 
Are public to private transactions more common for firms with block ownership? Do they differ 
depending on the buyout type?  
Furthermore, a buyout typically involves leveraging the target company to a significant 
extent. The leverage creates an agency conflict between the investors in the target firm and its 
debtholders (Sherwin, 1988). When the target firm is restructured and left with sufficient funds to 
pay back its debt, it does not harm the creditors. However, the protection of creditors’ rights 
becomes critical when the target firm is left insolvent or without necessary funds in order to sustain 
its operations. 
Bankruptcy risk and expected agency costs are more relevant in the case of whole firm 
institutional buyouts than buildup strategies where the transaction was completed in several stages. 
Stronger creditor rights clarify and strengthen the lender’s legal remedies, and, therefore, increase 
the supply of capital for institutional buyouts.  In the absence of strong creditor rights, it could be 
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harder to secure the requisite amount of debt finance, and build-up strategies may be more likely 
due to financial constraints. Also, in the case of management buyouts, information asymmetries 
for the new management team are less pronounced (Howorth et al., 2004), which mitigates the 
need to have stronger creditor rights to bring about completed deals.  
We also examine whether legal conditions mitigate the probability of going private 
transactions. Better legal conditions ensure stronger certainty about the quality of exchanges and 
trading, thereby improving liquidity and lowering the cost of equity capital for publicly traded 
firms.  As such, better legal conditions increase the likelihood of a firm being public and reduce 
the likelihood of a going private transaction. 
Another concern about going private transactions is the possibility that they may lead to 
potential expropriation of minority shareholders through non-arms-length transactions. Going 
private imposes two primary costs for minority shareholders: lack of liquidity, and lack of 
transparency. In effect, a going private transaction potentially enables majority shareholders to 
extract greater rents from minority shareholders (DeAngelo, et al. 1984). Such misappropriation 
may happen even in developed countries, such as Canada and the U.S.5 While the legal system in 
developed countries affords protections to shareholders in ways that mitigates the likelihood of 
such activity and provides redress in the event that it occurs, there is much more scope for 
opportunistic behavior in countries that do not afford such protections to minority shareholders. 
We, therefore, study whether there are any systematic differences in terms of country 
characteristics before going private transaction.  
We examine these issues with a sample of 778 going private transactions between 2002 
and 2014 from 36 countries, including Australia, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, China, Denmark, 
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Honk Kong, Hungary, India, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, the 
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Republic of Korea, Lithuania, Malaysia, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, the Philippines, 
Poland, Portugal, the Russian Federation, Singapore, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, the United 
Kingdom, and the United States of America. 
We find that going private transactions are more likely if the firm is owned by institutional 
or corporate investors and less likely if it is owned by family. The data show strong and consistent 
evidence that pre-going private ownership is characterized by block corporate or institutional 
investor ownership, where block ownership is defined as a shareholder with 10% stake in the 
company in the year prior to going private. We find that going private through a buildup strategy 
is less likely if the firm is owned by family, while management buyouts are more likely when the 
firm is owned by a corporate investor.  
Stronger creditor rights increase the probability of going private, especially in the case of 
whole company and institutional buyouts. We also find that the legal conditions decrease the 
likelihood of going private for those buyout types. While the results might be affected by potential 
endogeneity problems, we try to mitigate these by running several robustness tests and find largely 
consistent evidence.  
We contribute to the management literature by analyzing ownership differences in public 
to private transactions in an international context. Our paper focuses on ownership differences and 
provides evidence from a multi-country setting to understand the association between law, 
institutions, and ownership on the probability of public to private buyouts. 
This paper is organized as follows. Section II summarizes the hypotheses. The data are 
introduced in Section III. The summary statistics and univariate tests are discussed in Section IV. 
Multivariate analyses and limitations are discussed in Section V. Concluding remarks follow in 
Section VI. 
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4.2. Theory and Hypotheses 
The separation of ownership and control might be a major motive to extract private benefits 
by entrenched managers. Jensen (1986) claims that entrenched managers might not act in the best 
interest of existing shareholders. They might misuse the company’s resources for empire building 
or to invest in negative NPV value projects. These agency costs might be more severe where the 
separation between the owners and management is more pronounced.  
Aslan and Kumar (2011) claim that agency-cost theories explain the decision to go private. 
Ljungqvist, et al. (2016) analyze the consequences of public to private transactions when the 
incentives to sell become misaligned. Ownership structure is a central part of their model. They 
claim that shareholders in public companies do not internalize the consequences of their decision 
to sell to the wider economy; therefore, it has negative consequences for the economy.  Renneboog, 
et al. (2007) show that shareholders in the UK receive a premium that results from firm 
undervaluation and incentive realignment. Mehran and Peristiani (2010) claim that the main reason 
for going private is due to poor financial visibility. Boot, et al. (2008) show in a theoretical model 
that firm ownership and investor participation are important determinants of a going private 
decision. Achleitner, et al. (2013) study how corporate control affects the likelihood of private 
equity acquisition for a sample of continental European firms. Political and governance factors are 
important for the going private decision. For example, Aguilera (2005) finds that corporate 
governance matters and director accountability varies, depending on the institutional setting and 
rule changes. Wright et al. (2016), for example, discuss the impact of Brexit on LBOs. 
Owners are not the same. The time horizon of owners and investors affects investment 
decisions (Thanassoulis and Somekh, 2015) and voting practices (Stathopoulos and Voulgaris, 
2016).  Connelly, et al. (2010) claim that different types of shareholders might serve as an 
122 
 
influential form of company governance. They suggest that corporate owners, on one hand, 
provide capital to the firm; yet, on the other hand, they are mostly interested in subsequently selling 
their shares in a takeover. Typically, a corporate takeover is a lucrative exit strategy for investors 
generating a high premium (Greenwood and Schor, 2009). The effect of institutional investors 
such as banks on firm corporate policies is inconclusive (Gorton and Schmid, 2000; Agarwal and 
Elston, 2001). Yuan et al. (2009) show that financial institutions play an important role in 
governance of listed companies in China.  We expect greater agency problems when the firm is 
controlled by corporate or institutional shareholders and, therefore, greater potential gains from 
public to private transactions. Furthermore, corporate or institutional investors might be more 
likely to exercise an exit opportunity and obtain a lucrative premium through a buyout.  Therefore, 
we predict that firms with a greater percentage of institutional or corporate owners are more likely 
to be targets in going private transactions. 
Corporate and institutional investors are concentrated owners and, as such, are more likely 
to be blockholders. As a blockholder, a corporate or institutional investor would have an 
exacerbated incentive to exercise a buyout for the following reasons.  Public firms have significant 
costs of disseminating information (Bharath and Dittmar, 2010).  Merton (1987) shows that under 
imperfect information expected returns to investors decrease with the size of the investor base. 
Block ownership by outside investors is associated with concentrated monitoring and private 
benefits. Blockholders can exercise their power over management. Yet, concentrated ownership 
often leads to costly overmonitoring and a decline in managerial initiative (Burkart, et al. 1997; 
Pagano and Roell, 1998). Furthermore, blockholders can often exercise their power, which leads 
to wealth expropriation from minority shareholders; these private benefits of block ownership have 
been confirmed by Barclay and Holderness (1989, 1991, 1992) through evidence that blockholder 
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trades are at a premium, thus implying private benefits of control.  Blockholders may also benefit 
through production synergies associated with cross-ownership of other companies owned and 
controlled by the blockholders, and they make better use of those synergies without the costs of 
disseminating information in the ways required when the company is public. If the block 
ownership is associated with costly overmonitoring, a decline in managerial incentives, production 
synergies, and wealth expropriation, we would expect higher buyout probability to enable value 
creation through reducing agency costs and improvements in operating efficiency.  
 
H1: Corporate and institutional ownership increase the probability of a public to private 
transaction.  
 
H2: Blockholdings of corporate and institutional ownership exacerbate the increase in the 
probability of a public to private transaction.  
 
Family firms, by contrast, have a substantially less pronounced separation of ownership 
and control. Family shareholders typically have tighter control over (or are a part of) the 
management team; as such, there is evidence that family owned firms have better performance and 
a lower cost of debt (Anderson and Reeb, 2003; Anderson, et al., 2003).  Thus, companies owned 
by families are expected to have lower agency costs (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) and to run more 
efficiently.6 As the potential for value creation associated with mitigating agency costs is less 
pronounced for buyouts of family firms, we expect family ownership to lower the probability of a 
public to private transaction. Ahlers et al. (2017) find that non-financial factors are particularly 
important among non-family firms in buyouts, and there is related evidence that innovation is 
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valued less among family firms (Chang et al., 2010).  Furthermore, there could be emotional ties 
associated with family ownership that reduce the likelihood of a buyout (Zellweger and Astrachan, 
2008). 
 
H3: Family ownership decreases the probability of a public to private transaction.  
 
H4: Blockholdings of family ownership exacerbate the decrease in the probability of a 
public to private transaction.  
4.3. Data 
4.3.A. Sample Selection  
We select a sample of worldwide public to private buyouts from the Zephyr database. We 
select all institutional and management buyouts where the public firm was a target in the buyout 
transaction and became private. We carefully check the delisting reason for each target firm and 
make sure that the delisting date is later than the buyout date. We include whole company buyouts 
and buildup strategies (i.e. where the transaction was completed in several stages). In the case of 
whole company buyouts, the entire firm is converted from a public to private company in a single 
transaction. In other words, whole company buyouts are those that are not done through a buildup 
strategy. 
We construct the main measure of ownership using data from the Orbis database. The Orbis 
ownership database is a primary source for owner links around the world for around 7 million 
companies. We decided to use Zephyr as a source of buyout transactions, as it shares common 
identifiers with Orbis, and both databases are provided by one vendor—Bureau Van Dijk.  
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All financial information is primarily from Orbis, supplemented by Thomson Reuters. All 
financial data are from the last fiscal year end before the going private transaction. Our main 
sample contains 778 public to private transactions from 2002 to 2014 from 36 countries, including 
Australia, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, China, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Honk 
Kong, Hungary, India, Ireland, Israel Italy, Japan, Republic of Korea, Lithuania, Malaysia, 
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Russian Federation, 
Singapore, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States of America. 
We choose a control sample, as the distribution of buyouts is not random (Davis, et al. 
2015). For each public to private firm, we find one matched firm based on country, industry, year, 
and revenue (Weir, et al., 2005; North, 2001; Klein and Zur, 2009). We summarize the sample 
decomposition in Table 4.1. In Column 2, we show all public to private deals in our sample; in 
Column 3, we show whole firm buyouts (buyouts that were not done through a buildup strategy); 
in Column 4, we show buyouts through buildup strategies; and, in Columns 5 and 6, we distinguish 
between management and institutional buyouts. In Panel A, we present composition by year. 
Looking at Table 4.1, we can see that public to private transactions occur in waves. With one wave 
around 2006-2007 and another wave around 2010-2011. So there is in fact some variability in the 
number of public to private transactions across time. We do not observe a clear increasing trend in 
the number of public to private transactions. There is a peak in buyouts in 2006-2007, reaching a 
number of 228 deals in 2007. In Panel B, we present composition by country. Buyouts through 
buildup strategies are common; yet, only in certain countries, with the majority of deals taking 
place in France, Germany, Italy, and the US. This might be related to strong shareholders’ rights 
and the difficulty of buying the whole company. In Panel C, we present composition by industry. 
Most of the deals occur in the services and manufacturing sector.  
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[Insert Table 4.1 here] 
4.3.B. Ownership Measures 
We generate ownership measures based on the ownership data provided by Orbis. For each 
target firm going private, we extract information on its immediate shareholders. We then generate 
three types of shareholders: 1) INSTITUTION is equal to the percentage of ownership of 
institutional investors, including private equity, banks, venture capital, etc.; 2) CORPORATION 
is equal to the percentage of ownership of an industrial company; and 3) FAMILY is equal to the 
percentage of ownership of family.  
We also generate the block ownership variables. We define block ownership when one 
type of shareholder holds more than 10% of the stock. We define three types of blockholders: 1) 
INSTITUTION_BLOCK, equal to one if the ownership of institutional investors is greater than 
10%; 2) CORPORATION_BLOCK, equal to 1 if the percentage of ownership of the industrial 
company is greater than 10%; and 3) FAMILY_BLOCK, equal to one if the ownership of family 
is greater than 10%, and zero otherwise.  
4.3.C. Other Controls 
Although the main focus of our analysis is to analyze the relationship between ownership 
and public to private transactions, we also include other variables that are identified in the previous 
literature as determinants of buyout transactions. The theories of agency problems between the 
principal and agent of Jensen (1986) argue that firms with more free cash flow are more likely to 
be targets in buyout transactions (e.g., Halpern, Kieschnick, and Rotenberg,1999; Lehn and 
Poulsen, 1989). Financial leverage is important in many buyout transactions, as it shows the 
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magnitude of the borrowing costs. Yet, it has been shown that buyout transaction can cause wealth 
expropriation from bondholders to shareholders (Asquith and Wizman, 1990). Growth 
opportunities are also related to the free cash flow hypothesis and debt level. Firms with low 
growth prospects might misuse the cash flows and invest in negative NPV projects. On the other 
hand, firms with excessive debt levels might underinvest and forgo positive NPV projects.  
We, therefore, include the following control variables. First, we include target firm age 
(AGE), the age of the company in years. Second, we control for target firm total assets in the 
logarithm (ASSETS). Third, we include a return on assets (ROA) that proxies for profitability of 
the firm. Fourth, following Jensen (1986), we control for the misuse by entrenched managers of 
free cash flows (CASHFLOW). Fifth, we include the debt-to-asset ratio (LEVERAGE) that 
proxies for borrowing costs and wealth expropriation. Sixth, we control for the ratio of fixed assets 
to total assets (CAPINV). Finally, we include the market-to-book ratio (MB) to control for growth 
opportunities.  
4.3.D. Country Characteristics 
Investor protection has an important effect on firm governance (La Porta et al., 1998), we 
therefore include, as control variables, several measures that proxy for legal, institutional, and 
creditor rights. We control for creditor rights using an index developed by La Porta et al. (1998) 
and for legal origin an English legal region that is equal to 1, if a firm is incorporated in a country 
of English legal origin before going private, and zero otherwise. We also control for country 
market size using the natural log of GDP per capita of the country in which the firm is incorporated 
before going private.  
4.4. Univariate Tests 
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In Table 4.2, we compare the going private sample with the control sample of matched 
firms that remained public. We first report summary statistics for the going private sample and 
then for firms that remained public. In the last two columns, we present the difference between 
means of two samples and t statistics. The statistically significant t-test suggests that going private 
firms are different in terms of ownership from firms that remained public. In particular, going 
private firms have a higher institutional and corporation ownership percentage, but a lower family 
ownership percentage.  
[Insert Table 4.2 here] 
 
We also present our results graphically. In Figure 4.1, we show that the trends for different 
types of ownership are relatively stable over time. However, one can see that the average FAMILY 
ownership is higher for the non-buyout sample than for the buyout sample. In contrast, the average 
CORPORATION and INSTITUTIONAL ownership is lower for the non-buyout sample than for 
the buyout sample. This is in line with our univariate tests. We observe similar trends in Figure 
4.2, where we only present whole company buyouts. Subsequently, in Figure 4.3, we present 
buyouts based on a buildup strategy. The plot suggests that there is only a difference in FAMILY 
ownership that is higher for the non-buyout sample than for the buyout sample. 
 
[Insert Figures 4.1 to 4.3 here] 
 
Table 4.3 presents the correlations between variables. Institutional and corporate ownership 
are positively and significantly correlated with the going private probability. Family ownership is 
negatively and significantly correlated with the going private probability.  
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[Insert Table 4.3 here] 
 
4.5. Multivariate Regressions 
4.5.A. Ownership Structure 
We first examine how different shareholder types affect the probability of going private. 
We focus on three types of shareholders: institution, family, and corporation. We aggregate 
percentages of shares held by all shareholders from each of these three types. For example, 
institutional ownership is the percentage of shares held by all institutional shareholders. In Table 
4.4, we present the results of logit regressions. In Models 1 to 5, the dependent variable is equal to 
1, if the target firm went private after a buyout transaction, and 0 otherwise. In all models, standard 
errors are clustered by industry (Petersen, 2009). We report average marginal effects with p-values 
below.  
[Insert Table 4.4 here] 
 
In Model 1, we present the results for the whole sample of going private transactions. The 
institutional and corporate ownership has a positive and significant effect on the probability of 
going private, consistent with H1, while the family ownership has a negative and significant effect 
on the probability of going private, consistent with H3. All three ownership variables are 
significant at the 1% level. The average marginal effect of the institutional ownership is 0.0032. 
The interpretation is that a one percent increase in intuitional ownership would increase the 
probability of going private by 0.32%. Similarly, one percentage increase in corporation ownership 
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would increase the probability of going private by 0.23%. However, a one percent increase in 
family ownership would decrease that probability by 0.23%. The results are consistent with our 
predictions.  
In Model 2, we present the results for a sample of targets that underwent a whole company 
buyout in one stage. We observe similar results. Corporate ownership has an even stronger effect. 
The probability of going private increases by 0.28% if the corporate ownership increases by 1%. 
In Model 3, we present the results for the targets that went private in a buildup strategy, 
where the acquirer bought the target firm in several stages. In the case of a buildup strategy, only 
family ownership is a strong deterrent against going private buyouts. The probability of going 
private decreases by 0.60% if the family ownership increases by 1%. The other two types of 
ownership show no significant effect. 
In Model 4, we present the results for management buyouts. The corporate ownership has 
a positive and significant effect (at the 10% level) on the probability of a management buyout.  
In Model 5, we present the results for institutional buyouts. We show that corporate and 
institutional ownership is positively associated with an institutional buyout that results in going 
private, while family ownership is negatively associated with the probability of an institutional 
buyout. Again, all three are significant, and the effect magnitudes are very close to what we 
reported for the whole sample. 
Many of the control variables are significant in Table 4.4.  For example, we find that the 
probability of going private is higher for younger firms with lower profitability, higher free cash 
flows, higher leverage, and less fixed assets. We also find that the credit rights index increases 
the probability of whole company and institutional buyouts. These findings are consistent with 
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Cao, Cumming, Qian, and Wang (2015), who show that LBOs are facilitated by stronger creditor 
rights. 
4.5.B. Ownership Block 
Instead of using aggregated ownership percentages, we look at the ownership structure by 
using a dummy variable for each of the three shareholder types. For each type, the dummy equals 
1, if the aggregate ownership is higher than 10% of the total shares. For example, an institution 
block is equal to 1, if the aggregate institution ownership in a firm is higher than 10%. This process 
allows us to compare firms closely held by a particular type of shareholders with those not held 
closely by the same type of shareholders.  
In Table 4.5, we present the results for the effect of block ownership on the going-private 
decision. As seen previously, in Models 1 to 5, the dependent variable is equal to 1, if the firm 
went private as a result of a buyout transaction, and 0 otherwise. In all models, standard errors are 
clustered by industry. We report average marginal effects with p-values below.  
 
[Insert Table 4.5 here] 
 
Results here confirm our previous findings reported in Table 4.4. We show that if a firm is 
closely held by an institution or corporation, the probability of going private is higher, consistent 
with H2. However, if closely held by family, the probability of going private is lower, as expected, 
based on H4. In Model 1, for the whole sample, all three ownership variables are significant. The 
average marginal effect of the institution block is 0.1381, significant at the 1% level, and that of 
the corporation block is 0.1061, significant at the 5% level. The family block has a negative 
132 
 
marginal effect of -0.1361, significant at the 1% level. On average, a firm closely held by 
institution (corporation) shareholders is 13.81% (10.61%) more likely to go private than a firm not 
closely held by institution (corporation) shareholders. A firm closely held by family shareholders 
is 13.61% less likely to go private than a firm not closely by family shareholders. Using both the 
whole firm buyout sample and the institutional buyout sample, we see consistent results.7 
We find that block ownership is not related with the probability of going private in a 
buildup strategy. A family block is still a strong deterrent against going private in a management 
buyout, suggesting that firms with a strong family block have strong control over management.  
4.5.C. Endogeneity of Ownership Structure 
In this subsection, we discuss the potential endogeneity issue when analyzing the 
ownership and the decision to go private. The problem of endogeneity is quite common in 
international studies (Reeb, et al., 2012). However, while it is extremely unlikely that the going 
private decision determines the firm’s ownership structure, the firm might have some unobservable 
characteristics that might determine both ownership structure and the decision to go-private. 
Although it is difficult to completely address the endogeneity problem, we try to mitigate the 
potential bias in the three following ways. First, the carefully chosen sample design already 
corrects for the endogeneity concerns, as we match firms that go private with a similar control 
sample of firms that remain public, based on country, industry, year, and sales (Weir, et al., 2005; 
North, 2001; Klein and Zur, 2009; Davis, et al., 2015). Second, in order to further alleviate these 
concerns, we perform an additional test, where we include country x year and industry x year fixed 
effects to capture omitted variables. Third, we instrument for the ownership structure and perform 
instrumental variable regression.  
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 We test the robustness of our baseline results in Table 4.6. We replicate the results reported 
in Table 4.4 by adding country x year fixed effects in Panel A and by adding industry x year fixed 
effects in Panel B. The results reported in Table 4.6 with country x year and industry x year fixed 
effects support our baseline regressions.  All effects remain similar to baseline findings in Table 
4.4 in magnitude and statistical significance levels. 
 
[Insert Table 4.6 here] 
 
In Table 4.7, we present instrumental variable regressions. In Model 1 to 4, we present the 
results for the whole sample of going private transactions. The instrument for 1) INSTITUTION 
is an indicator variable that is equal to one, if the institution ownership is greater than the median 
largest industry ownership, and zero otherwise; 2) FAMILY is an indicator variable that is equal 
to one, if the family ownership is greater than the median largest industry ownership, and zero 
otherwise; and 3) CORPORATION is an indicator variable that is equal to one, if the corporation 
ownership is greater than the median largest industry ownership, and zero otherwise. The median 
industry ownership is calculated for the initial year of our sample. The median industry ownership 
is correlated with the firm’s ownership structure but is unlikely to affect the buyout probability, 
except through the target’s ownership structure. The first stage of our regressions (untabulated) 
suggests that instruments are valid. In Table 4.7, we present second stage instrumental variables 
regressions. All effects remain similar to previous findings in magnitude and statistical 
significance levels.  
 
[Insert Table 4.7 here] 
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4.5.D. Additional analyses 
Antidirector rights across countries might affect going private transactions in ways 
consistent with potential wealth expropriation of minority shareholders. Delisting may be 
undesirable for minority shareholders for at least two primary reasons. First, minority shareholders 
lose liquidity; and, second, transparency decreases due to fewer disclosure requirements. This 
implies that strong antidirector rights (measured using ADRI6) would deter whole company 
buyouts, while increasing the probability of build-up buyouts, where the acquirer buys the firm in 
several stages and delists it once it has majority votes. We tested this hypothesis (results not 
tabulated) and found some evidence that stronger antidirector rights increase the likelihood of 
going private in the case of a buildup strategy, while the effect on the probability of whole company 
buyouts was negative, albeit statistically insignificant. We also interacted an ADRI_D7 variable 
with an ownership type (results not tabulated) and found that positive relationships between 
corporate ownership and buyout, and between institutional ownership and buildup type buyout, is 
mitigated when ADRI is higher than its mean. The interaction of ADRI with other ownership 
variables and for other types of buyouts did not result in statistically significant results. 
The level of corruption in a country and the degree to which the less powerful members of 
a society accept and expect power to be distributed equally might also impact buyout probabilities. 
Hence, we considered models including the Corruption Perception Index (CPI8) and the Power 
Distance Index (PDI9) as control variables (results not tabulated), and found these variables to not 
have any effect on our main results.  
The weak effect of ADRI, CPI, and PDI may be a result of these variables having very little 
variability over the sample period for any given country. We have also tried the interaction of 
ADRI_D, CPI_D10 and PDI_D11 with the ownership variables (results not tabulated). We find that 
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the positive relationship between institutional ownership [corporate ownership] and buyout 
probability is mitigated when CPI [PDI] is higher than its mean. The other interaction terms did 
not show any significant results. 
We analyzed interactions between ownership types and various proxies for cultural 
dimensions of the target country including Trust12, Individualism13, IDV14, MAS15, UAI16, 
ITOWS17, and IVR18 (results not tabulated). The interaction of corporate ownership and Trust (only 
for Management buyouts); IDV (for all buyouts, whole firm buyouts, and institutional buyouts); 
MAS (for all buyouts, whole firm buyouts, and institutional buyouts); and IVR (for all buyouts 
and institutional buyouts) has a positive coefficient, indicating that these cultural variables increase 
the probability of a buyout when there is corporate ownership. We believe that future research can 
further investigate the effect of cultural dimension. 
Finally, we tried standard industry fixed effects and country fixed effects regressions 
(without including any time fixed effects) and find that our results are unchanged to these 
alternative specifications (results not tabulated). 
4.5.E. Limitations and Extensions 
In this paper, we assess a link between ownership and going private.  The stability in 
different types of ownership in the period from -10 years to -1 year, prior to going private, is 
suggestive that ownership is not endogenous to going private.  Our instrumental variable analyses 
are consistent with this interpretation, and our regression analyses with country, industry, and year 
fixed effects confirm a link between ownership and going private.  However, our sample does not 
offer a natural experiment nor a randomized test to provide further assessment of causality.  Future 
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work as other samples become available in different countries over different time periods might 
shed further light on this issue. 
Also, further work could consider the performance implications of going private 
transactions for shareholders.  Our cross-country legal analyses are suggestive of conflicts of 
interest between majority and minority shareholders.  The extent of wealth expropriation and 
insider dealing, and other possible conflicts of interest, is worthy of further study. 
4.6. Conclusion 
In this paper, we examine the ownership structure before the public to private transaction. 
Based on data from 36 countries spanning 12 years, we find strong and consistent evidence that 
pre-going private ownership is characterized by higher institutional and corporate ownership. All 
these data suggest that buyout transactions are often motivated by reducing overmonitoring, 
agency problems, and improving management efficiency. We also find that family ownership (or 
block) is a strong deterrent against a going private buyout. This supports the predictions that family 
owned firms are run more efficiently19. Management buyouts are more likely when the firm is 
owned by a corporate investor. We also find that going private through a buildup strategy is less 
likely if the firm is owned by family, while management buyouts are more likely when the firm is 
owned by a corporate investor. Overall, the data are consistent with the view that corporate and 
institutional block ownership facilitates going private, while family ownership decreases the 
probability of going private. Overall, the data are consistent with the view that corporate and 
institutional block ownership facilitates going private, while family ownership decreases the 
probability of going private. 
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Furthermore, we highlight the role of creditor rights and legal conditions. We find some 
evidence that stronger creditor rights increase the probability of going private, especially in the 
case of whole company and institutional buyouts, while the legal conditions decrease the 
likelihood of going private for those buyout types. 
Our study has some managerial implications as well. The composition of ownership is one 
of the most important factors for improving a firm’s efficiency. Going private transactions imply, 
for minority shareholders, a lack of liquidity and a lack of transparency. Consequently, some 
dispositions could be better at integrating all shareholders (minority and majority). The study also 
highlights the role of the legal system in protecting shareholders.  
Future research could examine whether the shareholders, particularly the minority 
shareholders, were treated differently depending on the ownership structure. Future research 
could also examine the real operating consequences on firms, including labor and productivity, 
conditional on the pre-going private ownership in different countries around the world. Future 
research could also study the reason why family ownership positively affects the efficiency of 
the going private transaction.  
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Figure 4.1. The dynamics of ownership over time (All Public to private deals) 
This figure presents the dynamics of the average percentage in ownership in the months before the buyout and non-buyout deals. 
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Figure 4.2. The dynamics of ownership over time (Whole firm buyout) 
This figure presents the dynamics of average percentage ownership in the months before the buyout and non-buyout deals. 
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Figure 4.3. The dynamics of ownership over time (Buildup strategy) 
This figure presents the dynamics of average percentage ownership in the months before the buyout and non-buyout deals. 
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Table 4.1. Sample 
The sample contains 778 Public to private transactions from 2002 to 2014 around the world, matched with 
778 control firms based on country, industry, year, and sales. In Column 2, we present a sample composition 
for all Public to private buyouts. In Column 3, we present a sample composition for whole company buyouts. 
In Column 4, we present the firms that went private in buildup strategies. In Columns 5 and 6 ,we present 
firms that went private through institutional buyout and management buyout, respectively. We present sample 
decomposition by year in Panel A, by target firm country in Panel B, and by target firm industry in Panel C. 
Panel A. Composition of sample by year 
Year 
All Public to 
private deals 
Whole firm 
buyout 
Buildup 
strategy 
Management 
buyout 
Institutional 
buyout 
2002 10  6 4 0 10 
2003 80 64 16 34 46 
2004 92 74 18 10 82 
2005 140 126 14 14 126 
2006 202 182 20 14 188 
2007 228 210 18 12 216 
2008 118 106 12 18 100 
2009 86 80 6 14 72 
2010 138 128 10 14 124 
2011 160 142 18 6 154 
2012 114 108 6 12 102 
2013 114 112 2 8 106 
2014 74 72 2 4 70 
Total 1556 1410 146 160 1396 
Panel B. Composition of sample by country 
Country All Public to private deals 
Whole firm 
buyout 
Buildup 
strategy 
Management 
buyout 
Institutional 
buyout 
AU(Australia) 32 (2.06%) 30 (2.13%) 2 (1.37%) 2 (1.25%) 30 (2.15%) 
BE(Belgium) 2 (0.13%) 0 (0%) 2 (1.37%) 0 (0%) 2 (0.14%) 
BG(Bulgaria) 2 (0.13%) 2 (0.14%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 2 (0.14%) 
CA(Canada) 108 (6.94%) 108 (7.66%) 0 (0%) 8 (5%) 100 (7.16%) 
CN(China) 2 (0.13%) 2 (0.14%) 0 (0%) 2 (1.25%) 0 (0%) 
DE(Germany) 34 (2.19%) 18 (1.28%) 16 (10.96%) 0 (0%) 34 (2.44%) 
DK(Denmark) 8 (0.51%) 6 (0.43%) 2 (1.37%) 0 (0%) 8 (0.57%) 
ES(Spain) 8 (0.51%) 6 (0.43%) 2 (1.37%) 0 (0%) 8 (0.57%) 
FI(Finland) 4 (0.26%) 2 (0.14%) 2 (1.37%) 0 (0%) 4 (0.29%) 
FR(France) 74 (4.76%) 30 (2.13%) 44 (30.14%) 10 (6.25%) 64 (4.58%) 
GB(UK) 212 (13.62%) 210 (14.89%) 2 (1.37%) 44 (27.5%) 168 (12.03%) 
GR(Greece) 4 (0.26%) 0 (0%) 4 (2.74%) 0 (0%) 4 (0.29%) 
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HK(HongKong) 2 (0.13%) 2 (0.14%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 2 (0.14%) 
HU(Hungary) 4 (0.26%) 2 (0.14%) 2 (1.37%) 0 (0%) 4 (0.29%) 
IE(Ireland) 4 (0.26%) 4 (0.28%) 0 (0%) 4 (2.5%) 0 (0%) 
IL(Israel) 2 (0.13%) 2 (0.14%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 2 (0.14%) 
IN(India) 2 (0.13%) 0 (0%) 2 (1.37%) 0 (0%) 2 (0.14%) 
IT(Italy) 16 (1.03%) 6 (0.43%) 10 (6.85%) 0 (0%) 16 (1.15%) 
JP(Japan) 92 (5.91%) 86 (6.1%) 6 (4.11%) 42 (26.25%) 50 (3.58%) 
KR(Korea) 2 (0.13%) 2 (0.14%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 2 (0.14%) 
LT(Lithuania) 2 (0.13%) 2 (0.14%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 2 (0.14%) 
MY(Malaysia) 10 (0.64%) 10 (0.71%) 0 (0%) 4 (2.5%) 6 (0.43%) 
NL(Netherlands) 26 (1.67%) 20 (1.42%) 6 (4.11%) 4 (2.5%) 22 (1.58%) 
NO(Norway) 18 (1.16%) 14 (0.99%) 4 (2.74%) 0 (0%) 18 (1.29%) 
NZ(New Zealand) 4 (0.26%) 2 (0.14%) 2 (1.37%) 2 (1.25%) 2 (0.14%) 
PH(Philippines) 2 (0.13%) 0 (0%) 2 (1.37%) 0 (0%) 2 (0.14%) 
PL(Poland) 12 (0.77%) 6 (0.43%) 6 (4.11%) 0 (0%) 12 (0.86%) 
PT(Portugal) 2 (0.13%) 2 (0.14%) 0 (0%) 2 (1.25%) 0 (0%) 
RU(Russia) 2 (0.13%) 0 (0%) 2 (1.37%) 0 (0%) 2 (0.14%) 
SE(Sweden) 18 (1.16%) 16 (1.13%) 2 (1.37%) 0 (0%) 18 (1.29%) 
SG(Singapore) 26 (1.67%) 24 (1.7%) 2 (1.37%) 2 (1.25%) 24 (1.72%) 
US(USA) 808 (51.93%) 784 (55.6%) 24 (16.44%) 34 (21.25%) 774 (55.44%) 
ZA(South Africa) 12 (0.77%) 12 (0.85%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 12 (0.86%) 
Total 1556 (100%) 1410 (100%) 146 (100%) 160 (100%) 1396 (100%) 
Panel C. Composition of sample by industry 
Industry 
All Public to 
private deals 
Whole firm 
buyout 
Buildup 
strategy 
Management 
buyout 
Institutional 
buyout 
Agriculture 2 2 0 0 2 
Construction 18 16 2 2 16 
Finance, Insurance 256 234 22 34 222 
Manufacturing 404 352 52 42 362 
Mining 28 26 2 2 26 
Retail Trade 172 166 6 20 152 
Services 490 448 42 36 454 
Transportation 110 102 8 10 100 
Wholesale Trade 76 64 12 14 62 
Total 1556 1410 146 160 1396 
 
143 
 
Table 4.2. Univariate tests 
 
 Going private Firms Control Sample T-test for the Difference 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Obs Mean Std. Dev. Diff in means t-stat 
Ownership variables         
INSTITUTION 778 19.4568 28.4473 778 11.9972 19.6090 -7.4596 -6.0221 
FAMILY 778 3.4818 11.9795 778 5.3788 16.2718 1.8970 2.618658 
CORPORATION 778 8.2785 23.1485 778 5.0733 16.1034 -3.2052 -3.17043 
INSTITUTION_BLOCK 778 0.4370 0.4963 778 0.3111 0.4632 -0.1260 -5.17513 
FAMILY_BLOCK 778 0.0835 0.2769 778 0.1272 0.3335 0.0437 2.812323 
CORPORATION_BLOCK 778 0.1401 0.3473 778 0.1003 0.3005 -0.0398 -2.41981 
         
Other variables         
AGE 778 24.0180 23.8733 778 26.7686 29.7786 2.7506 2.010198 
ASSETS 778 5.4495 1.6659 778 5.4515 1.9316 0.0021 0.022584 
ROA 778 0.1024 0.1866 778 0.1354 0.4493 0.0330 1.894442 
CASHFLOW 778 -0.0044 0.1925 778 0.0216 0.3896 0.0260 1.66746 
LEVERAGE 778 0.2622 0.3204 778 0.2339 0.4726 -0.0283 -1.38129 
CAPINV 778 0.4938 0.4418 778 0.4340 0.7685 -0.0598 -1.88063 
MB 778 7.7057 37.4491 778 5.8751 34.5855 -1.8306 -1.00165 
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Table 4.3. Correlations 
  Buyout Institution Family Corporation 
Institution 
Block 
Family 
Block 
Corporati
on Block AGE ASSETS ROA 
CASH-
FLOW 
LEVE-
RAGE CAPINV MB 
BUYOUT 1.0000 
             
INSTITUTION 0.1510* 1.0000 
            
FAMILY -0.0663* -0.0681* 1.0000 
           
CORPORATION 0.0802* -0.0957* -0.0185 1.0000 
          
INSTITUTION 
BLOCK 
0.1302* 0.7089* -0.0380 -0.1306* 1.0000 
         
FAMILY BLOCK -0.0712* -0.0561* 0.8087* -0.0154 -0.0101 1.0000 
        
CORPORATION 
BLOCK 
0.0613* -0.0512* 0.0185 0.8119* -0.0856* 0.0276 1.0000 
       
AGE -0.0509* -0.0641* -0.0677* 0.0250 -0.0769* -0.0651* 0.0259 1.0000 
      
ASSETS -0.0006 0.0314 -0.2177* -0.0695* 0.0460 -0.2317* -0.0542* 0.1469* 1.0000 
     
ROA -0.0480 -0.0258 0.1524* -0.0032 -0.0360 0.1195* -0.0060 -0.0616* -0.3510* 1.0000 
    
CASHFLOW -0.0423 -0.0138 0.1414* -0.0132 -0.0152 0.0986* -0.0148 -0.0301 -0.2733* 0.9395* 1.0000 
   
LEVERAGE 0.0350 0.0486 0.1358* 0.0243 0.0052 0.0882* 0.0331 -0.0510* -0.0039 0.5008* 0.4777* 1.0000 
  
CAPINV 0.0477 0.0012 0.0974* 0.0449 -0.0104 0.0522* 0.0502* 0.0417 -0.0685* 0.1131* 0.0489 0.1048* 1.0000 
 
MB 0.0254 -0.0149 0.1156* 0.0261 0.0003 0.0908* 0.0081 -0.0333 -0.1231* 0.1048* 0.0891* 0.0393 0.3163* 1.0000 
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Table 4.4. Ownership structure and going-private decision 
This table presents logit regressions. The dependent variable in each regression is an indicator 
variable equal to one, if the firm goes private, and zero otherwise. The sample includes firms from 
2002 to 2014. In Model 1, we present the results for the whole sample of going-private 
transactions. In Model 2, we present the results for a sample of targets that underwent a buyout 
of the whole company in one stage. In Model 3, we present the results for the targets that were 
acquired in a buildup strategy where the acquirer bought the target firm in several stages. In 
Model 4, we present the results for management buyouts. In Model 5, we present the results for 
institutional buyouts. All models include constant, industry and year fixed effects. Robust errors 
are clustered at industry level. We report the marginal effects with p-value in parentheses. ***, 
**, and * represent 1%, 5%, and 10% significance levels. See Appendix 1 for variable definitions. 
  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 
All Public to 
private deals 
Whole firm 
buyout 
Buildup 
strategy 
Management 
buyout 
Institutional 
buyout 
Ownership      
INSTITUTION 0.0032*** 0.0033*** 0.0033 0.0001 0.0034*** 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.3963) (0.9839) (0.0000) 
FAMILY -0.0023*** -0.0018* -0.0060* -0.0011 -0.0024*** 
 (0.0019) (0.0574) (0.0646) (0.7378) (0.0056) 
CORPORATION 0.0023*** 0.0028*** -0.0011 0.0059** 0.0021*** 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.6385) (0.0113) (0.0001) 
Controls      
AGE -0.0010* -0.0009* -0.0019* -0.0006 -0.0012* 
 (0.0649) (0.0864) (0.0790) (0.6267) (0.0545) 
ASSETS -0.0113* -0.0107 -0.0334 -0.0022 -0.0095 
 (0.0745) (0.1173) (0.2229) (0.9443) (0.1942) 
ROA -0.2970*** -0.2682*** -0.5571 -0.1835 -0.3370*** 
 (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.3857) (0.5634) (0.0045) 
CASHFLOW 0.1420*** 0.1061* 0.4132 0.1133 0.1868*** 
 (0.0000) (0.0667) (0.2993) (0.7922) (0.0004) 
LEVERAGE 0.1011** 0.1054 0.0666 0.0586 0.1009 
 (0.0368) (0.1086) (0.4035) (0.4711) (0.1050) 
CAPINV 0.0487 0.0411 0.1289 0.2558** 0.0555* 
 (0.2027) (0.2245) (0.4918) (0.0286) (0.0770) 
MB 0.0003 0.0003 -0.0022 0.0038*** -0.0002 
 (0.5755) (0.5213) (0.6786) (0.0034) (0.6594) 
GDPCAPITA 0.0079 0.0146 0.0106 0.0682 0.0025 
 (0.5036) (0.5652) (0.7895) (0.2888) (0.8568) 
CREDITOR_INDEX 0.0056 0.0075* 0.0076 0.0053 0.0055 
 (0.1242) (0.0610) (0.6272) (0.6746) (0.2262) 
LEGAL_UK -0.0148* -0.0051 -0.0645** 0.0469 -0.0162* 
 (0.0684) (0.6618) (0.0470) (0.2452) (0.0546)       
N 1556 1410 146 160 1396 
PSEUDO R-SQ 0.0362 0.0379 0.0664 0.0690 0.0395 
LOG LIK. -1039.4481 -940.3442 -94.4810 -103.2515 -929.3679 
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Table 4.5. Block ownership and going-private decision 
This table presents logit regressions. The dependent variable in each regression is an indicator variable 
equal to one, if the firm goes private, and zero otherwise. The sample includes firms from 2002 to 2014. 
In Model 1, we present the results for the whole sample of going-private transactions. In Model 2, we 
present the results for a sample of targets that underwent a buyout of the whole company in one stage. 
In Model 3, we present the results for the targets that were acquired in a buildup strategy where the 
acquirer bought the target firm in several stages. In Model 4, we present the results for management 
buyouts. In Model 5, we present the results for institutional buyouts. All models include constant, 
industry and year fixed effects. Robust errors are clustered at industry level. We report the marginal 
effects with p-value in parentheses. ***, **, and * represent 1%, 5%, and 10% significance levels. See 
Appendix 1 for variable definitions.   
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 
All Public to 
private deals 
Whole firm 
buyout 
Buildup 
strategy 
Management 
buyout 
Institutional 
buyout 
Ownership      
INSTITUTION 
BLOCK 
0.1381*** 
(0.0001) 
0.1355*** 
(0.0001) 
0.2312 
(0.1696) 
0.0260 
(0.7923) 
0.1466*** 
(0.0005)       
FAMILY BLOCK -0.1361*** -0.1256*** -0.2531 -0.1818* -0.1353*** 
 (0.0000) (0.0035) (0.1783) (0.0801) (0.0000) 
CORPORATION 
BLOCK 
0.1061** 
(0.0107) 
0.1301*** 
(0.0011) 
-0.0512 
(0.7921) 
0.2304* 
(0.0512) 
0.0965** 
(0.0484)       
Controls      
AGE -0.0010* -0.0009* -0.0025** -0.0004 -0.0012** 
 (0.0551) (0.0772) (0.0207) (0.7101) (0.0479) 
ASSETS -0.0137** -0.0140** -0.0233 -0.0175 -0.0113* 
 (0.0163) (0.0232) (0.2582) (0.5748) (0.0641) 
ROA -0.2891*** -0.2634*** -0.5521 -0.2638 -0.3181*** 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.4228) (0.4351) (0.0007) 
CASHFLOW 0.1232*** 0.0866 0.4559 0.1392 0.1584*** 
 (0.0000) (0.1548) (0.2676) (0.7768) (0.0001) 
LEVERAGE 0.1148** 0.1233* 0.0324 0.0515 0.1161* 
 (0.0139) (0.0547) (0.7146) (0.4935) (0.0514) 
CAPINV 0.0482 0.0418 0.1457 0.2461* 0.0542* 
 (0.2190) (0.2253) (0.4508) (0.0529) (0.0815) 
MB 0.0002 0.0003 -0.0040 0.0039*** -0.0002 
 (0.5733) (0.4819) (0.3694) (0.0038) (0.6702) 
GDPCAPITA 0.0035 0.0115 -0.0013 0.1027 -0.0042 
 (0.7035) (0.5214) (0.9740) (0.1343) (0.7083) 
CREDITOR_INDEX 0.0066** 0.0076* 0.0090 0.0020 0.0067* 
 (0.0265) (0.0614) (0.4020) (0.8923) (0.0625) 
LEGAL_UK -0.0214* -0.0124 -0.0733 0.0332 -0.0256* 
 (0.0645) (0.3071) (0.1540) (0.2933) (0.0603)       
      
N 1556 1410 146 160 1396 
PSEUDO R-SQ 0.0311 0.0315 0.0703 0.0666 0.0330 
LOG LIK. -1044.9606 -946.5941 -94.0864 -103.5184 -935.7423 
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Table 4.6. Robustness: Country x year and  industry x year fixed effects 
This table presents logit regressions. The dependent variable in each regression is an indicator variable 
equal to one, if the firm goes private, and zero otherwise. The sample includes firms from 2002 to 2014. 
In Model 1, we present the results for the whole sample of going-private transactions. In Model 2, we 
present the results for a sample of targets that underwent a buyout of the whole company in one stage. 
In Model 3, we present the results for the targets that were acquired in a buildup strategy where the 
acquirer bought the target firm in several stages. In Model 4, we present the results for management 
buyouts. In Model 5, we present the results for institutional buyouts. All models include constant, 
controls, industry and year fixed effects. Robust errors are clustered at industry level. We report the 
marginal effects with p-value in parentheses. ***, **, and * represent 1%, 5%, and 10% significance 
levels. See Appendix 1 for variable definitions.   
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
  
All Public to 
private deals 
Whole firm 
buyout 
Buildup 
strategy 
Management 
buyout 
Institutional 
buyout 
Panel A. Country x year fixed effects 
Ownership      
Institution 0.0037*** 0.0038*** 0.0040 -0.0009 0.0039*** 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.5181) (0.7926) (0.0000) 
Family -0.0025*** -0.0019* -0.0090* -0.0015 -0.0026*** 
 (0.0020) (0.0575) (0.0643) (0.6833) (0.0076) 
Corporation 0.0029*** 0.0036*** -0.0017 0.0122* 0.0027*** 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.6102) (0.0551) (0.0000) 
            
N 1556 1410 146 160 1396 
PSEUDO R-SQ 0.0419 0.0438 0.0910 0.1182 0.0455 
LOG LIK. 1033.3853 -934.5384 -91.9922 -97.7920 -923.5916 
Panel B. Industry x year fixed effects 
Ownership      
Institution 0.0034*** 0.0035*** 0.0048 -0.0002 0.0037*** 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.2987) (0.9485) (0.0000) 
Family -0.0025*** -0.0018* -0.0076** -0.0021 -0.0025*** 
 (0.0022) (0.0742) (0.0342) (0.5857) (0.0080) 
Corporation 0.0023*** 0.0029*** -0.0011 0.0090*** 0.0021*** 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.7180) (0.0081) (0.0001) 
            
N 1556 1410 146 160 1396 
PSEUDO R-SQ 0.0382 0.0399 0.0844 0.0874 0.0423 
LOG LIK. 1037.3032 -938.3024 -92.6621 -101.2137 -926.6817 
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Table 4.7. Robustness: Instrumental Variable (IV) estimation 
This table presents instrumental variable regressions. The dependent variable in each regression is an 
indicator variable equal to one, if the firm goes private, and zero otherwise. The sample includes firms 
from 2002 to 2014. In Models 1 to 4,we present the results for the whole sample of going-private 
transactions. The instrument for 1) INSTITUTION is an indicator variable that equals to one, if the 
institution ownership is greater than the median largest industry ownership, and zero otherwise; 2) 
FAMILY is an indicator variable that equals to one, if the family ownership is greater than the median 
largest industry ownership, and zero otherwise; and 3) CORPORATION is an indicator variable that 
equals to one, if the corporation ownership is greater than the median largest industry ownership, and 
zero otherwise. All models include constant, controls, industry, and year fixed effects. Robust errors are 
clustered at industry level. We report the marginal effects with p-value in parentheses. ***, **, and * 
represent 1%, 5%, and 10% significance levels. See Appendix 1 for variable definitions.  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Ownership     
INSTITUTION 0.0030***   0.0030*** 
 (0.0000)   (0.0000) 
FAMILY  -0.0025***  -0.0020** 
  (0.0053)  (0.0458) 
CORPORATION   0.0015** 0.0017*** 
   (0.0291) (0.0061) 
Controls     
AGE -0.0010* -0.0012** -0.0011** -0.0010* 
 (0.0988) (0.0241) (0.0361) (0.0678) 
ASSETS -0.0084 -0.0131*** -0.0080 -0.0108** 
 (0.1534) (0.0069) (0.1584) (0.0257) 
ROA -0.2940*** -0.3329*** -0.3221*** -0.2958*** 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
CASHFLOW 0.1367*** 0.1662*** 0.1540*** 0.1429*** 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
LEVERAGE 0.1024** 0.1210** 0.1105** 0.1031** 
 (0.0412) (0.0110) (0.0154) (0.0328) 
CAPINV 0.0508 0.0529 0.0491 0.0495 
 (0.2844) (0.2159) (0.2681) (0.2279) 
MB 0.0002 0.0003 0.0002 0.0003 
 (0.6258) (0.5223) (0.7101) (0.5566) 
GDPCAPITA -0.0055 -0.0034 0.0060 0.0051 
 (0.3307) (0.4570) (0.3493) (0.6000) 
CREDITOR_INDEX 0.0068** 0.0016 0.0033 0.0056 
 (0.0409) (0.4542) (0.1006) (0.1503) 
LEGAL_UK -0.0252*** -0.0138 -0.0066 -0.0173 
 (0.0076) (0.2409) (0.6241) (0.1386)      
     
N 1556 1556 1556 1556 
PSEUDO R-SQ 0.0207 0.0133 0.0131 0.0250 
LOG LIK. -1056.1931 -1064.2134 -1064.4382 -1051.5761 
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Appendix 4.1. Variables definitions 
Variable Name Definition  
 
Dependent Variable 
 
INSTITUTIONAL BUYOUT 
 
An indicator variable equal to one, if the institution ownership is greater than the 
median largest industry ownership, and zero otherwise; “This is an acquisition 
where a Private Equity firm has taken a 50% stake or more in the Target company, 
or is the parent of the acquirer. The acquisition often takes place through a ‘new 
company’ (newco) or an acquisition vehicle. Often the target company’s 
management will take a small stake. If the buy-out is for less than 100 per cent 
of the target company, the deal is coded as IBO X%. Many deals described in the 
media as MBOs are coded on Zephyr as IBOs due to the fact that the management 
team did NOT take a majority stake in the target. There are very few occasions 
when venture capital may be inserted instead of private equity as the financing 
method. This would only occur when an early-stage company raises development 
capital funding, and the investors achieve a majority stake.” [Zephyr Definition] 
MANAGEMENT BUYOUT An indicator variable equal to one, [????]. “All or some of the existing 
management of the company buys at least 50% of the company from its existing 
owners. A private equity company is often brought in to aid the purchase through 
provision of equity funding. A ‘new company’ (newco) is normally formed by 
the management team specifically to purchase the target. The acquirer company 
would also show ‘MBO Team’ unless the name of the newco is known. If the 
name of the newco has been released, this company would be entered as the 
acquirer. If the Private Equity firm backing the deal takes a majority stake in the 
target, the deal is not defined as an MBO and would be coded as an IBO.” 
WHOLE COMPANY BUYOUT An indicator variable equal to one, if in the public-to-private buyout transaction 
acquirer has taken a 100% stake in the target company, and zero otherwise 
BUILDUP BUYOUT  An indicator variable equal to one, if the public-to-private buyout transaction was 
completed in several stages, and zero otherwise 
  
Ownership  
INSTITUTION The percentage ownership of private equity or bank  
FAMILY The percentage ownership of family  
CORPORATION The percentage ownership of industrial company  
INSTITUTION_BLOCK An indicator variable equal to one, if ownership of private equity or bank is 
greater than 10%, and zero otherwise  
FAMILY_BLOCK An indicator variable equal to one, if ownership of family is greater than 10%, 
and zero otherwise  
CORPORATION_BLOCK An indicator variable equal to one, if percentage ownership of industrial company 
is greater than 10%, and zero otherwise  
 
Controls 
 
AGE The natural logarithm of the company age in years  
ASSETS  The natural logarithm of total assets  
ROA Return on assets  
CASHFLOW Operating income minus capital investment minus change in net working capital 
scaled by total assets  
LEVERAGE The ratio of total debt to total assets  
CAPINV The ratio of fixed assets to total assets  
MB The firm’s market-to-book  
GDPCAPITA Gross national income per capita [World Development Indicators] 
LEGAL_UK 
 
An indicator variable equal to one, if the firm is incorporated in a country of 
English legal origin before going private, and zero otherwise [La Porta et al. 
(1998)] 
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CREDITOR_INDEX 
 
Creditor rights index from La Porta et al. (1998).  A score of one is assigned when 
each of the following rights of secured lenders are defined in laws and 
regulations: First, there are restrictions, such as creditor consent or minimum 
dividends, for a debtor to file for reorganization. Second, secured creditors are 
able to seize their collateral after the reorganization petition is approved, i.e., 
there is no automatic stay or asset freeze. Third, secured creditors are paid first 
out of the proceeds of liquidating a bankrupt firm, as opposed to other creditors 
such as government or workers. Finally, if management does not retain 
administration of its property pending the resolution of the reorganization. The 
index ranges from 0 (weak creditor rights) to 4 (strong creditor rights) and is 
constructed as at January for every year from 1978 to 2003. [La Porta (1998)] 
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Chapter 5 
Concluding Remarks 
This dissertation contributes to our knowledge of the interaction between Finance and Innovation 
and to our understanding of Public to Private transactions, and the effect of these transactions on target 
firms. This dissertation provides insight into the effect of stock market manipulation and public to private 
buyout transactions on both the quantity and quality of innovation. In addition, we gain a deeper 
understanding of how ownership structure plays an important role in public to private buyout 
transactions. 
In the first essay, we study the effect of suspected market manipulation on innovation measures 
such as the number of patents and number of patent citations. We consider two types of suspected 
manipulation cases – End of Day manipulation and Information leakage. We find that firms that have 
experienced End of day manipulation more than once, subsequently produce fewer patents and these 
patents are cited fewer times. This implies a strong negative impact on the innovativeness of these firms. 
On the other hands, firms that have experienced information leakage do not reduce their patents or 
citations, and in certain cases, we find a positive effect of this type of manipulation on innovation.  
In the second essay, we investigate the effect of public to private transaction on the innovation 
activity of target firms. We find that after a public to private buyout, the target firms have fewer number 
of patents as well as fewer number of citations. They also reduce the number of radical patents and lower 
their innovation efficiency. The negative effects on innovation is more pronounced for institutional 
buyouts, and for the post-2006 period.     
In the third essay, we examine how ownership structure has an impact on the public to private 
transactions. We find strong evidence that before going private, target companies are characterized by 
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higher institutional and corporate ownership. Family ownership reduces the likelihood of going private 
transactions. We also find that Management Buyouts are more likely in the case of a corporate ownership. 
In addition, we also find that strong creditor rights are associated with an increased probability of going 
private buyout, while legal conditions decrease the probability of going private. 
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NOTES 
 
1 Not all buyouts are going private transactions, and likewise, not all buyouts or going private transactions involve 
private equity sponsors. In this paper, we use the term ‘buyout’ to refer to public to private buyout transactions only, 
and consider both private-equity and non-private equity sponsored buyouts. 
2 Ben Stein, “On Buyouts, There Ought to Be a Law” The New York Times (September 3, 2006), at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/09/03/business/yourmoney/03every.html?ex=1314936000&en=6679077c5af5c4a6&
ei=5088&partner=rssnyt&emc=rss 
3 “The uneasy crown,” The Economist (February 8, 2007) http://www.economist.com/node/8663441 
4 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Locust_(finance) 
5 For example, in a recent legal dispute involving Protective Products of America (PPA), PPA allegedly did not 
disclose material information about a $300 million contract award and was subsequently delisted and then put into 
bankruptcy.  In bankruptcy, PPA was sold to a new company created by many of the prior managers of PPA.  With 
the help of a PE fund, the new company bought PPA’s assets in bankruptcy for roughly $10 million.  Shortly thereafter, 
the managers of new announced the $300 million contract award. 
6 The Antidirector Rights Index (ADRI) is formed by adding one when: (1) the country allows shareholders to mail 
their proxy vote, (2) shareholders are not required to deposit their shares prior to the General Shareholders’ Meeting, 
(3) cumulative voting or proportional representation of minorities on the board of directors is allowed, (4) an oppressed 
minorities mechanism is in place, (5) the minimum percentage of share capital that entitles a shareholder to call for an 
extraordinary Shareholders’ Meeting is less than or equal to 10 percent the sample median, or (6) when shareholders 
have pre-emptive rights that can only be waived by a shareholders meeting. 
7 ADRI_D is a dummy variable that is equal to one, if the ADRI is higher than the mean of ADRI, and zero otherwise. 
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8 The Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) scores and ranks countries/territories based on how corrupt a country’s 
public sector is perceived to be [Transparency International] 
9 The Power Distance Index (PDI) measures the degree to which the less powerful members of a society accept and 
expect that power is distributed unequally [http://geert-hofstede.com/] 
10 CPI_D is a dummy variable that is equal to one, if the CPI is higher than the mean of CPI, and zero otherwise. 
11 PDI_D is a dummy variable that is equal to one, if the PDI is higher than the mean of PDI, and zero otherwise. 
12 Trust is a dummy variable equal to one, if the trust is higher than the mean, and zero otherwise. Trust is an average 
answer to the following question: “Generally speaking, would you say that (1) “Most people can be trusted.” Or, (2) 
“Most people need to be very careful.” 
13 Individualism is a dummy variable equal to one, if the individualism is higher than the mean, and zero otherwise. 
Individualism is an average answer to the following question: “Incomes should be more equal.” Or, “We need larger 
income differences as incentives for individual effort.” 
14 IDV is a dummy variable equal to one, if the IDV is higher than the mean, and zero otherwise. IDV is the 
Individualism versus Collectivism of the respective target country (see http://geerthofstede.com/national-
culture.html). 
15 MAS is a dummy variable equal to one, if the MAS is higher than the mean, and zero otherwise. MAS is the 
Masculinity versus Femininity of the respective target country (see http://geerthofstede.com/national-culture.html). 
16 UAI is a dummy variable equal to one, if the UAI is higher than the mean, and zero otherwise. UAI is the Uncertainty 
Avoidance Index of the respective country target country (see http://geerthofstede.com/national-culture.html).  
17 ITOWS is a dummy variable equal to one, if the ITOWS is higher than the mean, and zero otherwise. ITOWS is 
Long -Term Orientation versus Short-Term Normative Orientation of the respective target country (see http://geert-
hofstede.com/nationalculture.html). 
18 IVR is a dummy variable equal to one, if the IVR is higher than the mean, and zero otherwise. IVR is the Indulgence 
versus Restraint of the respective target country (see http://geert-hofstede.com/nationalculture.html). 
19 Westhead and Cowling (1997) study the performance between family and non-family unquoted companies in the 
UK. They find that family companies are more interested in non-financial objectives than non-family companies. 
Daily and Dollinger (1992) and Neubauer and Lank (1998) find that family firms have superior performance to non-
family firms. Ganderrio (1999) found that family firms have a higher level of ROE and are financially stronger than 
non-family firms. Anderson and Reeb (2002) show that family ownership is prevalent and substantially more 
profitable and more valuable than non-family ownership. 
20 In untabulated analysis, we checked whether our results are robust to the definition of the block ownership of 5% 
and 20%. The results remain unchanged.  
